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BUILDING A REGIONAL FRAMEWORK IN CENTRAL ASIA BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

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M. Campins Eritja, & A. Mañé Estrada
(Ed. & Coord.)

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A

INTRODUCTORY ISSUES

This text presents a summary of the results of a project carried out by a multidisciplinary team comprising lecturers in International Law and Economic Policy from three universities in Catalonia (Spain): the University of Barcelona (UB), the Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV) and the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC). The project, entitled “Cooperation in Central Asia and threats to international security arising from environmental and energy challenges” (RICIP2010) was led by Dr. Mar Campins and funded by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP). The text also draws on the results of the research project CSO2011-29438-C05-02 led by Dr Miguel H. Larramendi of the University of Castile-La Mancha, “New spaces, actors and instruments in Spain’s foreign relations with the Arab and Muslim world”, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education.

As it progressed, this project evolved from an analysis of a specific case study – issues to do with the environment, energy and water in Central Asia – towards the more general problem of understanding the region composed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (commonly known as the five Stans) in the context of post-modern global governance.

From the perspective of international law, this kind of governance has two main elements: the concept of shared natural resource inside a global ecosystem, and its place under the national jurisdictions of different States. In economic terms, this governance reflects the balance of power between global economic stakeholders and the supposed national interest, which States – or more broadly, the Public Sector – must oversee.

From both perspectives, the main challenge is to identify and define the possible legal and institutional structures and the spaces of cooperation or conflict in the region, bearing in mind the fact that the Yalta Order, with its balance between the two superpowers, has gone for ever. Conceptually we lack the structures to analyse the new geo-political scenario that emerged after the disintegration of

the USSR, though the signs are there will be an eastward shift in power in the international arena.

This is the background to the remarkable transformation of the five former Central Asian Soviet republics into new independent nation-states, through no particular will of their own. The republics are now subject to international law in the context of the break-up of the bipolar world and the development of a new global order. Leaving aside the issues arising from the Soviet legacy, the five Stans faced the arduous task of achieving what many countries had managed in the nineteenth century – the task of establishing themselves as national states, and at the same time finding their place in the global community of the twenty-first century, in which many of the “traditional” state and regional structures are in profound crisis.

This highly unusual historical background makes it particularly difficult to analyse the reality of Central Asia or to propose specific policies. We lack a conceptual framework for the study of problems which may seem very similar to those facing other countries, but which in this case appear in a totally new scenario. In fact, we realize that the assumptions about the region and the structure of governance in Central Asia that formed the basis of our study, while not mistaken, were certainly inaccurate. Perhaps this is the most important message of this summary.

Basically, we began our study assuming that the conflict over water and energy existing between the countries of Central Asia could be resolved via regional-international agreements that would foster exchanges between the countries rich in water and the countries rich in fossil fuels. Implicit in this hypothesis were four additional assumptions.

The first was that, in the process of national construction and the search for political legitimation, the region’s governments would prioritize policies designed to satisfy the basic needs of their citizens – for example, energy and water – over their own interests.

The second was the belief that these governments would feel included in the regional, international and multilateral bodies that make up today’s world order and would therefore accept their legality. Though, looking back, these bodies might be seen as if they were the structures of a world order in extinction

The third was the assumption that the five Stans, due to their shared past inside the Soviet Union and the problems in the transition process that were common

to them all, would feel part of the same “unit”; this identification would favour the regional management of the natural resources and the reconstruction of part of their infrastructure network.

The fourth was the conjecture that in this globalized world, national governments possessing great natural wealth would have the capacity to manage “their” resources using their own criteria.

Seen a posteriori, the summary we present here suggests that all these four assumptions are either to some extent flawed or need to be qualified

The first section in part B (*Political, social and international panorama in Central Asian region*) analyses the first assumption, suggesting that in these fledgling countries the attempts to strengthen the respective national identities, the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for regional leadership and mutual distrust are obstacles to regional and international cooperation. The conclusion is that although the region -leaving aside Afghanistan, perceived in part as an external threat- faces problems that can only be adequately resolved through cooperation, such as the dispute over water, the countries have opted for a policy of divergence and resistance to multilateral management. Hence, somehow, this first section outlines the difficulties of apprehending this region. As its author rightly notes, some of this difficulties are due to the fact that in many cases the international community sees Central Asia more as a source of natural resources than as a region where the establishment of democracy and the rule of law should be the priorities.

This introduction is complemented by the following section (*Participation of the Central Asian States in international organizations*) which aims to establish whether there is a common pattern underlying the integration of the five countries inside the international system. The author’s thorough-going review of the affiliations and behaviour of each of the States in international organizations shows that their role in the prevailing international order is minimal, especially in the case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. So in a way this section tests our second assumption, that is, that the States would identify with the international order or not. Beyond that, this section also qualifies to a certain extent the findings of the first section: although the States do not appear to form a “cohesive region”, their interventions at the UN General Assembly show that they are all aware they face common problems. This suggests that in the future there is room for the construction of a regional institutional architecture defined with functional criteria.

In a way, the two following sections (*A sub-regional framework of cooperation for transboundary water management and the role of EU into the region* and *A sub-regional framework of cooperation to combat desertification through the Central Asian countries' initiative on land management*) also highlight this point. The first one explicitly examines the water conflict in the region and stresses the consequences of the Aral Sea disaster. This section confirms that our third assumption is not necessarily borne out. In the case discussed, the countries are reluctant to accept a regional management of their resources, and are unwilling to rebuild the infrastructures and to apply regional rather than national criteria; the lack of leadership and political support and the fact that water management is considered a domestic issue reveal a situation which is hardly compatible with the model of equitable and reasonable use of water resources widely promoted by international agreements. These problems are compounded by the low level of effective internationalization and multilateralization in the region, exemplified by the EU Strategy for Central Asia which lacks genuine implementation. Furthermore it seems that the EU Strategy for Central Asia lacks genuine implementation, as well as, the EU acted bilaterally and not regionally

The last section in part B reiterates these points and defines the region of Central Asia as a case of post-modern global governance, stressing the importance of a subregional focus in the terms proposed by Agenda 21 of the United Nations. In this regard, the conclusion of this section is optimistic, because the account of the final failure of the CALCIM highlights three crucial points: a) that, in spite of the current conflict, water is objectively a common ground for cooperation, b) that the low level of regional consciousness is related to the low perception that the rest of Asia has of the five Stans as a subregion, and c) that external action can be effective and influential if it is clear, specific, and accompanied by adequate means.

Finally, focusing more on economic aspects, part C focuses on our last assumption – the possibility of a regional approach to the management of the region's natural resources. The analysis is based on three case studies: petroleum and uranium in Kazakhstan and gas in Turkmenistan, and has a dual purpose. The first is to propose the Global Commodity Chains (GCC) methodology as an instrument of analysis of energy relations. The second is to establish a structure of governance for the energy resources of Central Asia, in order to determine which energy stakeholders – that is, companies of different kinds – will have the capacity to decide how regional energy resources are managed. The main

conclusion is that the regional stakeholders would not be able to manage their natural resources by applying their own criteria.

This conclusion rejects the possibility that in a context like the post-modern global governance of the region's natural resources there can be a straightforward exchange of water for energy. However, we also acknowledge that due to the methodological difficulties we have faced during the study, this conclusion might be qualified if our hypotheses had been framed in a "new" conceptualization of the region of Central Asia and its structure of governance. Probably, a more accurate definition would have led to more optimistic conclusions, because what this project has shown us is that we need to look at the unexpected emergence of Central Asia on the world stage in the twenty-first century from a new viewpoint.

B

ELEMENTS FOR A NEW REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN CENTRAL ASIA

Section I: Introduction

The purpose of this Part is to discuss and to provide insights, from an international legal perspective, on different aspects related to the role played by Central Asian republics into the international arena. The *point de départ* is the debate about national identity of the five “states”, their future development and the consistence of the regional approach concerning Central Asia. Therefore, the first section describes the panorama of the political regimes and the socioeconomic context of the Central Asia States.

The aim of the other three sections is to analyze how those States interact in the international arena through the completion of three case studies. That way, the second section addresses the process via which these States became members of international organizations, and it tries to see if there are any common trends underlying their integration in this international system.

As far as the region is a good example of an arid and sub-arid region, and knowing that Central Asian countries have not succeed to establish a common ground for substantial collaboration hence giving rise to potential conflict in the region¹, the other two case studies focus on the efforts of cooperation undertaken in order to promote patterns of sustainable water and land management. Therefore, the third section is devoted to the study of how one of these international organizations, the European Union (EU), approaches its relations with those States. It looks at the externally EU induced regional cooperation in the specific

1 Mar Campins, “Los retos de la cooperación regional en Asia Central: más sombras que luces en la gestión de los recursos hídricos compartidos”, *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. 1 (19), 2010; Iskandar Abdullayev, Herath Manthritilake and Jusipbek Kazbekov, “Water and Geopolitics in Central Asia”, in Murat Arsel and Max Spoor (eds.), *Water, Environmental Security and Sustainable Rural Development: Conflict and Cooperation in Central Eurasia* (Routledge ISS Studies in Rural Livelihoods, 2010), p. 125.

field of cross-border problems of water management in the region of Central Asia, taking into account the special linkage between water-supply/energy-supply infrastructure and water control. The fourth section focuses on how an incipient framework of (sub) regional cooperation has been established in order to foster sustainable land management in the framework the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. Finally some remarks are given to conclude.

Section II.

Political, social and international panorama in Central Asian region

a. The political regimes of the Central Asian States

The five independent republics that make up Central Asia² cover a surface area of four million square kilometers and have a total population of 55 million inhabitants. Kazakhstan is the largest of the States, and in fact is larger than the four other republics combined; Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the most densely populated, with approximately half of the region's population living in the latter country. Most of the Central Asian population speaks languages deriving from the Turkic family, with the exception of Tajik, which is Persian in origin. As regards geography, the Central Asian region is made up mainly of arid steppe land and deserts, crossed by the two great rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya.³ Created by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the five republics share a great many common features that allow a general, joint analysis, although obviously with plenty of qualifications, as we shall see throughout this paper.

When describing the set of States that make up this region it is customary to begin by stressing their extremely short history, dating as they do from the break-up of the Soviet Empire in late 1991. The reality is rather more complex, as they are not just States that recently gained independence, but in fact they had never

2 In this study we focus on the new Central Asian states that emerged after the dissolution of the USSR. Regions such as Xingjian in China and countries like Afghanistan and Mongolia can also be regarded as part of Central Asia but we will not consider them here.

3 Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, "Du Turkmenistan au Sin-Kiang: axes énergétiques et reconfigurations géopolitiques de l'ancien Turkestan", *Institut Thomas More*, 5 January 2010, p. 3.

previously existed as sovereign States, or as minimally autonomous entities. Nor – and perhaps more significantly – had they been minimally identifiable cultural units in the areas they cover today, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan. In fact, in the pre-Soviet era, the identity of the inhabitants of the region could be “considered to varying degrees as ‘Muslims’, ‘Turks’ or even ‘Persians’ or ‘Russians’, although these categories did not necessarily suppose a greater link of identification and social cohesion than local, tribal, clan, dialectal or religious ascriptions.”⁴ Soviet policy in the region consisted in “breaking down the Turk-Muslim ensemble into distinct administrative units” so as to “avoid any kind of unifying project in Central Asia.”⁵ Thus, to a certain extent, in September 1991 the Central Asian republics found themselves declaring their independence as sovereign States almost against their will, and facing the urgent challenge of constituting a political regime and constructing a national identity. The fact that these countries now have strongly authoritarian regimes is due to a large extent to the manner of their birth. During the Soviet era, the main feature of national construction was “the emergence of a new political elite under the protection of the Communist Party and the new authorities”, a ruling class that “brought together and aimed to perpetuate a government based on identities created in practice in the laboratories of Soviet political engineering” whose leaders “would be the mainstay of this new ‘national’ consciousness.”⁶ During the transition these elites remained in power in four of the five Central Asian republics (the sole exception being Tajikistan), just as they did in many of the other ex-Soviet republics in that initial period. More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that very little has changed since then. The political regimes that emerged from this transition are unanimously considered to be ‘among the most closed of all political regimes.’ Repression and human rights violations have been reported in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan⁷ while Kyrgyzstan is the only country that has made any genuine attempt at democratic transition in recent times. Proof of this is that twenty

4 Francesc Serra, “El proceso de construcción nacional en Asia Central y la influencia regional de Rusia”, in Stelios Stavridis and Cesar de Prado (coord.), *Panorámica de actores y factores en Asia Central*, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Universidad de Zaragoza, 2010, p. 45.

5 Nora Sainz, “Asia Central en un mundo en cambio: de región periférica a área generadora y de aplicación de políticas. Actores, política y seguridad”, *Revista Cidob d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 70-71, October 2005, pp. 116-117.

6 Serra (2010), p. 47.

7 Rubén Ruiz, “Los regímenes neopatrimonialistas y el clan en Asia Central, 1991-2010: un análisis conceptual”, in Stelios Stavridis and Cesar de Prado (coord.), *Panorámica de actores y factores en Asia Central*, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Universidad de Zaragoza, 2010, p. 15.

years after the disappearance of the USSR three of these countries still have the same president;⁸ in a fourth, the president from the Soviet era died and had to be replaced via a completely obscure and undemocratic process;⁹ and as we said, only in Kyrgyzstan have there been two changes of government, which were both the result of popular uprisings outside the framework of the constitution.

Nevertheless, the authoritarian character of the political regimes of Central Asia has not been able to reduce the tensions, rivalries and power struggles in these countries. To a large extent this is due to the competition between regional networks and “clans” which seek to acquire power and wealth and which recognize the presidency of the republic as the sole arbiter. These are not usually tribal or ethnic clans in the traditional sense, but “relations and contacts of interest between individuals with access to economic and political resources (...) even though these individuals (...) may of course be from the same region.”¹⁰ To a large extent this is an updating of the old Soviet *nomenklatura*, expanded to include “a new elite of businessmen and technocrats who have access to the management of resources.”¹¹

All the authors concur that the impact of organized crime and corruption are two of the greatest scourges in the region, with an immensely negative effect both politically and socio-economically. Central Asia is a transit and distribution zone for opium and heroin from Afghanistan,¹² and there is also some drug production in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Along with the drug traffic, arms and people smuggling are the source of the proliferation of mafias, which in turn creates rampant corruption at all levels of national government.¹³ Linked or

8 Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan; Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan; and Emomali Rahmon in Tajikistan. Rahmon rose to the presidency in Tajikistan in November 1992, as a consequence first of the fall of the last General Secretary of the Soviet era in 1991 (Mahkamov) due to his support for the coup against Gorbachov, and after a year of political convulsions with three interim presidents and the outbreak of the Tajik Civil War, which was to continue intermittently until 1997.

9 Separmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan; followed on his death in 2006 by Berdymukhammedov.

10 Nicolás de Pedro, “El consenso Nazarbayev y sus límites. Kazajstán: ¿un camino irreversible hacia la democracia?“, *Notes internacionales CIBOB*, No. 31, May 2011, p. 22.

11 Ibid.

12 Afghanistan is the world’s leading producer of heroin. This production has a disastrous impact throughout the region. Niklas Swanström, “Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Central Asia: Connecting the New and the Old”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (2), p. 44.

13 Sainz (2005), p. 124.

not to organized crime, the corruption of the leading elites constitutes without any doubt the defining political feature of the regimes in the region, and has undeniable repercussions for their socioeconomic solvency. Corruption also hits the attempts to introduce social reform. It is a strong deterrent to international stakeholders considering the possibility of funding development projects¹⁴ and “reduces business opportunities”.

Other reasons of worry are the situation of minorities and of Islamism. They tend to be exaggerated from the outside. Truth, the national identity in the countries of Central Asia has been forged on the basis of “strengthening the position of the ethnic group expressed in the name of the country (to the exclusion of the minorities) and the rejection of the language of the ‘colonizer’ (in the form of policies of de-Russification).”¹⁵ The fighting between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 1990 and then twenty years later in June 2010 exemplifies the risk. The Tajik civil war also had an interethnic component, although ethnicity was by no means the only or even the key issue.¹⁶ However, it should be borne in mind that these conflicts have been the exceptional rather than the rule over these twenty years, and the political regimes of Central Asia deserve credit for having avoided greater confrontation. As for political Islam, although there has been a certain penetration of foreign religious groups, some more radical than others, it is agreed that any emergence of an extremist and violent Islamism would be due to the repression and lack of democracy in the Central Asian States and is alien to the version of Islam practiced in the region.¹⁷ In spite of certain fears,¹⁸ “the

14 The cases of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are quoted in International Crisis Group, *Central Asia: Decay and Decline*, Asia Report No. 201, 3 February 2011, p. 4.

