{"id":62906,"date":"2026-06-08T07:42:30","date_gmt":"2026-06-08T07:42:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.icip.cat\/?post_type=icip_opinion&#038;p=62906"},"modified":"2026-06-08T07:46:38","modified_gmt":"2026-06-08T07:46:38","slug":"a-dangerous-atomic-normalisation","status":"publish","type":"icip_opinion","link":"https:\/\/www.icip.cat\/en\/opinion\/a-dangerous-atomic-normalisation\/","title":{"rendered":"A Dangerous Atomic Normalisation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine was seized by Russian military forces in March 2022 and has remained a contested military objective ever since. A new and unprecedented situation for which the international community was wholly unprepared. While the destruction of Iraq\u2019s Osirak reactor in 1981 remains the most significant historical attack on a nuclear reactor,<strong> today\u2019s conflicts in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf are drawing nuclear installations into the theatre of war in ways that go beyond anything previously seen<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In Ukraine, in addition to the damage inflicted on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant since its occupation, which has drastically compromised its safety, the NSC-KIPT nuclear research centre in Kharkiv and the KINR centre in Kyiv were also struck in 2022. On the other side, in 2024 <strong>Russia incorporated into its new military doctrine the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks on Russian territory<\/strong>. And, in 2025, a drone strike pierced the protective dome over the Chernobyl plant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>During the twelve-day war with Iran in June 2025, the uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the Isfahan nuclear centre, as well as the Khondab IR-40 heavy water reactor under construction, were all bombed. The full extent of the damage remains unknown, but following the resumption of hostilities in February 2026, these facilities were apparently struck again, as was an area close to the Israeli nuclear centre at Dimona. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr -a Soviet-designed facility staffed by Russian personnel- was targeted on four separate occasions, prompting Russia to warn of unpredictable consequences. Meanwhile, President Trump threatened to destroy key Iranian infrastructure, including power plants, beginning with the largest, understood as a clear reference to the Bushehr plant. The United Arab Emirates also reported a drone strike on last 17 May that damaged secondary equipment at their Barakah nuclear power plant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>A Paradigm Shift<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The involvement of nuclear facilities in armed conflicts is becoming normalised together with public statements about the possibility of limited tactical nuclear weapon use.<\/strong> The latter references are reaching mainstream public discourse in a way that would have been unthinkable until very recently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The last treaty to reduce and limit nuclear weapons between the US and Russia expired last February, and with several countries considering joining the nine existing nuclear powers, some states have developed plans that identify civilian and energy infrastructure as strategic targets in wartime scenarios, with the aim of hampering enemy strategies or ground movements. Those also encompass civilian nuclear facilities, which -if attacked, sabotaged or involved in accidents during large-scale conflicts between rival blocs- could release radioactivity, indiscriminately affecting public health and the environment across several countries. Depending on the type of facility and the scale of the damage sustained, the resulting radioactive releases could force large-scale evacuations, extending the strategic dimension of a conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While there is still great uncertainty about how the current wars will unfold, the trend of treating civilian nuclear infrastructure as a legitimate military target is gaining ground. <strong>This new role for nuclear facilities, transformed into platforms onto which strategic military objectives are projected, represents a paradigm shift<\/strong>, threatening the peaceful use of nuclear energy and posing the serious challenge of strengthening the nuclear security and physical protection of civilian nuclear infrastructures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Possible Corrective Actions<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The implications of this growing entanglement between nuclear facilities and armed conflicts extend far beyond technical considerations.&nbsp; They touch on issues of global concern and expose the absence of a non-aggression treaty covering nuclear installations, as well as the urgent need to adapt and develop the International Atomic Energy Agency&#8217;s (IAEA) specific safety standards for such facilities in the context of armed conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed, the Additional Protocol I of 1977, which expands upon the 1949 Geneva Conventions, does not specifically address military attacks on nuclear facilities, nor does the IAEA&#8217;s 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. <strong>The ratification of a specific global convention or treaty prohibiting aggression against nuclear installations is therefore a matter of urgenc<\/strong>y. The IAEA has already made unsuccessful attempts towards securing such a prohibition at IAEA General Conferences and at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regarding nuclear safety and nuclear security standards, the IAEA established seven safety pillars following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine to assess specific risks in wartime contexts, but it was unable to establish a demilitarised zone around Zaporizhzhia. For that reason, the UN Security Council endorsed the IAEA&#8217;s five guiding principles in 2023, aimed at preventing an accident at the plant. Building on these foundations, the IAEA Safety Standards Committee is working to adapt and apply existing standards, while the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) is pursuing parallel efforts in the same direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet the prospects for ratifying a specific global non-aggression convention or treaty covering nuclear facilities to address that legal vacuum, remain gloomy as long as wars continue and nuclear proliferation is on the rise. In addition, the current disarray of the international legality provides no guarantee that new nuclear safety standards would be effectively enforced. One further support for addressing both challenges could be their incorporation into any ongoing or emerging peace negotiations, allowing bodies such as the IAEA to contribute to the development and verification of a future regulatory framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Alejandro Zurita <\/strong>served as Head of International Nuclear Research Cooperation at the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) from 2008 to 2016.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":62731,"template":"","class_list":["post-62906","icip_opinion","type-icip_opinion","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v25.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A Dangerous Atomic Normalisation - ICIP<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The involvement of nuclear facilities in armed conflicts is becoming normalised together with public statements about the possibility of limited tactical nuclear weapon use.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.icip.cat\/en\/opinion\/a-dangerous-atomic-normalisation\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A Dangerous Atomic Normalisation - 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