15 See Sainz (2005), p. 122

16 For an analysis of the conflict, “Tajikistan Civil War 1992-1994” in *Wars of the World*, www.onwar.com (accessed in March 2012).

17 Alberto Priego, “Islam, Islam Político y Radicalismo en Asia Central” in Stelios Stavridis and Cesar de Prado (coord.), *Panorámica de actores y factores en Asia Central*, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Universidad de Zaragoza, 2010, p. 39.

18 Niklas Swanström, “Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Central Asia: Connecting the New and the Old”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2010), p. 47: “Fundamentalism has increasingly become a serious threat to all states in the region”, although this claim is only valid because he includes Afghanistan in his analysis. In any case, the same author recognizes that “much of the problem lies in the growing unemployment; weak government sponsored health care, social welfare at large, as well as a lack of belief in the future”.

capacity “of extremist Islam” to destabilize the Central Asian States has proved weak to date.”¹⁹

b. The socio-economic framework

The greatest strength of these five countries lies in their mineral and energy resources. In fact, the region has often been described as a new El Dorado because of its natural wealth, even if on occasion its potential has been exaggerated.²⁰ The only sector that can compete with these resources is agriculture, in particular cotton. The region’s natural wealth and agriculture allowed these republics to recover from a first decade after independence that had been disastrous in macroeconomic terms.²¹ Growth rates are currently near two figures.²² But these growth rates have not been accompanied by an increase in welfare among the populations – quite the contrary. According to the last report by the United Nations Programme for Development (UNPD), the countries all fared poorly in the human development ranking; Kazakhstan did best, in 66th place, and Tajikistan worst, in 112th (with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan not far above Tajikistan). All the countries had fallen slightly over the previous five years and had recorded negligible increases in their human development rates in absolute terms in the same period.²³ Interestingly, however, their human development rate is notably higher than their per capital GDP would suggest because of the good performance of the life expectancy and education indicators, which of course are linked to the Soviet past:²⁴ an inheritance which is gradually disappearing. Experts concur that “slowly but surely, the material and human infrastructure of Central Asia is disappearing: the roads, power plants, hospitals and schools, along with the last generation of specialists, who were in charge of their functioning and who

19 Ruiz (2010), p. 11.

20 Sainz (2005), p. 123

21 According to De la Cámara, after the dissolution of the USSR, “Central Asia took at least five years to return to growth (achieving this between 1996 and 1999) and more than a decade to surpass the levels of production” of the Soviet era. Carmen de la Cámara, “Seguridad económica en el espacio post-soviético de Asia Central”, *Real Instituto Elcano*, ARI No. 84, 2009, p. 2

22 Aurèlia Mañé and Carmen de la Cámara, “Asia Central: una región en transición hacia la pobreza energética”, *ICE. Revista de Economía*, No. 857, November-December 2010, p. 49.

23 Chart “Human Development Index Trends, 1980–2010”, *Human Development Report* (2010), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/es/> (accessed in March 2012). The exception is Tajikistan, whose human development index has fallen by a tenth of a point in the last five-year period.

24 De la Cámara (2009), p. 2

were trained by the Soviets.”²⁵ This diagnosis can be applied practically across the board to the five countries in two areas that are particularly sensitive from the social point of view: health and education. The panorama described by the International Crisis Group in the areas of health and education could hardly be more bleak. With regard to health, the main problem is human resources: due to low salaries, the ageing of doctors and health staff, and the inadequate structures for training new professionals to replace them, the countries in the region are suffering a progressive decline in qualified health care. In the education sector, the current situation of human resources is fairly similar: low salaries and low social and professional prestige for teachers, many of whom are about to retire with no generation of new staff ready to replace them. Schools are overflowing, most of the pupils have no course books, and the syllabus is obsolete.²⁶

c. International relations

We shall finish this general scope of the region with a short reference to international affairs. If anything has characterized the external relations of the Central Asian States in recent years it is that, facing clearly common problems that can only be resolved through cooperation and agreement, they have opted for a policy of divergence and steadfast resistance to any multilateral management.²⁷ This is clear in the relations of individual States with the others inside the region and is also manifested, to varying degrees, in their relations with other States and international stakeholders, as this paper will try to make evident. The common past of the five Central Asian republics, far from aiding the situation, has created “serious obstacles for the development of (common) structures of international cooperation”. First, “to reaffirm their independence, the new States tend to prioritize those elements of their identity that distinguish them from the rest.”²⁸ To this, in the second place, we should add a certain rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (the region’s largest and most populated countries respectively) for leadership of the area, and the natural competitiveness of independent States in defence of their national interests. But this regional dissension has also an

25 Paul Quinn-Judge and Gabriel Keseberg, “Asia Central, el próximo domino”, *Foreign Policy en español*, April 2011, p. 1-3.

26 International Crisis Group (2011), p. 17.

27 Sainz (2005), p. 126.

28 Laura Huici, “Marco institucional regional y gobernanza”, *ICE. Revista de Economía*, No. 857, November-December 2010, p. 98.

outwards dimension. A shallow analysis of the foreign policy priorities of the five republics highlights the same phenomenon and the difficulty of speaking of the region as a geopolitical unit. While the great World powers look towards the region, the countries of the region are also looking outwards, but they are not looking in the same direction, or with the same intensity.

Section III.

Participation of Central Asian States in international organizations

a. Participation in global international organizations

The participation of the five Central Asian republics in the United Nations (UN) system is quite broad-ranging, but it is not complete. Not all the republics joined at the same time, nor did they all join the same organizations. Some Specialized Agencies (SA) have not aroused the interest of any of these States; in other SAs, some but not all of the republics are members. A State may choose not to join a particular organization because of its own political priorities or because of its inability to participate effectively: for instance, among international financial institutions, Turkmenistan is not a member of the International Development Association (IDA), and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not members of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Alternatively, the decision to join may be based on the characteristics of the organization in question: in the case of the **International Maritime Organization (IMO)**, for instance, only the two countries that have direct access to the sea (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are members²⁹.

Outside the UN system, some of these States are members of other global international organizations with specific powers such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Organization for Migrations (IOM)³⁰.

Looking at the dates at which the five States became members of these organizations, we can identify three stages of accession. The first stage was immediately after independence, in 1992 – 1993; during this period the States joined the UN,

29 Turkmenistan joined on 24 August 1993 and Kazakhstan on 11 April 1994.

30 These Organizations are linked with the UN by collaboration agreements but cannot be considered as SA.

international financial institutions, and some SAs involved in social, humanitarian and cultural cooperation. In the second stage, between 1993 and 1997 the States joined most of the SAs, fundamentally those involved in communications and economic cooperation. In the third stage, from 1997 until the present, the States completed the process of joining the SAs, and began to seek membership of global organizations outside the UN system.

i) Accession to membership of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies

The five Central Asian republics have been full members of the UN since their admission at the session of the General Assembly on 2 March 1992³¹. Kazakhstan, the last of these States to achieve independence, was the first to obtain the support of the Security Council, on 23 January 1992³². A few days later, on 29 January, the Security Council declared itself in favor of the admission of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan³³. Turkmenistan's application was approved by the Council on 7 February 1992³⁴. Although in all cases the President of the Security Council congratulated the new States on their forthcoming membership, he was particularly effusive in relation to Kazakhstan, describing the country's admission as a "historic occasion" which would "help to consolidate the positive developments that the world has witnessed in the past few months"³⁵.

UN membership makes admission to the SAs much easier. Nevertheless, as the SAs are international organizations outside the remit of the UN, admission is not automatic; States must apply for membership and must comply with the procedure stipulated by each organization.

31 Resolutions of the General Assembly 46/224 on the admission of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a Member of the United Nations, 46/225 on the admission of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan as a Member of the United Nations, 46/226 on the admission of the Republic of Uzbekistan as a Member of the United Nations, 46/228 on the admission of the Republic of Tajikistan as a Member of the United Nations, 46/229 on the admission of the Republic of Turkmenistan as a Member of the United Nations. As noted in the article 4.2 of the Charter of San Francisco the admission of new members of "the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council".

32 Resolution of the Security Council 732(1992), 23 January.

33 Resolutions of the Security Council 736(1992), 737(1992) and 738(1992), 29 January, respectively.

34 Resolution of the Security Council 741(1992), 4 February.

35 Resolution of the Security Council 732(1992), 23 January.

Naturally enough, given their severe economic difficulties immediately after independence, the initial priority of the five Central Asian republics was to join the international financial institutions in the UN system. Table 1 shows the dates of their admission to these organizations. Most obtained membership between 1992 and 1993. The first State to join a financial institution was Kyrgyzstan, which became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 8 May 1992. During the second half of 1992, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were also admitted. Tajikistan was the last to join, in April 1993. As IMF members, the States could join the institutions belonging to the World Bank group³⁶: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Fund Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

The five States joined the IBRD between July 1992 and June 1993. Kazakhstan took the lead, followed by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (the last two joining the IBRD and the IMF on the same day). Tajikistan was once again the last State to join, less than two months after it had joined the IMF. The five republics are also members of the IFC and MIGA. On this occasion, the first State to join the IFC was Tajikistan, in late 1992, followed by Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the course of 1993. Turkmenistan did not accede until nearly four years later, on 29 May 1997. Tajikistan was again the last of the five Central Asian republics to join the MIGA, only becoming a member on 2 December 2000. Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been members of this organization since late 1993; Kazakhstan joined a year earlier, on 12 August 1992.

Finally, not all the republics are members of the IDA or the ICSID. Turkmenistan is the only one that is not a member of the IDA, and Tajikistan did not join until 1996. Neither Tajikistan nor Kyrgyzstan is a member of the ICSID. Turkmenistan was the first to join the ICSID in 1992, followed by Uzbekistan almost three years later, in August 1995; Kazakhstan did not join until 21 October 2000.

36 This is established in Section 1 b) of the Constitutive Agreement of the World Bank.

Table 1: Accession to International Financial Institutions

	IMF	IBRD	IDA	IFC	MIGA	ICSID
Kazakhstan	15.07.92	23.07.92	23.07.92	30.09.93	12.08.92	21.10.00
Kyrgyzstan	08.05.92	18.09.92	24.09.92	11.02.93	21.09.93	No
Tajikistan	27.04.93	04.06.93	04.06.96	02.12.92	09.12.02	No
Turkmenistan	22.09.92	22.09.92	No	29.05.97	01.10.93	26.10.92
Uzbekistan	21.09.92	21.09.92	24.09.92	30.09.93	04.11.93	25.08.95

Coinciding with their accession to these international financial institutions, between 1992 and 1993 the States also joined other organizations in the UN system such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). All the republics joined the WHO in 1992, in quick succession. Kyrgyzstan was the first to join the WHO and the ILO, and Kazakhstan the first to join UNESCO and the ICAO.

Table 2: The first wave of accessions to UN agencies (1992-1993)

	ILO	WHO	UNESCO	ICAO
Kazakhstan	31.05.93	19.08.92	22.05.92	20.09.92
Kyrgyzstan	31.03.92	29.04.92	02.06.92	27.03.93
Tajikistan	26.11.93	04.05.92	06.04.93	31.10.93
Turkmenistan	24.09.93	02.07.92	17.08.93	14.04.93
Uzbekistan	13.07.92	22.05.92	26.10.93	12.11.92

The second ‘wave’ in the process of accession to the organizations in the system dates from the period between 1993 and 1997 (with one or two exceptions). During this period the republics joined the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Global Postal Union (UPU), the World Tourism Organization, the United Nations for Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Table 3: The second wave of accessions to UN agencies (1993-1997)

	WMO	ITU	UPU	UNWTO	UNIDO	WIPO*	FAO
Kazakhstan	05.05.93	23.02.93	27.08.92	08.10.93	03.06.97	23.12.91	07.11.97
Kyrgyzstan	20.07.94	02.01.94	26.01.93	08.10.93	08.04.93	23.12.91	08.11.93
Tajikistan	10.08.93	28.04.94	09.06.94	22.11.07	09.06.93	23.12.91	10.10.95
Turkmenistan	04.12.92	07.05.93	16.01.93	08.10.93	16.02.95	23.12.91	10.10.95
Uzbekistan	23.12.92	10.07.92	24.02.94	08.10.93	26.04.94	23.12.91	02.11.01

* On the basis of the official date of accession of the republics, this institution could be included in the previous table. In fact, however, the WIPO considered the States as members since their dates of independence, with the addition of a later, explicit declaration that the constitutive treaty should continue to apply. The dates of this declaration in the respective republics were: Kazakhstan – 16 February 1993; Kyrgyzstan – 14 February 1994; Tajikistan – 14 February 1994; Turkmenistan – 1 March 1995; Uzbekistan – 5 May 1993

During this second stage, we should also mention the accession of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Non-aligned Movement on 1 September 1993 and 18 October 1995 respectively. All five republics also joined the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the **International Telecommunications Satellite Organization** (ITSO), both organizations outside the UN umbrella. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became members of the WCO in June and July 1992, Turkmenistan did so a year later, in May 1993 and Tajikistan in July 1997. Kyrgyzstan did not become a member until February 2000. On the contrary, Kyrgyzstan was the first to accede to the ITSO in May 1994, followed by Kazakhstan in August 1994, Tajikistan in February 1996 and Uzbekistan in May 1997. Turkmenistan is not member of the ITSO yet.

Since 1997, the republics have progressively joined other global organizations, both inside the UN system (the few that remained) and outside. As in Table 3, some of the accessions date from before 1997 – for instance, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994³⁷ – but most correspond to this third period.

37 The five republics are also signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The first to sign was Uzbekistan on 7 May 1992, followed, in 1994, by Tajikistan on 17 January, Kazakhstan on 14 February, Kyrgyzstan on 5 July and Turkmenistan on 29 September.

Table 4: Accessions to global international organizations since 1997

	IAEA	OPNW	OPCW	IOM	IFAD	WTO
Kazakhstan	14.02.94	22.04.00	22.04.00	02.12.02	25.09.98	29.01.96*
Kyrgyzstan	10.09.03	29.10.10	29.10.03	28.11.00	10.09.93	20.12.98
Tajikistan	10.09.01	29.04.97	29.04.97	29.11.94	No	29.05.01*
Turkmenistan	No	29.04.97	29.04.97	Observer	No	No
Uzbekistan	26.01.94	29.04.97	29.04.97	No	29.02.11	08.12.94*

* Dates on which these States applied to join the WTO.

Perhaps the most significant feature of this ‘third stage’ is the republics’ accession to international organizations of arms control like the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPNW) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In this period, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also joined the International Organization for Migrations (IOM). Tajikistan had already been a member of this organization since 1994. Uzbekistan, although it has benefited from and cooperated with some of the IOM’s projects, has not become a member, and Turkmenistan only has observer status. In fact, during this period Turkmenistan has bucked the general trend in the region: it is not a member of the AIEA or the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and it has not applied to join the WTO. Coupled with its absence from some of the international organizations listed in the tables above, this makes it the State with the lowest level of integration in global international cooperation structures.

Finally, only Kyrgyzstan is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it joined on 20 December 1998. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have observer status and are in the process of obtaining membership. Although it was the first to apply, Uzbekistan is the one that currently furthest from gaining entry; its application has been in abeyance since 2005, in spite of the adoption of a legislative action plan in 2007. The last meeting of the working group on the admission of Kazakhstan was held in 2008, and in the case of Tajikistan the last meeting was in July 2011³⁸.

38 The draft report of the working group for Tajikistan was adopted on 25 October 2010. The last review of the draft report for Kazakhstan dates from 25 June 2008.

ii) The presence of the ‘region’ in global organizations: key issues³⁹

The degree of the republics’ involvement in the activities of the international organizations of which they are members varies widely. Kazakhstan is, by some distance, the one that participates most actively in the debates inside these organizations and the one that holds the most positions of responsibility⁴⁰.

As Table 5 shows, Kazakhstan has delivered almost four times as many speeches in the debates at the main bodies of the UN than the other States⁴¹. Over their twenty years of membership, all the States have gradually participated in the debates, with the exception of Tajikistan, whose contributions have fallen off considerably in the last decade⁴².

Table 5: Speeches at the UN’s main institutions*

	GA	SC	ECOSOC	TOTAL		
				92-02	03-11	92-12
Kazakhstan	418+2	32	34	207	277	484
Kyrgyzstan	154	7	12	118	55	173
Tajikistan	104	24	1	73	56	129
Turkmenistan	76	3	-	35	44	79
Uzbekistan	115	13	-	50	78	128

* Source: UNBISNET database of the speeches made at the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

The themes addressed by the representatives of the republics in their speeches at the UN do not allow us to identify many common priorities. Exceptions are the international protection of Human Rights, the fight against people smuggling and international organized crime, and also the debates on the reform of the Charter and in particular on the composition of the SC. The five republics also share a concern with the protection of the environment. Representatives of

39 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section comes mainly from data from the UN.

40 As can be seen, this also applies to the regional international organizations.

41 For comparative purposes only, note that since March 1992, when these States joined the UN, Spain has made 713 speeches to the same institutions.

42 However, it might be also noted that in 2011 Turkmenistan did not make a single speech, Tajikistan made two and Uzbekistan only one.

all the countries have spoken on issues such as sustainable development, water management and the fight against climate change during UN debates. Although this concern is shared by all the States, and their official positions show certain points of consensus, there are also significant differences; the environment, development, and the management of energy resources in the region are all conflictive issues⁴³. An interesting initiative was the consensus reached between the five Republics on the establishment of a United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Ashgabat⁴⁴.

The Central Asian republics hold the following posts of responsibility in UN bodies⁴⁵:

- Kazakhstan has been a member of ECOSOC since 2006⁴⁶, of the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme since 2008, and of the Committee for Programme and Coordination since 2009⁴⁷.
- Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the Council of Human Rights since 2009⁴⁸ and held one of the vice-presidencies of the GA in its 63rd session⁴⁹.
- Turkmenistan held one of the vice-presidencies of the GA in its 62nd session⁵⁰. Turkmenistan also hosts the UN's Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia.

Finally, another important element in the assessment of the involvement of the Central Asian States in the UN is their participation in the decision-making pro-

43 Among the opinions recently expressed on these subjects, in a speech to the GA on sustainable development the representative of Kazakhstan declared his republic's commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 15% by the year 2020 and by 25% by the year 2025, and asked for Kazakhstan to be added to the list of states in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. In the same session, the representative of Tajikistan stressed the importance of suitable management of water resources, in particular freshwater resources (Debate of the Tenth Commission, 2 November 2010, Doc. A/C.2/65/SR.24).

44 Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 7 May 2007, Doc. S/2007/279, 16 May 2007.

45 Study of the decision-making posts in the GA from the data compiled between 2004 and 2011.

46 Decision of the GA 61/404, September-December 2006, Doc. A/61/49 (Vol. II).

47 Decision of the GA 63/414, September-December 2008, Doc. A/63/49 (Vol. II).

48 Decision of the GA 63/420, December 2008 – September 2009 Doc. A/63/49 (Vol. III).

49 Decision 62/418, December 2007 – September 2008, Doc. A/62/49 (Vol. III).

50 Decision of the GA 61/420, December 2006 – September 2007, Doc. A/61/49 (Vol. III).

cesses. A review of their votes on the resolutions of the GA in 2009 highlights certain common points in their positions on particularly sensitive issues. Like the majority of States, when a resolution of the GA is put to the vote, the Central Asian republics have tended to vote in favor. Only in the voting of resolutions on the control and reduction of armaments adopted on the recommendation of the First Commission do we find different (not to be say conflicting) positions; some States opt for abstention and others vote in favor (or in one case against) the adoption of the resolution⁵¹.

At UNESCO, again Kazakhstan has been the more active participating in several subsidiary organs of the General Conference. Kazakhstan is currently a member of the Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) (its mandate expires in 2013)⁵², the Legal Committee and the Intergovernmental Council for the Information for All Programme (IFAP)⁵³. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are both members of the UNESCO Executive Board (their mandate expires in 2013). A representative from Uzbekistan has been also elected as member of the Governing Board of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)⁵⁴. Finally, as a recent goal it can be mentioned the establishment in Almaty, Kazakhstan, of the Central Asian Regional Glaciology Centre as a category 2 centre under the auspices of UNESCO⁵⁵. Besides, despite being behind on its financial contributions to UNESCO, Kyrgyzstan has been granted the right to participate in the last General Conference.

An overview of the SA and other global International Organizations shows that Uzbekistan is currently a member of the Executive Board of the WHO (its mandate expires in 2014) and the WTO (its mandate expires in 2015), a representative of Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Radio Regulations Board at the ITU and of the FAO Committee on Agriculture, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are members of the FAO Committee on Fisheries and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are members of the FAO Committee on Forestry.

51 Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly, Doc. A/64/49 (Vol. I).

52 Kazakhstan was to be member of the International Coordinating Council of the Programme on Man and the Biosphere (MAB) until 2013 but he decided to withdraw before the end of the mandate.

53 UNESCO Doc. 36 C/NOM/INF.2 Rev. 3, 2 November 2011.

54 UNESCO Doc. 36 C/NOM/INF.2 Rev. 3, 2 November 2011.

55 Records of the 36th session of the General Conference, 2011.

b. Participation in regional international organizations

The Central Asian republics also participate in a variety of regional international organizations. Unlike the global international organizations, the regional institutions only seek the participation of certain States. We divide these regional organizations into two groups: those with more than fifty members, and those with a more restricted membership, of around ten States. The Central Asian republics joined these international organizations in two main phases: during the first years of independence, and since 2004.

i) Accession to membership of regional organizations

The Central Asian States participate in a dozen international organizations of restricted membership. Table 6 shows the dates of their accession to regional organizations with more than 50 member States; these are international organizations which predate the formation of the Central Asian republics as independent entities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was the first to admit these States as full members, followed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Table 6: Accessions to regional organizations with more than 50 member States

	OSCE	EBRD	IC	ISESCO	IDB	ADB
Kazakhstan	30.01.92	27.07.92	1995	02.12.02	16.05.96	19.01.94
Kyrgyzstan	30.01.92	05.06.92	01.12.92	28.11.00	03.11.93	13.04.94
Tajikistan	30.01.92	16.10.92	01.12.92	27.04.93	01.06.97	20.04.98
Turkmenistan	30.01.92	01.06.92	01.12.92	No	15.11.94	31.08.00
Uzbekistan	30.01.92	30.04.92	10.02.96	No	27.08.03	31.08.95

Being a ‘European’ Organization, accession to OSCE was contested at the beginning. However, it evidenced the will to treat equally all former soviet Republics giving “the Central Asian States a ‘European’ outlook” and transforming “the OSCE into an organization with a Central Asian emphasis”⁵⁶

56 Heidemaria Gürer, “Forms of regional cooperation in Central Asia”, in *Facing the Terrorist Challenge - Central Asia's Role in Regional and International Co-operation*, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence (BMLV), Vienna, 2005, p. 8.

The Central Asian republics are also members of other regional organizations created after, and to a large extent as a result of, the break-up of the Soviet Union. In some cases, some or all of the Central Asian republics were founder members of these organizations. Membership of these organizations is restricted and, at present at least, none of them include more than twelve member States. The institutions are the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All these Organizations seek to strength cooperation on political, security and/or economic issues. Differences between Member States together with the strongly centralized nature of their internal political regimes are challenges that have questioned their efficiency⁵⁷. Still, by now, they offer the main framework for *inter-regional* cooperation serving to very different interests.

Table 7: Accessions to other regional organizations

	CIS	CSTO	EAEC	CACO ⁵⁸	SCO	CICA	ECO
Kazakhstan	21.12.91*	07.10.02*	31.05.01	28.02.02*	15.06.01*	4.06.2002	28.11.92
Kyrgyzstan	21.12.91*	07.10.02*	31.05.01	28.02.02*	15.06.01*	4.06.2002	28.11.92
Tajikistan	21.12.91*	07.10.02*	31.05.01	28.02.02*	15.06.01*	4.06.2002	28.11.92
Turkmenistan	21.12.91* ⁵⁹	07.10.02*	No	No	No	No	28.11.92
Uzbekistan	21.12.91*	23.06.06	25.01.06 ⁶⁰	28.02.02*	07.06.02	4.06.2002	28.11.92

* Founder members of the organization.

57 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.), *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, Washington, Brookings Institution, 2001, pp. 13 and 19; Antonio Alonso, “El sistema regional en Asia Central”, *Comentarios UNISCI*, No. 18, 2009.

58 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan formed the Central Asian Commonwealth (CAC) in 1991. In 1994, the CAC was transformed in the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), in which Tajikistan and Turkmenistan did not participate. In 1998, the creation of the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) marked the return of Tajikistan. Russia also joined this Organization in May 2004. The accession of Uzbekistan to the EAEC in 2006, left without meaning the existence of the CAEC, whose members considered somehow merged to the EAEC. However, in 2008 Uzbekistan has decided to temporarily suspend its membership of the EAEC so it still might be a forum to take into account.

59 Turkmenistan reduced its participation in the CIS to associate membership on 16 August 2005.

60 Suspended, at its own request, on 20 October 2008.

The CIS offers a framework for dialogue and cooperation between the former Soviet Republics⁶¹. The CSTO and the EAEC have also been created under the Russian leadership. Although the five Republics participate in the CSTO, Turkmenistan has not acceded to the EAEC. Besides, at the end of 2008, Uzbekistan left the organization⁶². China and Russia share the leadership role in the SCO. This is the main trend of this Organization with large political and economic cooperation aims. Its great challenge to overcome in the near future, are Russian and Chinese confronted interests' in Central Asia⁶³.

The Conference on Interaction and Cooperation in Central Asia (CICA) is also a very interesting regional Organization that, having a limited number of Member States, differs a little from the previous ones. Kazakhstan promoted its creation for enhancing political cooperation towards security and stability in Asia⁶⁴. The only Central Asian Republic that does not participate in CICA is Turkmenistan. Presently the Organization has twenty four member States⁶⁵. As the previous group, the effectiveness of this Organization is discussed. The creation of the

61 Although its legal nature was quite unclear at the beginning, it is generally admitted now that the CIS can be considered as an “intergovernmental organization”. Sergei A, Voitovich, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An emerging institutional Model” in *EJIL*, 1993, pp. 403-417. Along with five Central Asian Republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are member of the CIS. It must be stated that Ukraine is not a member states but it participates in the activities of the organization.

62 As the constituent Treaty does not entails the right to withdraw, the EAEC secretariat considers that Uzbekistan is only suspended.

63 As Marlène Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse point out “in Central Asia, the Russo-Chinese entente has been made possible thanks to Beijing’s desires to have Moscow’s support in the region. It is in fact in China’s interests to keep Central Asia under Russia’s political and security shelter. But if the Chinese authorities were to consider, for whatever reasons, that they ought to modify their activities in Central Asia, and involve themselves in political issues, and not just in economic ones, then Chinese interests would come into conflict with Moscow’s”. Marlene Laurelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, *China as neighbor: Central Asian perspectives and Strategies*, Central Asia-Caucas Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Washington, 2009, p. 62.

64 The First International conference was held in Almaty in September 1999. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of fifteen Asian States participated in the Conference - Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan - Representatives of other States – outside the region – and some International Organizations also participated but just as observers (USA, Japan, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia and Ukraine and UN and the OSCE).

65 Bahrain, Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam have also joined this Organization.

SCO with very similar aims and increasingly the same Member States raises serious questions about its future⁶⁶

Another institution in this group is the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a regional organization with a very restricted membership, created in 1985. This is the only Regional International Organization, created before the dissolution of the USSR, which groups all the Central Asian Republics with a small group of other States that are close from geographic point of view. The other members are Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the potential of this Organization has been reduced because of essential differences existing between members in some political questions such as relations with Israel or religion and politics issues⁶⁷.

Finally, another group of regional international organizations in Central Asia are those created to manage the water resources. These are the only International Organizations whose members are just the five Central Asian republics⁶⁸. It is a quite complex group of International Structures that are all now grouped under the International Found for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS)⁶⁹. It is quite difficult to

66 Gürer (2005), p. 10.

67 As Sebastien Peyrouse and Sadykzhan Ibraimov point out “Central Asian states rejected Tehran’s attempts at politicization of the organization, which would have put them at odds with the United States; instead they demanded that the role of the ECO be limited to development assistance and regional transport. The organization has certainly failed to take off and today plays only a marginal role in the development of exchanges between Iran and Central Asia”. Sebastien Peyrouse and Sadykzhan Ibraimov, “Iran’s Central Asian Temptations”, *Current trends in Islamist ideology*, Vol. 10, 2010.

68 It can be pointed out that Russia has been recognized the observer status in the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination “in addressing the Aral Sea crisis and the rehabilitation of the disaster zone. It also provides the required financial and technical assistance in water treatment, creating the domestic and drinking water supply system in the region and fighting desertification (...) also cooperates in the scientific and technical spheres, in designing projects of regional significance, in creating the environment monitoring system, and renders expert services and also assists in the training of specialists”. (Article III of the Agreement between Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan on joint activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone around the Sea crisis, improving the environment, and enduring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea region, Kzyl-Orda 26 March 1993).

69 Following Article 2 of the agreement approved in Ashgabat on April, the 9th 1999 the ICWC and its executive bodies; the IFAS board, the IFAS Executive Committee, the revision Committee, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and its depending bodies have the status of International Organizations (Agreement between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan about the Status of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and it’s Organizations). The words of the article do not allow differentiating if legal personality is only accorded to the ICWC and the CSD or

establish the legal nature of each institution. However, following the Agreements adopted, at least three international organizations can be distinguished: the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia (ICWC), the Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (EC-IFAS) and the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development (ICSD)⁷⁰. An agreement signed in Almaty in 1992⁷¹ created the Interstate Committee for Water Coordination (ICWC),⁷² with the aim of fostering the rational use, protection and control of transboundary water. The ICWC, whose rules of operation did not receive approval until 2008,⁷³ is the first regional institution with an environmental focus since the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, although its primary objective was to replace the system inherited from the USSR, it maintained the old Soviet structures. It is a parity body based on the “community and unity of the region’s water resources”⁷⁴. The IFAS was created by a decision of the Heads of State of the five Central Asian Republics adopted in Tashkent in January 1993.⁷⁵ In particular, the IFAS offers a unique cooperation platform for the sustainable management of water resources, because it draws on the highest-level political participation of the five States. The executive committee of the IFAS is currently at work on the third phase of the Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP-3).⁷⁶ By virtue

also to their executive or other related bodies. However in the Statute of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia adopted in Almaty on September the 18th 2008, the following are clearly defined as executive bodies of the ICWC: the ICWC Secretariat, the BWO “Amudarya”, BWO “Syrdarya”, the Scientific Information Center for water related problems (SIC) and its national branches; the Coordination Metrological Center (CMC) and national organizations; the Training Center (TC) and its branches. A general analyses of the agreements adopted and the way of developing their activities justifies that we just refer to the ICWC and the CSD as International organizations.

70 Discussion paper on *Strengthening the Institutional and Legal Frameworks of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea: Review and Proposals* prepared by international consultants in the framework of the project *Regional Dialogue and Cooperation on Water Resources Management*, 31 January 2010.

71 <http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute1.htm> (accessed in March 2012).

72 http://www.icwc-aral.uz/legal_framework.htm (accessed in March 2012).

73 <http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm> (accessed in March 2012). The Statute of the ICWC was approved in Tashkent, 5 December 1992. This agreement has been substituted by the new Statute adopted in Almaty, 18 September 2008.

74 Article 1 of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on co-operation in interstate sources’ water resources use and protection common management, Almaty, 18 February 1992.

75 <http://www.ec-ifas.org/about/mfsa/110-legal-basis-of-ifas.html> (accessed in March 2012).

76 <http://www.ec-ifas.org/news/153-edited-version-of-asbp-3-is-sent-for-approval-to-the-governments-of-central-asia.html>

of the agreements signed in Almaty on 27 February 1997, and Tashkent on 20 March 1997 and 30 May 1997, the IFAS merged with the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS),⁷⁷ and the new IFAS assumed international legal personality. Since January 2009, the IFAS has held observer status at the United Nations⁷⁸ and was reinforced by the intergovernmental agreement between the five States on the status of the IFAS and its organizations in October 2010.⁷⁹ The Executive Committee is the standing executive body of the Fund and it has the status of an International Organization⁸⁰. The ICDS was created by a resolution of the IFAS executive Board on 19 July 1994⁸¹. All five countries take part in the ICSD, which has played an important role in supporting the Economic Commission for Europe's initiative on sustainable development in Central Asia.⁸² In May 2009, the ICSD reached agreement on a joint renewable energy program,⁸³ which has a specific focus for each country: wind energy (Kazakhstan), small hydroelec-

77 <http://www.ec-ifas.org/about/mfsa/110-legal-basis-of-ifas.html>

78 Resolution of the UN General Assembly 63/133: Observer status for the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/63/133, 15 January 2009.

79 <http://www.ec-ifas.org/news/54-the-intergovernmental-agreement-on-the-status-of-the-international-fund-for-saving-the-aral-sea-is-ratified.html>

80 Article 1,3 of the Regulations of the IFAS, approved by decision of the Heads of State of the five Central Asian Republics, Ashgabat, 9 April 1999.

81 Although, as it has been already mentioned, it is considered as an International Organization in article 2 of the the agreement approved in Ashgabat, 9 April 1999, the C

82 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/MOU/IFAS_MoU_Final_E_15Oct2010.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

83 <http://www.uznature.uz/eng/newsmain/33.html> (accessed in March 2012). In february 2011 the UNDP and Kazakhstan Electricity Association (KEA) signed the first Memorandum on cooperation in the field of renewable energy sources development in Kazakhstan, <http://www.windenergy.kz/eng> (accessed in March 2012). Tajikistan has built, in recent years, more than 260 small and medium-sized hydroelectric power plants, high voltage power lines and created a unified power network of the country, <http://khovar.tj/eng/security/2141-erahmon-our-country-has-great-hydropower-potential.html> (accessed in March 2012) and <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/irc/countries/tajikistan.pdf> (accessed in March 2012). In Turkmenistan the use of renewable energy, primarily the use of solar and wind energy, is now a priority area in the development of the country's energy sector, but at present there are few installations that use solar and wind energy for industrial purposes, <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/irc/countries/turkmenistan.pdf> (accessed in March 2012). In Uzbekistan the development of renewable energy, primarily the exploitation of hydro power potential of small rivers, has significantly increased in the recent years, <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/irc/countries/uzbekistan.pdf> (accessed in March 2012). The Asia Solar Energy Initiative was launched on May 2010 in Uzbekistan and it will provide US\$2.25bn to support projects with a combined generating capacity of 3000MW of solar power by 2012, <http://www.ifandp.com/article/004042.html>.

tric plants (Tajikistan), biogas (Kyrgyzstan), solar energy (Turkmenistan), and combined solar energy (Uzbekistan). Also, the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC)⁸⁴ was established at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on the Environment in Europe (Aarhus, 1998),⁸⁵ and has been active since 2001. Another significant step taken by the five countries was the approval of the Regional Environmental Action Plan (REAP)⁸⁶ in 2000, an instrument that identified five environmental areas as priorities: soil degradation, air pollution, water pollution, waste management and the degradation of mountain ecosystems. To these, other issues have been added, including climate change, the integrated management of chemical substances, the sustainability of mountain lakes and renewable energy. To date, the plan has not produced significant results largely because of funding shortfalls. The rationalization of this complex group of International Institutions is now under debate. The main proposals tend to unify the existing structures under a single International Organization. The IFAS would be the only one to have international legal personality⁸⁷.

ii) Level of involvement in regional organizations

As in our analysis of the global organizations, in this section we examine the degree of involvement of the Central Asian States in the activities of the regional organizations of which they are members. Obviously, the level of involvement has been high, in regional organizations with very restrictive membership. This allows the Central Asian republics to have a more active role, although it must be stressed that the creation, operation and evolution of these organizations responds mainly to the interests of third powers such as Russia, China⁸⁸. Besides differences between the five republics have limited the role played by these Organizations to promote regional cooperation.

84 <http://www.carecprogram.org/>

85 <http://www.unece.org/press/pr1998/98env10e.html> (accessed in March 2012).

86 http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar_oth33547.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

87 See the conclusions of the Discussion paper on *Strengthening the Institutional and Legal Frameworks of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea: Review and Proposals* prepared by international consultants in the framework of the project *Regional Dialogue and Cooperation on Water Resources Management*, 31 January 2010.

88 Other regional powers such as Iran or Turkey have also a great interest in Central Asia but they find great difficulties to attract Central Asian Republics interest in the present scenario. Mohammad-Reza Djalili, "L'Iran et la Turquie face à l'Asie centrale", in Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Thierry Kellner (dir.), *Asie centrale, Ancrage international & régional*, *Journal of International and Strategic Studies*, No. 1, 2008, pp 13-19.

Here we note some of the most significant examples of their participation in the administrative and functional structure:

- A Kazakh was Secretary-General of the ECO from August 2003 to August 2006, of the EAEC in 2007 and of the OSC from January 2007 to December 2009. Kazakhstan also occupied the presidency of the OSCE in 2010; it held the presidency of the Council of the EAEC in 2002, 2005 and again 2010.
- A Kyrgyz has been Secretary-General of the SCO since 2010.
- At the Moscow Summit of 1 January 2011, it was agreed that the Republic of Tajikistan should assume the presidency of the CIS, succeeding the Russian Federation. Tajikistan also took on the presidency of the Council of the EAEC in 2010 and spoke at the GA in representation of the IC in 2011.
- In 2012, the presidency of the CIS will be held by Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan had been reluctant to accept the institutionalization of the CIS in 2005, but its relations with this international organization took a new turn in 2007, when it declared that its relations with the member States of the CIS were now a foreign policy ‘priority’.

Besides, it must be highlighted that Kazakhstan fully participates in the Customs Union with Russia and Byelorussia, under the EAEC in 2010. Kyrgyzstan has also shown its interest to accede in 2011. The EAEC and the SCO are also engaged in pushing forward energy cooperation between these States.

Some of these regional organizations have been a useful instrument to plead the Central Asian republics claims inside other bigger international organizations. From this point of view, we must stress that most of these organizations have had some kind of recognition by the UN and some of the SA. Specifically, referring to regional organizations of restricted membership, the ECO⁸⁹, the CIS⁹⁰, the

89 Resolution of the GA 48/2, 22 October 1993, Observer status for the Economic Cooperation Organization in the General Assembly.

90 Resolution of the GA 48/237, 30 March 1994, Observer status for the Commonwealth of Independent States in the General Assembly.

EAEC⁹¹, CSTO⁹², the SCO⁹³ and the IFAS⁹⁴ have observer status in the UN GA. At their request, the cooperation between the UN and some of these organizations has been included as a specific item of the GA work program⁹⁵.

Section IV.

A sub-regional framework of cooperation for transboundary water management and the role of EU into the region

a. Transboundary water management in Central Asia: Between international cooperation and conflict

The five nations of Central Asia differ sharply with respect to how the water resources of the region's hydrographic basins should be used. The two principal basins (the Syr Darya and Amu Darya) are in jeopardy today because of a significant decline in the availability of water.⁹⁶ In this respect, the establishment of large-scale ir-

91 Resolution of the GA 58/84, 9 December 2003, Observer status for the EAEC in the General Assembly.

92 Resolution of the GA 59/50, 2 December 2004, Observer status for the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the General Assembly.

93 Resolution of the GA 59/48, 16 December 2004, Observer status for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the General Assembly.

94 Resolution of the GA 63/133, 15 January 2009, Observer status for the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea in the General Assembly and the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Europe, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, Geneva 15 October 2010.

95 In 2007 and 2008, another two resolutions have been passed on the cooperation between the UN and EAEC. (Resolutions 62/79, December the 6th, 2007, and Resolution 65/15, December 16th, 2008). In February 2009, the representatives of the 6 SCO member States' sent a request for the inclusion of cooperation between UN and SCO as an item in the provisional agenda of the GA 64th session (doc. A/64/141). This request was agreed and since 2009 cooperation between the UN and the SCO is a sub-item of the GA agenda (See Resolutions of the GA 64/183, 23 February 2010, and 65/124, 15 February 2011).

96 EACH-FOR Project Consortium, *Preliminary Findings from the EACH-FOR project on Environmentally Induced Migration* (October 2008), pp. 10 and ff., www.each-for.eu (accessed in March 2012); OSCE-UNEP-UNDP, *Environment and Security. Transforming Risks into Cooperation. The Case of Central Asia and Southeastern Europe* (2003), pp. 8 and ff. http://www.envsec.org/publications/ENVSEC.%20Transforming%20risks%20into%20cooperation.%20The%20case%20of%20Central%20Asia%20and%20South%20Eastern%20Europe_English.pdf. For specific information on the conflict in the Ferghana Valley, Nick Megoran, "The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary dispute, 1999–2000", *Political Geography*, Vol. 23 (2004), pp. 731–764, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629804000320>.

rigation systems and the inadequate maintenance of canal systems, together with the indiscriminate consumption of water for agricultural purposes, are well known to have caused the drying up of the Aral Sea in the nineteen-sixties.⁹⁷ This event significantly altered the prevailing water balance in the region,⁹⁸ which, in turn, caused more than 95% of the reservoirs and wetlands to dry up as well.

Seen from the viewpoint of water resource management, the hydrographic and geopolitical complexity of the region is evident.⁹⁹ The three downstream States – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – possess large reserves of gas, petroleum and uranium,¹⁰⁰ but suffer water shortfalls. Nevertheless, they are large consumers of water for the irrigation of crops, chiefly cotton. By contrast, upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not only extremely poor, but also lack gas and petroleum. However, they do possess important reserves of water and a high capacity to generate hydroelectric energy which can, if developed, bring about a radical change in the course of the two rivers.

From this perspective, the management of water resources has an effect on three specific areas that are essential to the development and stability of these States:

97 Philip Micklin, “The Aral crisis, introduction to the special issue”, *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 33 (5), 1992, pp. 269-282; Philip Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin of Central Asia: cause of conflict or cooperation?”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 43 (7), 2002, pp. 505-528; for another perspective, Laura Rodríguez, “La opción hidráulica en Asia Central ex soviética. Perspectiva histórica y situación actual”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 70-71, 2005, pp. 143-167.

98 Eric W. Sievers, “Water, Conflict and Regional Security in Central Asia”, *NYU Environmental Law Journal*, Vol. 10, 2002, pp. 356-402 and pp. 364 and ff.

99 For a general overview, Alec Rasizade, “Entering the Old “Great Game” in Central Asia”, *Orbis*, Vol. 47 (2003), pp. 41-58; Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Central Asia: Managing the delicate balance between the “discourse of danger,” the “Great Game,” and regional problem solving”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 40 (2007), pp. 257-267, (accessed in March 2012).

100 Aurèlia Mañé, “Territorios ricos en hidrocarburos de Asia Central ¿Países productores, enclaves exportadores o países de tránsito?”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 70-71, 2005, pp. 87-113; Nora Sainz and Roger Serra, et al., “Gobierno, regionalismo y recursos estratégicos en las repúblicas de Asia Central”, *Central Asia Observatory-CIDOB Foundation*, lectures at the summer course “Eurasia emergente: ¿Un nuevo ‘gran juego’ en torno a Asia Central?”, *Menéndez y Pelayo International University*, Barcelona, 9 and 10 July 2007; Nora Sainz, “Asia Central en un mundo en cambio: de región periférica a área generadora y de aplicación de políticas”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 70-71, 2005, pp. 115-141; Nadia Campaner and Shamil Yenikeeff, “The Kashagan Field: A Test Case for Kazakhstan’s Governance of Its Oil and Gas Sector”, *IFRI Papers* (2008), <http://www.ifri.org> (accessed in March 2012); Fernando Delage, “La nueva geopolítica asiática”, *Anuario CIDOB Asia-Pacífico 2005*, 2006, pp. 15-23; Alex González and Carmen Claudín (eds.), “Asia Central y la seguridad energética global. Nuevos actores y dinámicas en Eurasia”, *CIDOB, Interrogar la actualidad*, No. 20, Barcelona 2008.

food security, water security and energy security. Currently, these three areas face a severe crisis because of the effect on the region of climate change and the absence of adaptation strategies¹⁰¹. The situation has been further aggravated by the critical conjunction of poor water management and poor management of the risks associated with a lack of energy security. These two factors are particularly relevant in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.¹⁰²

In front of such challenges, any transboundary water management model must ensure a sustainable use of water resources that can guarantee a balance between the easternmost area of the region and the area of the alluvial plains.¹⁰³ However, it is not easy to achieve such an objective. The independence of the Soviet republics opened an intense debate on the subject of managing shared water resources, an essential tool for economic development.¹⁰⁴ In practical terms, the lack of understanding between these countries led to a drastic reduction in electricity generation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which need water in the winter to produce energy, soon experienced an extreme scarcity of energy, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which need water in the summer to irrigate fields, began to face periodic interruptions in their supply.¹⁰⁵ In spite of the complementary nature of trading gas and oil for

101 The phenomenon of climate change has been called “a multiplier of threats” to international peace and security by the EU’s High Representative, EU Doc. S113/08, 2008. Examples would include the social and economic consequences of the hydroelectric facilities mentioned above. This is the case with the upstream countries in the region, which depend primarily on glacial thawing and seasonal precipitation and face difficulties in managing flows that vary sharply by season and by year, because sound forecasting is so difficult.

102 Johannes F. Linn, “An International Response to Central Asia’s Severe Disaster Risks”, *The Brookings Institution* (April 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0426_central_asia_disaster_linn.aspx (accessed in March 2012).

103 Victor Dukhovny and Vadim Sokolov, *Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin*, UNESCO, Paris, 2003, pp. 4 and ff.; World Bank, *Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: Improving Regional Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin*, Washington, D.C., 2004; the Aquastat (FAO) database, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/water_res/indexesp.stm (accessed in March 2012).

104 For a historical perspective, Rodríguez (2005), pp. 152 and ff.

105 For example, Bea Hogan, “Decreased Water Flow Threatens Cotton Crop, Peace in Region”, *Eurasia News* (March 2000), <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/eavo80200.shtml> (accessed in March 2012); Joanna Lillis, “Water woes stoke economic worries”, *Eurasia News* (April 2008), <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eavo42808.shtml> (accessed in March 2012); Konstantin Parshin, “Dushanbe may stop water flow as Uzbekistan pulls plug on power”, *Eurasia News* (November 2009), <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav113009.shtml> (accessed in March 2012). Beyond new plans to exploit hydrocarbons and gas in the area, the independence of the countries of Central Asia also brought the uncontrolled extraction of resources from the Aral Sea,

water, these exchanges fell to a minimum, aggravating the clear mistrust among the five States in the region.¹⁰⁶ Over time, the situation has not changed. The five countries of Central Asia have not taken advantage of the opportunity to promote a regional focus that is economically, politically and environmentally sustainable. Rather, they have initiated an escalation in conflicts over the allocation and prioritization of different water uses. At present, this challenge has become one of the highest priorities for international security in the region.¹⁰⁷

Indeed, the European Union (EU) has explicitly acknowledged the threat posed by the resurgence of conflict over transboundary water resources in Central Asia.¹⁰⁸ The issue not only concerns the five previously mentioned States in the region, but also Afghanistan because of the resources that it draws from the Amu Darya basin. Nor should it be forgotten that this debate arises in a context in which the connection to the Caspian Sea Basin is vital to the West. The Caspian

an increase in illegal fishing, the invasion of exotic species in their waters and several uncontrolled oil spills that have killed off the native flora and fauna in a short period of time. Sievers (2002), pp. 377 and ff.; Eric W. Sievers, “Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh”, *Texas International Law Journal*, Vol. 37, 2002, pp. 1-42.

106 Sébastien Peyrouse, “The Hydroelectric Sector in Central Asia and the Growing Role of China”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (2), 2007, pp. 131-148, p. 133 and ff.

107 Sievers (2002), pp. 400-401; Kai Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony in the Amu Darya basin” (2006), *Water Policy* Vol. 10, No. S2, 2008, pp 71–88, p. 76-77, http://waterwiki.net/images/o/od/Wegerich_2008_Hydro-hegemony_Amu_Darya_Basin.pdf; Suvi Sojamo, “Illustrating co-existing conflict and cooperation in the Aral Sea Basin with TWINS Approach”, in Muhammad M. Rahaman and Olli Varis (eds.), *Central Asian Waters. Social, Economic, Environmental and Governance Puzzle*, Water & Development Publications - Helsinki University of Technology, 2008, pp. 75-88, http://www.water.tkk.fi/English/wr/research/global/material/CA_chapters/07-CA_Waters-Sojamo.pdf (accessed in March 2012); Anar Khamzayeva, “Water resources management in Central Asia: security implications and prospects for regional cooperation”, in *Water resources management in Central Asia: Regional and international issues at stake*, Documents CIDOB, No. 25, 2009, pp. 9-32, p. 15 and ff.; Daniel Kimmage, “Security challenges in Central Asia: Implications for the EU’s engagement strategy”, in Neil Melvin (ed.), *Engaging Central Asia. The European Union’s New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008, pp. 9-19, pp. 11-12, <http://www.ceps.eu> (accessed in March 2012); Jos Boonstra, “The EU’s Interests in Central Asia: Integrating Energy, Security and Values into Coherent Policy”, *FRIDE, EDC2020 Working Paper*, January 2011, p. 17; Ronald Kingham (ed.), “Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices. An Overview of Strategies and Initiatives of Selected Governments”, *International Organisations and Inter-Governmental Organisations, Institute for Environmental Security*, 2006.

108 *Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia* (Brussels, 28 June 2010), <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11402.en10.pdf#page=2> (accessed March 2012).

Sea is also an area where the interests of several players converge. These players include the EU, for whom the region is one of the most important transit routes for hydrocarbons and gas on the continent,¹⁰⁹ as well as China, the Russian Federation, the United States, Japan and Turkey.

An examination of international practice is not especially promising¹¹⁰. The countries in the region have ratified several international instruments, such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,¹¹¹ the UN Convention to Combat Desertification,¹¹² the UN Convention on Biological Diversity¹¹³ and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.¹¹⁴ However, only Kazakhstan (2001) and Uzbekistan (2008) have ratified the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes¹¹⁵, and only Uzbekistan is a signatory, since 2007,¹¹⁶ of the Convention

109 Mañé (2005); Sainz (2005); Delage (2005), pp. 15-23; González and Claudín (2008); Aashish Mehta, Satish Rao and Anil Terway, "Power sector reform in Central Asia: observations on the diverse experiences of some former Soviet Republics and Mongolia", *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 15, 2007, pp. 218-234, www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro (accessed in March 2012); Roy Allison and Lena Jonson and Roy Jonson, "Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics", in Roy Allison and Roy Jonson (ed.), *Central Asian Security. The New International Context*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2001, pp. 1-23; Boris Eisenbaum, *Guerres en Asie centrale, Lutttes d'influences, pétrole, islamisme et mafias, 1850-2004*, Grasset, Paris, 2005. For the EU perspective on energy safety, Michael Emerson and Jos Boonstra, "La evolución de las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Asia Central. Resumen ejecutivo y recomendaciones", *EUCAM EU Central Asian Monitoring, CEPS-FRIDE*, No. 13, (February 2010), www.fride.org/download/EUCAM_PB13_Into_EURASIA_SPA_feb10.pdf (accessed in March 2012); Michael Emerson, Jos Boonstra, Nafisa Hasanova, Marlene Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, "Into Eurasia. Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy", *CEPS-FRIDE* (2010), www.ceps.eu (accessed in March 2012); European Commission, *The European Union and Central Asia: The new partnership in action*, October 2007; Neil Melvin, "The European Union's strategic role in Central Asia", in Neil Melvin (ed.), *Engaging Central Asia. The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia*, Centre For European Policy Studies, Brussels (2008), pp. 137-151, <http://www.ceps.eu> (accessed in March 2012).

110 Mar Campins, "Los retos de la cooperación regional en Asia Central: Más sombras que luces en la gestión de los recursos hídricos compartidos", *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, No. 19, 2010, pp. 15 and ff.

111 <http://chm.pops.int/Convention/ConventionText/tabid/2232/Default.aspx>

112 <http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/Pages/Text-overview.aspx>

113 <http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/> (accessed in March 2012).

114 http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php (accessed in March 2012).

115 <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/pdf/watercon.pdf> (accessed in March 2012).

116 http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status.html (accessed in March 2012).

on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Waters, adopted in 1997.¹¹⁷ Up to now, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not signed the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context and its Protocol for Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment, either.¹¹⁸

The five Central Asia republic are also parties to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other States, e.g. China and the Russian Federation, which support transboundary cooperation in a general sense and also seek to safeguard a cheap supply of hydroelectric energy.¹¹⁹ In addition, they have signed several agreements amongst them addressing specific issues. In 1992, for example, they adopted a cooperation agreement on the shared use and protection of water resources - which drove the creation of the already mentioned ICWC- and two complementary agreements concerning the basins of Amu Darya and Syr Darya.¹²⁰ In 1993, they reached an agreement to carry out joint actions with respect to the Aral Sea, environmental rehabilitation and economic and social development in the region of the Aral Sea.¹²¹ In 1995, the five countries signed the Nukus Declaration on the sustainable development of the Aral Sea,¹²² confirming the validity of previous agreements on water resources in the Aral Sea Basin, and they adopted a program of specific actions to improve the Aral Sea. In one of numerous attempts to develop an effective instrument for regional cooperation, Turkmenistan sponsored a framework convention on the environment for the sustainable development of Central Asia¹²³ but the convention was not signed

117 http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

118 http://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/eia_text.html (accessed in March 2012). and http://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/sea_text.html (accessed in March 2012); http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4&chapter=27&lang=en (accessed in March 2012).

119 Peyrouse (2007), p. 134 ff and 141 and ff.

120 <http://www.icwc-ara1.uz/statute1.htm> (accessed in March 2012), <http://www.icwc-ara1.uz/statute9.htm> (accessed in March 2012) and <http://www.icwc-ara1.uz/statute10.htm> (accessed in March 2012).

121 <http://www.icwc-ara1.uz/statute13.htm> (accessed in March 2012).

122 http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=treaty_info&mitch_id=4418.

123 <http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails?id=TRE-143806&index=treaties> (accessed in March 2012).

by Turkmenistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan until 2006, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to consider their participation.

From an institutional standpoint, as it has already been mentioned in section II, paragraph b) i), a set of regional organizations has been created amongst the five central Asian republics. Despite all these initiatives, however, the political and institutional capacity and leadership needed to manage the necessary change into water management seems to be non-existent and the balance of hydropower in the region still is too relative. To fill this gap, the development of unilateral large projects has been favored against collaborative multilateral projects on an equitable basis. So, large infrastructure has dominated and no action has been taken at the regional level to build local capacities. Unlike what happened in other regions -as it may be the case of the Danube or the Rhine-, in the Central Asian context the lack of leadership and political support and the fact that water management is considered a domestic issue shows a situation which is hardly compatible with a model of equitable and reasonable use of water resources widely promoted by international agreements. In spite of the calls to regional cooperation from Central Asian's governments, such cooperation does not seem to be more than virtual and there is a widespread problem of poor governance in water resources' management, while the legal framework remains too general and implementation is not always adequate.

b. Two ways, one path for inducing regional cooperation in Central Asia

In such a framework and in addition of possible and punctual improvements to national water management, a change in governmental culture is needed. So the action of the EU has been deployed in two directions: the promotion of regional cooperation through the Europeanization of government structures of Central Asian republics, and the development of an EU Strategy for Central Asia.

i) Promotion of regional cooperation through the Europeanization of governance structures of Central Asian States

Historically, the EU has articulated its presence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Since 2004, the ENP has redefined the EU's relations with neighboring countries¹²⁴ with the

124 Recently, the EU has begun to review the ENP. *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A new response to a changing neighbourhood*, COM (2011) 303.

aim of creating a “ring of friends”¹²⁵ who share democratic values, norms and principles, the rule of law, free-market economics and good governance with the EU. In this way, the ENP aspires to overcome the limited effectiveness of existing EU policies with its neighbors, promoting internal economic and political reforms. This coincide with the development of a certain conception of security within the EU that views poverty and the absence of “good governance” in third States (e.g., political instability, environmental problems and public healthcare problems, organized crime and illegal immigration) as clear risk factors for the EU itself.

The origin of the policy can be traced to a Communication issued by the European Commission on 11 March 2003,¹²⁶ which proposed the establishment of a new framework for foreign relations with countries in Eastern Europe, immediate neighbors of the EU whose accession was not envisaged.¹²⁷ In May 2004, the European Commission presented what would become the basis for the design and implementation of the ENP,¹²⁸ with the aim of encouraging not only cooperation with neighbors, but also their integration in specific political arenas and, in some cases, the gradual Europeanization of their policies to promote greater convergence with the EU. In their Communication, the Commission announced the creation of a new financial instrument, the European Neighborhood and Part-

125 *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104 final.

126 *Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104.

127 Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Later, the policy also came to encompass the States on the southern Mediterranean area (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia) and three countries from the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).

128 *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008*, Brussels, COM (2009). Several political reasons gave rise to its creation. The idea of defining an area as “neighbouring” responded to the EU’s historical dilemma regarding inclusion and exclusion. Amid the growing difficulty of the EU to expand further, the ENP proposed a way of offering new neighbours a sufficiently attractive prospect of privileged integration with the EU, while clearly excluding the possibility of accession. The ENP was also conceived as an exercise in coherence for the EU itself, that is, as an opportunity to put its house in order and reorganize so that all the different policies and instruments that had proliferated gradually and in different EU bodies could be brought under one framework. Designing a single policy for geographic areas traditionally given separate treatment (the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus) made it possible to dilute the competition between Mediterranean and Central European member states who sought to privilege the Mediterranean or Eastern European dimension of the EU’s foreign policy.

nership Instrument (ENPI)¹²⁹ to assist to Eastern European countries, Southern Caucasus and South Mediterranean countries and which replaced the MEDA and TACIS instruments. The Commission also emphasized the logic of joint ownership of reforms and cooperation between partners and reinforced the references to greater cooperation in the area of political dialogue, in subjects concerning justice and home affairs (e.g., border control, the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration), cooperation in protecting the environment, regional cooperation and cooperation in the management of conflict. The goal of the EU was to work jointly with the authorities in neighboring countries to resolve common threats without tying cooperation to political conditions¹³⁰.

The point here is whether or not regional cooperation in Central Asia can be externally induced by the EU. In principle, relations between the EU and the Central Asian republics do not form a part of the ENP. However, the EU has tended to link its policy toward these countries to this more general cooperation framework¹³¹, suggesting that the basis of the ENP approach may also be

129 <http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/what-is-enpi-programming/general-introduction.html> (accessed in March 2012).

130 In a more formal way, this approach takes its ideological foundation from the text of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) itself, see Articles 2, 3 and 21 TEU.

131 On the bilateral level, EU relations with Central Asian republics are based on Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, reached between the EU and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as well as the Provisional Agreement on Trade and Trade Issues between the European Communities and Turkmenistan and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Turkmenistan, signed on 25 May 1998. The three agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, signed in 1995, remain into effect since 1999, while the agreement with Tajikistan took effect only in 2010, after starting negotiations as late as 2003. By contrast, the agreement with Turkmenistan, signed in 1998, has never been into effect. These agreements rest on three pillars: political dialogue, trade and economic relations, and cooperation in a variety of sectors. They are also built on respect for the values that the EU wishes to share with these States, specifically respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Through these agreements, the EU provides a common regional framework for cooperation with the five States of Central Asia. In addition, the agreements enable a certain gradual and limited participation in common policies, such as the single market, justice and home affairs, without requiring formal membership in the institutional structures of the EU. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part, *OJ L 229, 31/8/1999*; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part, *OJ L 196, 28/7/1999*; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Kazakhstan, *OJ L 196, 28/7/1999*; Decision of the Council and of the Commission on the conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and

applicable to Central Asian countries. Indeed, according to the European Commission itself, “With EU enlargement and the new external policies concerning Russia and the neighboring States, the countries of Central Asia have become ‘the essential neighbours of the EU Neighbourhood countries’, where approximation with EU legal frameworks and economic policies has been accelerated.”¹³²

As a result, we have an approach focused on EU relations with the Central Asia States that invites them to “share” peace, stability and prosperity with the EU. This is the context in which the EU has fostered Europeanization¹³³ in these

the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part, *OJ L* 350, 29/12/2009.

132 *Central Asia DCU Indicative Programme 2011–13*, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

133 Various definitions exist of this concept of Europeanization, which appears to be a matter more of political science than of law, although its use has gained currency in the field of the social sciences. Some authors emphasize the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level. Others understand Europeanization as a gradual process entailing the reorientation of the direction and form adopted by politics until they reach a point at which a sort of EU political and economic dynamic becomes part of the national politics in a given third State. In the broadest sense, Claudio Radaelli emphasizes the gradual process of transition and change in the political order, defining the concept of Europeanization as a process of “(a) construction; (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” The same idea can be found in the definition offered by Gergana Noutcheva, Natalie Tocci, Tamara Kovziridze et al., who incorporate the vision of an interactive process that is especially useful in conflict resolution and that ascribes an essential role to EU institutions: “a process that is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures. This link is made operational by means of specific conditionality and socialization measures, which are built into the process of Europeanization.” In short, Europeanization may be seen as a process to drive political, economic and social transformation and it has a very strong content of democratization. To channel the EU’s influence and analyze its possible impact, these processes of Europeanization are particularly important and their success depends to a great extent on the intensity of institutional links and contacts between the EU and the third States involved, as well as on their ability and legitimacy to encourage the values, norms and policies supported by the EU. Thomas Risse, Maria Green and James Caporaso (eds.), *Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 1; Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, (1), 1994, pp. 69 and ff.; Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 309 and ff.; Claudio Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 30 and ff.; Johan Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, *ARENA Working Papers* (2002), WP 01/2,

countries, similar to the ENP, in order to facilitate the application of the values on which the EU is built¹³⁴ and which must have an application to the resolution of conflicts affecting these neighboring States.¹³⁵ The use of elements of the current ENP in the case of Central Asian States - particularly turning to the idea of Europeanization as an instrument for the gradual transformation of their internal structures and the promotion of cooperation in areas of mutual interest-, could become an adequate way to promote “stability, security and welfare” in the region. The EU could make use of a “developed” version of the ENP, incorporating the dimension on EU “values” as an element in initiatives devoted to the governance of water resources.

Management of transboundary water resources is an example of how the EU’s environment, energy and security interests intersect with the EU global values and how, in turn, the promotion of international security can guide the resolution of these related-conflicts, influencing the political behavior of the regional actors and modifying the dynamic of conflicts by steering them towards a ne-

http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm (accessed in March 2012); Gergana Noutcheva, Tamara Kovziridze et al., “Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Paradigms”, in Bruno Coppieters, Michael Emerson et al., *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution. Case Studies from the European Periphery*, Academia Press, Ghent, 2004, p. 73. According to Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva “If Europeanisation is defined principally as EU-ization, other organisations and players must be borne in mind. For democracy and human rights, the Council of Europe is important as a norm-setting organisation and codifier of law. Membership of the Council of Europe requires adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supported by the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg”, Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: EU and US Strategies and Instruments*, Draft 28.9.4, Conference on *Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation*, Stanford University, 4-5 October 2004, pp. 6-7, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20744/Europeanisation_and_democratisation_Stanford_28.9.4.pdf (accessed in March 2012). Essentially, this approach brings into play three elements that interact synergistically: legal obligations in the political and economic areas that are related to what is required of these states to take part in international and regional mechanisms and organizations (e.g., the EU and the Council of Europe); objective elements tied to the political and economic structures of the state, which derive from the participation of the state in the process of European integration (in whatever form it takes); and subjective elements tied to national identity, which derive from the willingness of the state to push closer to EU values and norms in the context of economic development and civil society.

134 Sven Biscop, (ed.), *The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A call for an EU Grand Strategy*, Egmont Paper, Academia Press, No. 33, 2009.

135 Michael Emerson and Gergana, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”, Draft 28.9.4, *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: EU and US Strategies and Instruments*, conference at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, 4-5 October 2004, p. 6

gotiated settlement. An example of this situation is the interest of Tajikistan in finishing the construction of the Rogun hydropower dam project and the interest of Kyrgyzstan to build the Kambarata II dam, both projects clearly perceived as a country's road to energy independence. In both situations, the EU faces difficulties in directly supporting Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan in the completion of these projects, because that would involve explicitly ignoring the interests of other States in the region, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By contrast, the EU could support for instance the adoption of measures to promote the use of other types of renewable energy in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan as additional sources of energy. The fact that the EU is generally seen in Central Asia as a neutral actor¹³⁶ makes it easier to play a mediating role. In the words of the EU's special representative in Central Asia, Pierre Morel, the EU's position in such situations should be “*un partenaire qui facilite le règlement du problème et partage son expérience accumulée.*”¹³⁷ This dimension of the EU as a frame of reference in the support of political dialogue between Central Asian republics or as a neutral facilitator of cooperation among them can be a source of new options for conflict resolution.¹³⁸

In this respect, the EU commits to share its experiences and provide solutions in the service of supporting and consolidating a process that, nonetheless, must be started and conducted by the principal actors, the Central Asian republics. This is why the EU has also acted to develop national political dialogues on water in order to develop closer ties with governmental actors in the Central Asian States.¹³⁹ These political dialogues began in Kyrgyzstan in 2008 and in Tajikistan

136 Boonstra (2011), p. 18.

137 “L’Union Européenne est un partenaire de l’Asie Centrale prêt à l’aider” interview given by Pierre Morel to Mikhaïl Bushuev, *Deutsche Welle*, 1 November 2010, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DeutscheWelle-01.11.2010-FR.pdf> (accessed in March 2012)

138 Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Bruno Coppieters, Tamara Kovziridze, Michael Emmerson and Michel Huysseube, “Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories”, *Journal of Ethno Politics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2004, pp. 1 and ff., p. 8.

139 With respect to this political dialogue, the first EU-Central Asia High-Level Conference on the Environment and Water, held in Paris in 2008, was an important step. The conference was attended by 27 member states, the five states of Central Asia and several international and regional organizations. The final declaration of the summit makes explicit reference to this issue: “The European Union will pay particular attention to regional cooperation in Central Asia on the rational, efficient and sustainable use of hydraulic, hydro-energy and fuel resources and the environment.” The first meeting was followed by other high-level meetings, which also involved international organizations and aimed at fostering political dialogue among all the actors in the region. The third high-level conference took place in Rome in 2010, at which

and Turkmenistan in 2009,¹⁴⁰ and their chief objective is to promote the development of water-related priorities within the Millennium Development Goals and also in the context of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). The outcome of these political dialogues is a set of specific “policy packages”, which set out actions focused on reforms in sustainable water management, the funding of water supply and sanitation infrastructure, stronger regulatory services and the development of institutional frameworks.¹⁴¹

To date, however, the EU policy in Central Asia has been excessively timid in its scope and limited in its intensity, and has not yet produced major results.¹⁴² EU priorities do not appear to have prevailed in the region. Nor has permanent political dialogue been promoted successfully with local actors in order to build the necessary support for the basic principles of respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.¹⁴³

Only Kazakhstan has expressed its interest in building closer relations with the EU, but the lack of notable progress in the development of democratic structures remains a challenge in that country. For their part, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have shown an interest in strengthening ties with Europe, and the EU has reinforced its presence in both countries. By contrast, EU relations with Turkmenistan are

an EU-Central Asia partnership was established under the banner “Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation”. The aim is to strengthen cooperation in the areas of environmental governance, climate change and sustainable water management. The platform will be implemented through two working groups, one on environmental governance and the other on water management.

140 Committee for civil aspects of crisis management, annual report on the application of the EU programme for the prevention of violent conflicts 2009, Brussels, 27 May 2009.

141 In the preparations for the 6th World Water Forum, which is set for 2012, special attention is being given to the EU’s cooperation with third States in the area of water resources management in order to “better coordinate cooperation initiatives between the European actors; increase the human and financial means for cooperation programmes, e.g., European water initiative, European water facility, support to African transboundary basin organisations etc; reinforce the neighbouring cooperation of the EU with the Balkans, EECCA and the Mediterranean; reinforce European cooperation with other third-party countries and BRIC in the water area, e.g. EU-China BMP, EU-China water platform, Mediterranean Water Information System, Mediterranean Water Knowledge Hub, Support to Regional Framework for water resources management; create new funding systems for supporting cooperation, etc.”, <http://www.european-region-wwf2012.eu/spip.php?article121&lang=en> (accessed in March 2012).

142 Boonstra (2011), p. 4.

143 European Commission Communication, *European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper*, COM (2004) 373 final.

far from good. None of the initiatives in energy and environmental cooperation has materialized there. This is also the case with Uzbekistan, with which the EU has not yet succeeded in achieving a structured relationship. The situation reflects a significant phenomenon which concerns the attempt to treat Central Asian countries solely as passive recipients of the EU's demands for democratization. Such treatment will fail as a strategy over the long term and have only a limited impact.¹⁴⁴

Even with the growing role of the EU in the region, at present, the countries of Central Asia are still far from sharing the fundamental values set out in the Treaty of Lisbon. To the contrary, negative inertia in the operation of the internal structures of the State strengthens the position of dominant elites and their undemocratic habits ("the dark side of Europeanization").¹⁴⁵ This is aggravated by widespread corruption at different levels of decision-making. Currently, of the 178 countries ranked in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2010, Kazakhstan occupies position 105, Tajikistan stands at 154, Kyrgyzstan is at 164, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan both rank 172.¹⁴⁶ We cannot ignore the fact that the national actors in these States have their own agendas. Beyond formally supporting or resisting Europeanization, their actions focus in most cases on exploiting the process on behalf of their own interests¹⁴⁷. Amid this situation, the EU cannot ignore the authoritarian direction of some of these States nor their infringement of EU principles and values.¹⁴⁸

Clearly, the EU's actions have not had the desired effects, if we examine the level of Europeanization in the internal structures of the countries of Central Asia, whether we take a broad perspective or a sector perspective. Beyond one-

144 Olsen (2002); Katja Weber, Michael Smith and Michael Baun (eds.), *Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?*, Manchester, 2007; Gwendolyn Sasse, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours", *Europe Asia Studies* Vol. 60(2), 2008, pp. 295-316; Tanja Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk, *Europeanization Subverted? The European Union's Promotion of Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus*, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 26, April 2011; Boonstra (2011).

145 Börzel and Pamuk (2011); Boonstra (2011).

146 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 (accessed in March 2012).

147 Börzel and Pamuk (2011), pp. 20 and ff.

148 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, *Asie central, la dérive autoritaire*, Notes from the FSR (30 April 2006), pp. 3 and ff., <http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/20060430.pdf> (accessed in March 2012).

off formal changes to institutions, the EU's contributions appear more to have stabilized some of the existing regimes than to have transformed them according to the rule of law. As T. Börzel noted, "Rather than transforming structures (...) Europeanization helps to stabilize the political and economic structures of neighbourhood countries. While they have improved their statehood, the level of democracy has remained quite stable on a rather low level."¹⁴⁹

ii) The EU Strategy for Central Asia: A way forward?

In addition, the EU aims to influence the political behavior of Central Asia's regional actors within the framework offered the EU Strategy for Central Asia, of June 2007.¹⁵⁰ The Strategy defines three areas for EU intervention: the promotion of regional cooperation and good neighbor relations, a reduction in poverty and an improvement in living standards, and governance and economic reform. It also took a broad approach and identified a considerable number of priorities: human rights, the rule of law, good governance and democratization; youth and education; the promotion of economic development (trade and investment); strengthening of energy and transport policy; environmental sustainability and water management; the fight against common threats; and intercultural dialogue.

Environmental protection and water management feature among these priorities and they are closely tied to the general objectives of security, stability and development. In particular, water management has become one of the fundamental

149 Börzel and Pamuk (2011), pp. 20 and ff.

150 *The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership* (Brussels, June 2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf (accessed in March 2012) and *European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013*, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012). The starting point can be traced to 2001, the year when the EU first started to discuss its policy in Central Asia. However, it was not until October 2006 that, at the initiative of the German government, the leaders of the EU missions in the five countries met in Astana, in Kazakhstan. From this meeting emerged the initial ideas for the design of a strategy for Central Asia. Eventually adopted on 20 and 21 June 2007, the strategy is closely related to the objectives pursued by the EU by means of the EU-Russia Common Spaces Initiative and through the ENP with countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. In the more general context of the ENP, this structure follows the Union for the Mediterranean - http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (accessed in March 2012) -, the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy (*Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the Black Sea Synergy, a new regional cooperation initiative* COM(2007) 160 final), and precedes the Eastern Partnership (*Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Eastern Partnership*, COM(2008) 823 final).

challenges of the region that cannot be addressed solely in a unilateral or bilateral manner, but rather requires regional cooperation. In this sense, the Strategy sets out as a specific objective: “Support the implementation of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia component of the EU Water Initiative for safe water supply and sanitation and integrated water resources management; promote transboundary river basin management; give particular support to the integrated management of surface and underground transboundary water resources; enhance cooperation for appropriate frameworks for facilitating the financing of water related infrastructure projects; support regional capacity building on integrated water management and production of hydro power; encourage increased environmental awareness and the development of environmental civil society.”

Cooperation in this specific area has focused, on the one hand, on the development of the Water Initiative for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which draws on the experience of EU member States (EU Water Initiative Eastern Europe Caucasus Central Asia – EUWI EECCA Component)¹⁵¹ and, on the other hand, what has come to be called the “Berlin Process”,¹⁵² sponsored by the German government. The objective of both initiatives is to strengthen existing alliances and bilateral and regional programs that address the management of water resources.¹⁵³ In the specific case of the Water Initiative for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, several actions have been envisaged: promoting the management of transboundary water basins; assisting in the integrated management of transboundary surface water and groundwater, including the introduction of techniques for the more efficient use of water; improving cooperation to create more adequate frameworks for funding, including international financial institutions

151 See *EUWI-EECCA Component - organisational set-up, Technical Secretariat*, at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/25/39117081.pdf> (accessed In March 2012)

152 The process was launched by Germany in 2008 in order to “set in train a process of political rapprochement in Central Asia that leads to closer cooperation in the use of scarce water resources and may result in joint water and energy management in the long term”. There are three main components: fostering regional institutional cooperation; strengthening transboundary river basin management and implementing fast-track projects, http://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cadialogue/docs/BerlinProcess_ProjectFlyer_Eng.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

153 In these mechanisms, the European state that plays the role of strategic partner and takes the initiative in national dialogue with each Central Asian country may or may not be an EU member (e.g. Switzerland and Norway provide assistance to the region). It is this strategic partner who works directly with the Central Asian country to identify priorities and set objectives and who monitors progress toward meeting the goals of the EUWI.

and public and private funds; supporting the creation of regional abilities in integral water resources management and the production of hydroelectric energy.

The EU has also turned to more classic instruments devised in the framework of ministerial meetings, such as the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration adopted at the Security Forum (Paris, September 2008)¹⁵⁴ and the declarations of successive EU-Central Asia Ministerial Conferences.¹⁵⁵ These declarations reflect efforts focused on the several platforms for strengthening cooperation in the areas of environmental governance, climate change and sustainable water management. For example, the Joint Communiqué adopted at the Third High-Level Conference on Central Asia (Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation) expressly stated that “the EU is ready to use its cooperation capabilities to facilitate the implementation of best practices, the availability of drinking water and sanitation as well as the increase in the efficiency of water usage in energy and agriculture, while safeguarding the ecological balance in the region.”¹⁵⁶ This action is to be achieved through “a regular dialogue (...) on how to address the threats posed by climate change in Central Asia. We agreed to establish a new EU-CA Working Group on Environmental Governance and Climate Change, that will also help to strengthen policy cooperation at regional level and will provide guidance on cooperation activities between the EU and CA, taking advantage of the participation of other donors, IFIs, international organizations, regional bodies, including the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development in Central Asia, and representatives of civil society including NGOs and the private sector.”¹⁵⁷

The EU Strategy also entailed the multi-year Central Asia Indicative Program 2007-2010,¹⁵⁸ with financial assistance for the region over a period of seven years. The principal source was a new EU instrument, the Development Coop-

154 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN-strategyAsia_int.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

155 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/index_en.htm (accessed in March 2012).

156 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/conference_environment_water_1109_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

157 Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation, The Third EU-Central Asia High-Level Conference Rome, 5-6 November 2009, *Joint Communiqué between European Union and Central Asian countries*.

158 *Central Asia Indicative Programme 2007-10*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/nip_07_10_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

eration Instrument (DCI). The EU also earmarked additional funds to the region through instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Recently, the Commission has drawn up a new Indicative Program for the period 2011-2013,¹⁵⁹ totaling 321 million Euros. The goals for the new period remain the same as the original goals, but they now specify “the focus of DCI assistance interventions for each country of the region over the three-year period” in the context of the “coherence of EU policies and complementarity, both between EU-based programs and instruments and with those of other donors [...] in all priority areas”, making national priorities and programs the most significant current focus of change. From this perspective, the Commission took a positive step with the creation of a new aid instrument for Central Asia, the Investment Facility for Central Asia 2010 (IFCA),¹⁶⁰ which had a budget of 20 million Euros in 2010. The main aim of the IFCA is to promote additional investment in essential infrastructure, and the priority areas of the IFCA are energy¹⁶¹ and the environment,¹⁶² the improvement of transport infrastructure, the creation of small and medium-sized businesses and the improvement of social services (without prejudicing future expansion in these areas).

Notwithstanding, it seems that the EU Strategy for Central Asia lacks genuine implementation, and the governments in these countries have not taken advantage of their participation in the various EU initiatives. Additionally, it seems that the EU acting bilaterally and not regionally has had an important effect in the region. Similarly, the EU has not developed the mechanisms to push this

159 *Central Asia DCU Indicative Programme 2011–13*, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

160 *Investment Facility for Central Asia 2010 (IFCA)*, DCI-ASIE/2010/021-627, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2010/af_aap_2010_central-asia.pdf (accessed in March 2012); *Commission Decision of 23/04/2010 on the Annual Action Programme 2010 part 1 in favor of Central Asia to be financed under Article 19.10.02 of the general budget of the European Union*, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2010/aap_2010_central-asia_en.pdf (accessed in March 2012).

161 Better transport connections between the EU and Central Asia, and among the countries of Central Asia; better security of EU and Central Asian energy supplies; better security of energy infrastructure; improved energy efficiency and energy savings; higher production and use of renewable energy (wind, solar).

162 Better integrated water management, including infrastructure; reduced air, soil and water pollution; promotion of investments related to climate change (renewable energy, energy savings, cleaner production, etc.); promotion of integrated waste management (domestic, municipal and industrial waste), including the necessary infrastructure.

cooperation forward in a time when the severity of the economic crisis has clearly diverted the attention of the regions with which the EU has begun to build new ties. These mechanisms are still so diffuse that limits the effectiveness of EU action and, in the long term, poses obstacles to addressing the problems of international security in the region.¹⁶³

A further echo of such a situation appears in the report on the application of the EU Strategy for Central Asia in 2010, issued jointly by the Commission and the Council. This report acknowledges important deficiencies in terms of security and calls for greater efforts in this regard. According to the Report, “It will be necessary to expand the concept of security to include major international and regional challenges such as human security, combating drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings, precursors, nuclear and radioactive materials, uranium tailing, border management, bio-safety, bio-security, combating terrorism and preventing radicalization and extremism, including via a continued emphasis on poverty alleviation. Combating corruption is an important element in countering many of these security challenges.” Concerning environment, water and energy security, the Report also recognizes that “tensions between upstream and downstream countries over the construction of new hydropower facilities continue” that “present a major regional challenge and a challenge for the EU in terms of developing cooperation with and within the region” and that “there is a need to give an additional political impetus”, as well as to promote “an integrated approach to water resource management” and “transboundary dialogue on water management”.¹⁶⁴

163 Sébastien Peyrouse, “Human security in Central Asia: Can the EU help out?”, *EUCAM Policy Brief*, No. 21, October 2011; Boonstra (2011), p. 6.

164 Council of the European Union, Doc.11402/10, *The Joint EU Council and Commission Implementation Report of the EU Strategy for Central Asia*, 28 June 2010, p. 19, 20 and 26, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11402.en10.pdf> (accessed in March 2012).

Section V.

A sub-regional framework of cooperation to combat desertification through the Central Asian countries' initiative on land management

a. Sub-regional cooperation in Central Asia for the implementation of the UNCCD: Legal framework, institutional settings and actors involved

Other than it is the case for the global and regional multilateral treaties concerning the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes, all five Central Asian States are Parties to the three global environmental treaties stemming directly or indirectly from the UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, namely, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on the Climate Change and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the 1994 UNCCD.

Based on a very delicate compromise reached in the preliminary stages to the 1992 Rio Summit between developing States themselves, on the one hand, and developing and developed States, on the other hand,¹⁶⁵ this latter treaty gives rise to an international regime for the protection of a component of the global ecosystem –the soil– which is a natural resource under the jurisdiction of States. Adopting a strictly legal perspective, the UNCCD builds upon obligations stemming from general international law –such as the preventative or ‘do no harm’ principle–¹⁶⁶ by setting up a global framework of inter-state and transnational cooperation to address the causes leading to aridification and desertification, by promoting the sustainable use of land,¹⁶⁷ in what has been qualified as an example of post-modern global governance.¹⁶⁸ In so doing, however, the UNCCD relies heavily on the differential treatment between developed and developing

165 Bo. Kjellén, “The Saga of the Convention to Combat Desertification: The Rio/Johannesburg Process and the Global Responsibility for the Drylands”, *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, 12(2), 2003, pp.127-132. Aenza Konate, “L’Afrique et la Convention des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre la désertification”, *African Journal of International Comparative Law* 12(4), 2000, pp. 718-753, at p. 730-731.

166 UNCCD, Preamble, para. 15.

167 Art. 4.

168 Andreas Rechkemmer, *Postmodern Global Governance. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004, p. 172

States,¹⁶⁹ as it has to be acknowledged that there is a “high concentration of developing countries, notably the least developed countries, among those experiencing serious drought and/or desertification”.¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, countries affected by drought or desertification, on the one hand, and developed countries, on the other hand, undertake each different sets of obligations: whereas the former undertake to give due priority to the issue and to adopt measures to prevent and mitigate desertification to the extent of their available resources,¹⁷¹ developed States –either individually or jointly– undertake for their part to support those efforts by providing financial and technological means.¹⁷² The reciprocal nature of these commitments is made particularly evident in article 20 UNCCD –one of the convention’s central provisions concerning financial resources–, in which it is stated that “[t]he full implementation by affected developing country Parties (...) of their obligations under the Convention will be greatly assisted by the fulfilment by developed country Parties of their obligations under the Convention, including in particular those regarding financial resources and transfer of technology. In fulfilling their obligations, developed country Parties should take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first priorities of affected developing country Parties, (...)”¹⁷³

Furthermore, despite its global scope, the UNCCD was designed in order to rely significantly on regional, and even sub-regional, institutions for its implementation.¹⁷⁴ The Convention is actually complemented with five additional regional implementation annexes for Africa (Annex I), Asia (Annex II), Latin America and the Caribbean (Annex III), the Northern Mediterranean (Annex IV), and for Central and Eastern Europe (Annex V), all of which form an integral part

169 Lavanya Rajamani, *Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law*, OUP, Oxford, 2006.

170 Preamble, para. 5.

171 Art. 5.

172 Art. 6.

173 Art. 20 (7).

174 In pursuing the UNCCD’s objective, states shall *inter alia* “... (d) promote cooperation among affected country Parties in the fields of environmental protection and the conservation of land and water resources, as they relate to desertification and drought; (e) strengthen sub-regional, regional and international cooperation; (f) cooperate within relevant intergovernmental organizations; (g) determine institutional mechanisms, if appropriate, keeping in mind the need to avoid duplication; and (h) promote the use of existing bilateral and multilateral financial mechanisms and arrangements that mobilize and channel substantial financial resources to affected developing country Parties in combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought.”. See art. 4 (2).

of the Convention.¹⁷⁵ As pointed out in the literature on the negotiation of the Convention's text, initially only a specific regional implementation annex was foreseen for Africa, in order to cope with the UN General Assembly's mandate, in which it was implicit to put particular emphasis on the situation in the African continent.¹⁷⁶ However, fearing a disproportionate allocation of financial and technological resources to African States, in detriment of other developing countries, Asian and Latin American States also requested their own, specific regional implementation annexes.¹⁷⁷ However, the various regional annexes are quite divergent from each other. As Burns points out, in sharp contrast to other regional annexes, the Asian annex is fairly brief and its provisions strikingly general in content, thereby "reflecting the belief of Asian nations that detailed provisions were not appropriate on a continent marked by great geographical diversity".¹⁷⁸

The aforementioned features of the UNCCD's regional implementation annex for Asia (RIAA) may be regarded as highly symptomatic not only for geographical, but even more so, for political diversity and weak regional consciousness in the continent, as the only obvious motivation for the request for such an annex was not to lag behind Africa in financial and technological transfers from developed countries. In this particular context, moreover, Central Asian countries did not appear as a (sub) regional actor. Very much in the line of the previous analysis of section II, it may be assumed that the five Central Asian republics did not yet adopt an own sub-regional profile in this specific setting, due to their still very recent independence and their initial priority to underscore national sovereignty over regional alliances and integrative efforts.

Be that as it may, article 11 of the Convention allows countries affected by serious drought and/or desertification "to prepare, as appropriate, in accordance with relevant regional implementation annexes, sub-regional and/or regional action programmes to harmonize, complement and increase the efficiency of national programmes", further stating that "[s]uch cooperation may include agreed joint programmes for the sustainable management of transboundary

175 Art. 29 (1).

176 UNGA Res 47/188 (22 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/188.

177 William Burns, "The International Convention to Combat Desertification: Drawing a Line in the Sand?", *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 16 (3), 1995, pp. 831-883, at p. 861; Konate (2000), 718-53, p. 733.

178 Burns (1995), p. 862.

natural resources, scientific and technical cooperation, and strengthening of relevant institutions”. Article 5 RIAA further allows relevant countries “to entrust subregional, including bilateral or national organizations, or specialized institutions, with responsibilities relating to the preparation, coordination and implementation of programmes. Such organizations or institutions may also act as focal points for the promotion and coordination of [implementing] actions”.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, building upon national action plans (NAP) as the ultimate instrument of the UNCCD’s implementation, these may be streamlined and complemented through subregional, and even regional, action plans (SRAP, and RAP, respectively) in view of an enhanced effectiveness of the implementation measures.

After several preparatory meetings held in the middle 90s, Asian countries established a RAP based on six Thematic Programme Networks (TPN), each having their seat in different countries, their action being coordinated through a steering committee.¹⁸⁰ These networks deal respectively with ‘Desertification Monitoring and Assessment’ (TPN1), ‘Agroforestry and Soil Conservation in Arid, Semi-Arid, and Dry Sub-Humid Areas’ (TPN2), ‘Rangeland Management an in Arid Areas Including the Fixation of Sand Dunes’ (TPN3), ‘Water Resources Management for Agriculture in Arid, Semi-Arid, and Dry Sub-Humid Areas’ (TPN4), ‘Strengthening Capacities for Drought Impact Mitigating and Desertification Combating’¹⁸¹ (TPN5), and ‘Assistance for the Implementation of the Integrated Local Area Development Programmes (LAPDs) Initiatives’ (TPN6). All five Central Asian countries participate in TPN1 and TPN4, and some of them are also participating in other TPN.

In addition to the RAP and its six TPN, SRAP have also been adopted for South Asia, South-East Asia, North-East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and South Pacific. However, these mechanisms of regional and sub-regional cooperation seem to have been functioning properly. As highlighted in a recent workshop held by representatives of the UNCCD national focal points of Asian countries

179 RIAA, Art. 5 (1).

180 Declaration of the Beijing Ministerial Conference on Regional Cooperation to Implement the Convention to Combat Desertification in Asia, 13-15 May 1997, <http://archive.unccd.int/regional/asia/meetings/regional/2ndregionalconf/beires.htm>. Synthesis and Preliminary Analysis of Information Contained in Reports Submitted by Affected Asian Country Parties, And Progress Made in the Formulation and Implementation of Sub-regional and Regional Action Programmes in Asia. Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc ICCD/CRIC(1)/3/Add.1 (10 June 2002).

181 Ibid.

participating in the aforementioned SRAP, despite the initial momentum that led to their constitution, the activity of the TPN under the RAP rapidly decreased to a point of stagnation, mainly due to the lack of financial resources. And even though the different SRAP seem to have been more effective than TPN in fostering (sub)regional cooperation, affected countries are complaining also here about a structural lack of financial resources to enhance the operation of these mechanisms.¹⁸²

The five Central Asian countries adopted their SRAP in September 2003, during the 6th session of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held in La Habana (Cuba),¹⁸³ thereby concluding a process that had been set in motion in July 2000,¹⁸⁴ and had benefitted from technical and financial support through the *Strategic Partnership Agreement for UNCCD Implementation in the Central Asian Countries* adopted at COP5, involving initially the Convention's Global Mechanism (GM), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).¹⁸⁵ The support for this initiative grew quickly. During the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, moreover, the Strategic Partnership Agreement was presented as a Type II Partnership, aiming to support not only the implementation of the UNCCD in Central Asia, but more generally, to provide financial and technical assistance to a substantially broadened *Central Asian Initiative on Preparation and Implementation of Sub-Regional Agenda 21 as a Model for Sub-Regions*, led by the Central Asian Interstate Commission on Sustainable Development (ICSD-CA) and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC).¹⁸⁶ There after the Partnership Agreement was joined in 2003 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SADC), and the International

182 Report on Asia-Pacific NAPs/SRAPs Alignment Workshop, 12-13 September 2011, Bali, Indonesia, <http://archive.unccd.int/regional/asia/meetings/regional/COP10%20Preparatory/130911%20Riv%20Report%20of%20Asia-Pacific%20NAP%20SRAP%20Wkshp%20%28ATV%29%20lop.pdf>

183 Sub-regional Action Programme for the Central Asian Countries on Combating Desertification within the UNCCD Context, Havana, 3 September 2003, <http://www.unccd.int/ActionProgrammes/srapcd-eng2003>

184 Decision of the Ministerial Meeting on the Preparation of a Sub-Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in the Aral Sea Basin in the context of the UNCCD, 18 July 2000, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, <http://archive.unccd.int/regional/asia/meetings/subregional/aralSea2000/decision-eng.pdf>.

185 UN Doc ICCD/COP(5)/4 (11 September 2001), 50.

186 UN Docs A/CONF.199/CRP.4 (25 August 2002) and A/CONF.199/CRP.5 (28 August 2002).

Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA). In 2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also stepped in.¹⁸⁷

The SRAP's defines the objectives of sub-regional cooperation, which are focussed on the coordination of national implementation efforts, the enhancement of information and experience exchanges, the development and implementation of joint programmes, and the mobilization of bilateral and multilateral donors to support their coordinated action. Further, it identifies a series of thematic areas –such as monitoring and evaluation of desertification processes, the management of water resources in agriculture, the management of pastures and forest resources, the conservation of biological diversity, or economic capacity building of local communities– in which common endeavours under the SRAP enjoy priority. The main instruments for such cooperation comprise the implementation of national and sub-regional pilot projects, the furtherance of scientific cooperation, and the establishment of an information sharing system on desertification and land degradation in Central Asia.

The implementation of the SRAP ought to be coordinated and monitored at the national level through a national coordinating body (NCB), generally the competent Ministry or Agency. At the international level, monitoring and coordination takes place ordinarily through the meetings of national focal points for the UNCCD –convening at least once a year–, and through the Conference of Ministers responsible for their countries' participation in the UNCCD. This latter meeting is defined in the SRAP as “the highest governing body for the monitoring and coordination of the SRAP/CD implementation”, and should meet at least once every three years.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the different donors participating in the Strategic Partnership Agreement are to be involved in the consultative process, particularly with the government officials responsible for the implementation of the SRAP. Finally, the important role of NGOs, public organizations, and local authorities in the implementation process is also acknowledged. However, as it will be seen in the following sections, the sub-regional institutional arrangements set up to

187 ADB, GM, GEF, Canadian International Development Agency, GTZ-CCD, Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, ICARDA, IFAD, UNDP, *A Partnership Approach for Financing UNCCD Implementation. The Central Asian Experience*, October 2005, at p. 6, <http://www.global-mechanism.org/en/gm-publications/gm-publications/the-central-asian-experience-a-partnership-approach-for-financing-uncdd-implementation/download> (accessed in March 2012).

188 Decision of the Ministerial Meeting on the Preparation of a Sub-Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in the Aral Sea Basin in the context of the UNCCD (2000), p.14.

channel inter-state and transnational cooperation for the implementation of the UNCCD have grown and become more complex.

b. The implementation of the Sub-regional Action Programme for Central Asian Countries to Combat Desertification: the CACILM

Since the initiative was launched in 2000 Bishkek Conference of Ministers, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in 2001, the development and implementation of the UNCCD's SRAP for Central Asia may be divided in three periods, broadly speaking. In a first period, comprising the years 2000-2005, in which pilot projects were put in place in order to create the institutional arrangements necessary to start up the process of (sub)regional cooperation. Apart from community-based development projects financed and supported by the GTZ-CCD Project and the CIDA, several capacity building projects were financed and put in place by the international agencies participating in the SPA (see table 1). The second period initiated in 2006, with the adoption and implementation of the Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management Programme, supported by national and international agencies participating in the Strategic Partnership Agreement with estimated \$ 1.4 billion over a ten year period (2006-2016).¹⁸⁹ However, the withdrawal in 2010 of the ADB –the executing agency that had so far supported CACILM's multicountry framework project (CMFP) and its institutional arrangements– obliged to restructure the process under the aegis of the UNDP, and, more generally, casts doubts about the initiative's effectiveness.

i) The Tashkent Forum and the preparatory work leading to the CACILM

Shortly before the SRAP was officially signed in COP6 by all five Central Asian countries, and little after the GEF Governing Council had launched its *Operational Program on Sustainable Land Management*,¹⁹⁰ a forum was held in Tashkent in end of June, beginning of July 2003 under the aegis of the UNCCD's Global Mechanism, and with the support of the SPA. This meeting was attended by high-level governmental representatives and NGOs from the Central Asian republics, as

189 Global Environmental Facility, "Country Pilot Partnerships on Sustainable Land Management", CACILM Multi-country Partnership Framework - Executive Summary, 2006.

190 GEF Council, *Draft Operational Program on Sustainable Land Management*, GEF/C.21/6, 8 April 2003. Formally adopted during its 21st meeting; GEF Council, *Joint Summary of the Chairs*, GEF Council Meeting, 14-16 May 2003, GEF/C.21/Joint Summary, 20 May 2003.

well as international partners beyond those already participating in the SPA.¹⁹¹ Its most significant result was the adoption of the so-called ‘Tashkent Joint Platform of Action for UNCCD Implementation’, in which all participants reaffirmed their shared commitment i.e. to initiate a high level policy dialogue on issues related to desertification and land degradation, to enhance sub-regional cooperation in the field of sustainable natural resource management, and to the integration of the UNCCD’s objectives into ongoing sub-regional initiatives on sustainable development in Central Asia.¹⁹² According to the Forum’s final report, the underlying rationale to the Joint Platform was the evidence that “resource mobilisation for the UNCCD can neither be a one time nor a stand-alone activity but needs to be anchored in processes that seek to fulfill long term objectives”, and that therefore, there was a need to establish a participatory and effective institutional setting “in order to ensure ownership and commitment to seeing identified priorities translated into concrete activities”.¹⁹³ To that end, it was agreed to establish a *Working Group on Partnership Development for UNCCD Implementation* in each one of the five Central Asian countries, which ought be composed not only of high level governmental representatives, but should also integrate more broadly national¹⁹⁴ and international partners.¹⁹⁵ These national Working Groups’ main functions

191 The Global Mechanism, Report of the Sub-regional Partnership-Building Forum for Central Asian Republics: Confronting Land Degradation and Poverty through Enhanced UNCCD Implementation, Convened under the Aegis of the Strategic Partnership to Combat Desertification in Central Asia (SPA), Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, 30 June – 4 July 2003, <http://global-mechanism.org/en/Workshop-Reports/Workshop-Reports/Workshop-report-Tashkent-Uzbekistan-30-June-4-July-2003-Final-Report/Download>, (accessed in March 2012).

192 *ibid*, pp. 5-6.

193 *ibid*, p. 7.

194 In particular, national partners to each Central Asian country’s Working Group should include “representatives of Parliament, and Ministries and agencies dealing with Environment, Finance, Economy, Agriculture, Hydrometeorology, Water, Forests and Land Resource Management, Planning, Foreign Affairs, Education and Science and other relevant governmental agencies, the National Focal Point for the UNCCD, as well as, representatives from local governance bodies, civil society and the private sector. The Focal Point Institution for the UNCCD and a relevant Ministry will function as coordinators to facilitate the functioning of the Working Group and for information sharing. Attempts should be made to include a representative from the Cabinet and/or from the Presidential Office”; *ibid*, p. 8.

195 These should include “both key bilateral and multilateral donors such as Germany, Canada, Switzerland, USA, Japan, ADB, World Bank, UNDP/DDC, EU, [Islamic Development Bank], ICARDA, GM, etc. A single, or group of donors should function as coordinator(s) to facilitate the functioning of the Working Group and for information sharing among partners”. Moreover, the UNCCD’s Global Mechanism is a standing member of the Working Group; *ibid*, p. 8.

were to provide a standing platform for dialogue, thereby promoting coordination between national actors and international development partners and, hence, fostering partnerships between the Central Asian countries and the donors, leading eventually to the implementation of pilot projects.¹⁹⁶

After the GEF had been appointed to perform the functions of the financial mechanism under article 21 UNCCD in COP 6,¹⁹⁷ the GEF Governing Council decided in its 22nd meeting to require from the implementing and executing agencies to increase their efforts to establish projects under the operational program on sustainable land management.¹⁹⁸ Accordingly, under the initiative of the ADB, the SPA members intensified consultations in the context of the Tashkent process in order to formulate a long-term resource mobilization strategy under the GEF Program. In February 2004 a further workshop was convened at Almaty, in which the fundamental cornerstones of a new ten year project for the period 2006-2015 were set up under the common denomination of 'Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management' (CACILM). A so-called Multicountry CACILM Task Force was established, chaired by the ADB, with the mandate to develop fully the project and submit it to GEF approval.¹⁹⁹ In February 2005, the GEF Secretariat granted funding for the initiative's development.²⁰⁰ Hence, a broad consultative process was launched in each Central Asian country within the CCD national working groups established after the Tashkent forum. Coordinated through the CACILM Taskforce, the different national working groups met several times during 2005 and early 2006, in order to draw up the so-called National Programming Frameworks (NPF), taking as a starting point the NAP that each one of those countries had previously established in isolation from each other under article 9 UNCCD. The CACILM Multicountry

196 These should aim particularly at the development of technical packages to combat desertification/land degradation using a participatory and integrated approach for promoting sustainable natural resource management; designing models of broad participation in planning and implementation; establishing institutional linkages for policy harmonization; exploring innovative funding sources; providing services at the community level through private sector and other structures geared for improving the living conditions of local communities; the improvement of desertification monitoring and assessment systems; and/or the collection and sharing of information on desertification/land degradation related issues; *ibid*, pp. 8-9.

197 Dec 6/COP6 (3 September 2003) UN Doc ICCD/COP(6)/11/Add.1.

198 GEF Council, *Joint Summary of the Chairs*, GEF Council Meeting, 19-21 November 2003, 25 November 2003, GEF/C.22/Misc/6, para. 37.

199 CACILM, "CACILM Multi-country Partnership Framework Project Document", *Asian Development Bank*, April 2006, p. 10.

200 *ibid*; table 1.

Partnership Framework Project was finally submitted to the GEF Secretariat on 24 March 2006,²⁰¹ and approved by the GEF Governing Council in late August.²⁰²

Table 8. Achievements of the SPA prior to the establishment of the CACILM (2001-2005)

Initiative	SPA Members and Cost	Summary Information
Regional Technical Assistance Programme for Combatting Desertification in Asia (RETA 5941)	ADB: \$250 000 GM: \$200 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analytical studies on issues and approaches to combat desertification in each country and a regional synthesis report were prepared under this assistance programme. It also provided the factual basis for orienting SPA responses. The studies contributed to the integration of the UNCCD into the ADB's Central Asia country environmental analysis reports, country strategies and programme; IFAD's subregional strategy and issues paper for Central Asia and CIDA's programme for Central Asia.
Capacity Building of UNCCD Focal Point Offices	GM: \$ 26 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initiative facilitated inter-sectoral coordination, broadened stakeholder participation and launched mainstreaming activities.
Regional Environmental Officer (3 years)	GM: \$130 000 IFAD: \$ 70 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Regional Environment Officer, to coordinate SPA and country activities is hosted by ICARDA's Tashkent Office
Community-based dryland development activities	CCD Project of GTZ: over \$ 1 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local-level pilot projects to facilitate participatory and sustainable forms of land use. Actively supported the elaboration of a sub-regional action programme to combat desertification that promotes sub-regional collaboration.
Community Mobilization in Central Asia	GM: \$ 100 000 UNDP: \$ 100 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ongoing initiative to establish a cadre of community mobilizers and trainers to work in collaboration with the UNCCD focal point offices to institutionalize participatory approaches for sustainable land management.
Community-based Rangeland Management in Temir Village (Kyrgyzstan)	CIDA: \$ 200 000 GM: \$ 22 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This project was developed by the Global Mechanism and explores the linkages between climate change and land degradation. This project is being implemented by UNDP in Kyrgyzstan under the guidance of the Kyrgyz irrigation Research Institute.
Subregional Training Programme under the SRAP-CD	GM: \$ 77 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The training programme seeks to improve human and institutional capacity for implementing sustainable land management in the Central Asian countries. Collaborators include the National institute of Deserts, Flora and Fauna of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Turkmenistan and the CCD Project of GTZ.
Central Asian Countries Initiative on Land Management (CACILM) (Programme Development Facility [PDF] B design)	GEF: \$ 700 000 ADB: \$ 500 000 GM : \$ 50 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Global Environment Facility (GEF) committed to financially support the development of a comprehensive response for UNCCD implementation at the Tashkent Forum (in Uzbekistan).

Source: ADB, GM, GEF, Canadian International Development Agency, GTZ-CCD, Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, ICARDA, IFAD, UNDP, 'A Partnership Approach for Financing UNCCD Implementation. The Central Asian Experience', October 2005, 7. Available at <<http://www.global-mechanism.org/en/gm-publications/gm-publications/the-central-asian-experience-a-partnership-approach-for-financing-unccd-implementation/download>> (last access: 5 February 2012).


²⁰¹ <http://www.adb.org/Projects/CACILM/milestones.asp> (accessed in March 2012).

²⁰² GEF Council, *Joint Summary of the Chairs*, Special GEF Council Meeting, 28 August 2006, 30 August 2006, GEF/C.29/JointSummary, para. 9.

ii) The early operation of the CACILM: an assessment

The CACILM was officially launched on 16 November 2006.²⁰³ The project was set up for a ten year period (2006-2016), structured in three phases: phase I (inception) to be implemented until 31 December 2008, phase II (full implementation) until 31 December 2013, and phase III (consolidation) finalizing on 30 June 2016.²⁰⁴ Its core element are the NPF, through which the objective of sustainable land management is streamlined and integrated into the policy, budgeting, investment and monitoring mainstream in each one of the Central Asian countries, with the technical and financial support from the SPA.²⁰⁵ To that end, the institutional arrangements for the CACILM rely significantly on those that had previously been drawn up in the context of the Tashkent process, and that had proven to be particularly effective. Thus, the various national working groups established after the Tashkent forum were formalized into standing National Coordination Councils (NCC), and enacted in each Central Asian republic under national law.²⁰⁶ The five NCC are assisted, respectively, by their national secretariats, and coordinated through the CACILM Steering Committee, that takes over from the previous CACILM Task Force. In turn, the Steering Committee is assisted by the CACILM Secretariat (see table 2).

Table 9. CACILM institutional arrangements



Source: (CACILM. 2006), at 65.

203 Footnote 212

204 CACILM (2006), p. 31.

205 *ibid.*, p. 61.

206 *ibid.*, p. 66.

Notwithstanding specificities in each country, NCC are broadly composed of representatives of key government ministries, the SPA partners, the UNCCD Focal Point, as well as representatives of NGOs, the private sector, and the civil society. The NCCs' main functions are to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the NPF, monitor the performance of all projects and activities, and report to the CACILM Steering Committee.²⁰⁷ The Steering Committee, for its part, is composed of governmental representatives of the five Central Asian countries, the various GEF implementing and executing agencies (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, ADB, FAO, and IFAD), the GM, as well as bilateral agencies (GTZ, CIDA and SADC), and other international organizations participating in CACILM projects. Within this context, initially, the ADB took over the Steering Committee's chair and provided the CACILM Secretariat.²⁰⁸ The Steering Committee is responsible for the overall direction of CACILM. Further, it monitors the performance of the multi-country projects implemented within the CACILM and reports to the GEF.²⁰⁹

Still, despite the promising outline of the CACILM and its institutional and financial arrangements, its early operation demonstrated the sheer difficulty to implement its quite ambitious objectives. Several factors may explain it. However, it seems as if the most important one would lie in a somewhat unequal commitment by the different Central Asian countries to uphold the process' momentum. Admittedly, the Multicountry Secretariat's first performance report for the year 2007 did sound quite optimistic.. Even though few specific results could be shown at that moment, the Multi-country Secretariat considered that much of the foundation necessary for CMPF progress was laid during 2007. In each CAC, the National Coordination Councils and National Secretariats were formed, and progress was made to establish the NPFs as the basis for improving land management in their country. The CACILM Multicountry Secretariat was established, the First CACILM Steering Committee Meeting held, and a number of procedures developed for CACILM operations. Progress Reports on NPF Implementation in each Central Asian Country for 2007 were prepared by their National Secretariats and are provided as annexes to this report. The

207 *ibid.*

208 Asian Development Bank, *Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management*, Multicountry Partnership Framework Support Project (Cofinanced by the Global Environment Facility and International Fund for Agricultural Development). Technical Assistance Report, Appendix 3, November 2006.

209 CACILM, "CACILM Multicountry Partnership Framework Project Document", *Asian Development Bank*, April 2006, p. 65-6.

SLM-Research and the SLM-Knowledge Management multi-country component projects of the CMPF-SP are mobilized and reported results for 2007. The design of the SLM-Information System was revised. In parallel, progress was made to mobilize the medium and full size sustainable land management projects in all CACs and in mobilizing the parallel funding of GTZ during 2007.²¹⁰

However, already in its performance report for 2008, the tone became a little more sceptical. With respect to national implementation projects for sustainable land management, Kazakhstan was reported to be lagging behind, as none of the projects that had qualified for UNDP/GEF funding had been started. Also ADB/GEF investment projects were found to have a slow start in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In contrast thereto, multi-country projects scored ‘good progress’, and ‘certain progress’ was considered to have been achieved towards the realization of the CACILM’s general outcomes. Nevertheless, in its recommendations for future action, the assessment report also highlights a general situation of lacking coordination and cooperation, and stresses the urgent need for some sort of platform for the Multi-country Secretariat to meet regularly with the various National Secretariats to discuss technical matters, share experience, and coordinate their actions, particularly in large investment projects destined to capacity building. Uncoordinated reporting was also thought to hamper effective monitoring of the ongoing projects.²¹¹

Even though an initial joint workshop between the Multi-country Secretariat and its national counterparts was held in Bishkek in February 2009 in response to the aforementioned situation, the ADB decided to end its participation in CACILM after phase I during that year. Its participation was definitively completed by 30 June 2010. In its technical assistance completion report, the responsible ADB officer made an overall positive assessment of the CACILM project, but highlighted nevertheless some crucial shortcomings and difficulties.²¹²

210 CACILM Multicountry Secretariat, “CACILM Multicountry Partnership Framework - Performance Monitoring Report”, *Asian Development Bank*, April 2008, p. 3.

211 CACILM Multicountry Secretariat, “Performance Monitoring Report for 2008”, *Asian Development Bank*, March 2009, pp. 22-3.

212 TA 6357-REG, *Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management Multicountry Partnership Framework Support Project - Technical Assistance Completion Report*, Asian Development Bank, 18 May 2011.

Overall, CACILM's institutional arrangements were reported to have worked efficiently throughout phase I, even though the National Secretariat of Tajikistan was found to have performed poorly, due to underqualified leading staff. This notwithstanding, it was said that a favourable environment for effective coordination and implementation of the NPFs, and for the attraction of land management investment had been created in the Central Asian countries. Further, the information system set up was assessed as one of the projects most successful components, as hitherto inaccessible key data had been collected and made available to the National Secretariats through the Multi-country Secretariat. ICARDA had also initiated research activities on sustainable land management in all five countries, the results of which could only be properly appraised in the longer run.

As already mentioned, despite this overall positive assessment, the completion report also highlights remarkable deficits. Whereas CACILM's phase I had been successful in creating and gathering knowledge about sustainable land management in Central Asia, the report complains about a lacking culture of knowledge-sharing between and within the countries in the region. Within this context, it implies resistance to make the gathered knowledge easily available to the general public through the internet and regrets that no mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge and research results to farmers in the rural areas were put in place. And last, but not least, the completion report also reports about an unsatisfactory cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors, "as the co-funding agencies (GTZ and UNDP) were not performing as well as would have been expected as a result of a lack of an accountability mechanism".²¹³

iii) The remains of CACILM under the aegis of UNDP

The withdrawal of the ADB definitively meant the end of the CACILM Multicountry Framework Project and the logistical and financial support to the institutional arrangements that had been set up for sub-regional cooperation to implement the UNCCD. Nevertheless, even if seriously hit in the very centre of its operational structure, the cancellation of the ADB's involvement does not mean the end of CACILM, which has entered in the meantime into its implementation phase (phase II). Despite their slow start and notorious delay, several national and multi-country sustainable land management projects funded by bilateral and multilateral donors –particularly the UNDP– are presently on their way

²¹³ *ibid.*, p. 2.

(see table 3). One of the most significant ones, due to its strategic importance to the CACILM, is the Multicountry Capacity Building Project, led by the UNDP, which has recently been submitted to its mid term evaluation.²¹⁴

As highlighted in the conclusions of the aforementioned Mid Term Report, the ADB's withdrawal meant almost immediately the collapse of the National Coordination Councils and the National Secretariats in all Central Asian republics, except for Uzbekistan, due to the lack of budgetary resources to sustain their operation. National Secretariats and consultative structures similar to the NCCs were reestablished in the second half of 2010 with the support from the German *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ, formerly GTZ). In this sense, the report signals that the CACILM structure through which the Project was to act and was to strengthen has been weakened by the withdrawal of ADB but not fatally. The CACILM Framework is still highly valued in each country and the [Multicountry Capacity Building Project] MCB needs to better focus its efforts to strengthening this in a few directions so it can play its intended role in building a sustainable SLM structure.²¹⁵

However, UNDP's present management arrangements for the Multicountry Capacity Building Project are called into question and correcting actions are recommended in this regard.²¹⁶ Moreover, it suggests initiating a process to review and enhance CACILM's institutional arrangements, in order to make them more stable and ensure their long-term survival. In particular, the reviewers consider it necessary to enhance and stabilize the National Coordination Centres and Secretariats (or equivalent structures) in each country. At the same time, they propose to investigate more durable forms of institutionalization for multi-country regional cooperation within CACILM, which are acceptable to the UNCCD Focal Points, the relevant high level authorities in the Central Asian countries, as well as to likely donors. More specifically, the reviewers clearly suggest embedding or associating the CACILM framework to the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), an idea that would have –at least in principle– the official support of all five Central Asian countries. In this way, so the reviewers' argument goes, regional cooperation in the field of sustainable land management would be upgraded and

214 John Leake and Kanysh. Nuryngereyev, "CACILM Multi-country Capacity Building Project Mid Term Evaluation Report" UNDP, 29 October 2011.

215 *ibid.*, p. 45.

216 *ibid.*, p. 46-7.

integrated into policy structures and international institutions, which are dealt with at presidential level within each country. At the same time, such an association is thought contributing to coordinate and streamline two intimately related policy areas such as the sustainable management of land and water resources, as IFAS is “an institution that has water policy and sustainable development objectives, both highly relevant to [sustainable land management] and vice versa”.²¹⁷

Table 10. Ongoing country and multicountry sustainable land management projects under UNDP

Area of Work	Country	Project Title	Project Start Date	Expected Closing Date	GEF Funding	Country Investment
Land Degradation	Uzbekistan	CACILM CPP: Achieving Ecosystem Stability on degraded land in Karakalpakstan and the Kyzylkum Desert	17/12/2007	March 2013	\$ 950 359	\$ 2 267 250
Land Degradation	Turkmenistan	CACILM CPP: Capacity Building and On-the-Ground investments for Sustainable Land Management	12/10/2007	June 2011	\$ 975 000	\$ 1 074 000
Land Degradation	Kyrgyzstan	CACILM CPP: Demonstrating Sustainable Mountain Pasture Management in the Susamyr Valley, Kyrgyzstan	3/12/2007	30/11/2012	\$ 950 000	\$ 989 216
Land Degradation	Tajikistan	Demonstrating Local Responses to Combating Land Degradation and Improving Sustainable Land Management in SW Tajikistan				
Land Degradation	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	CACILM CPP: Multicountry Capacity Building Project	10/12/2009	1/12/2012	\$ 2 865 000	\$ 3 311 500
Land Degradation	Kazakhstan	CACILM CPP: Sustainable Rangeland Management for Rural Livelihood and Environmental Integrity	21/11/2008	March 2012	\$ 950 000	\$ 2 899 201

Source: http://www.undp.org/gef/document/project_by_region/Europe_CIS_project%2olist.pdf (last access: 5 February 2012)

217 *ibid*, p. 47.

Section VI: Final remarks

Although it would be wrong to claim that there is a cohesive ‘Central Asian region’ that can be considered as an international stakeholder, we have identified enough common points to suggest that an entity of this sort might emerge in the future. For example, to judge from the speeches made by representatives of the States at the UN GA there seem to be a number of areas of shared interest that they consider to be priorities: environmental matters, in particular, international cooperation in the fight against climate change, and the management of energy resources. Nonetheless, each State has its own objectives and favors different ways of trying to achieve them.

With this starting point, some concluding remarks can be made from a threefold perspective; all of them related to how and to what extent the five Central Asian republics interact in the international arena.

Firstly, and as for the participation of these States to global and regional international organizations, it has to be noticed that Kazakhstan stands out among the five States in terms of its high level of involvement in international organizations. The presence of the other republics in these institutions is lower, although they are now showing signs of seeking a fuller role. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are probably the two States with the lowest levels of participation; in the case of Turkmenistan, the recognition of its status of neutrality²¹⁸ has underpinned its foreign activity, in particular its membership of regional structures in the areas of security and defence such as the CSTO and the SCO.

So far, the differences between the five republics have prevailed and hindered cooperation on issues of common interest. In this context, the international organizations with a more restricted composition have been limited in their impact showing the limits of international cooperation between these countries. Only under the supervision of third powers, like Russia or China, there have been some goals achieved, but then marked more by interests other than intrinsic to the five Central Asian republics.

²¹⁸ Resolution of the GA 50/80, 12 December 1995.

However, regional organizations have also provided outreach to the region and have promoted the international debate on the challenges faced. In this context, it can be stated that either by the action of regional organizations, either by the participation of the five republics in global organizations, institutionalized international cooperation is a fertile ground to facilitate relations between them. It could be expected that the joint action of all these shared forums would change the current balance so that common interest would prevail over differences. Only on this basis, may one day the five republics act as a ‘cohesive region’ in international relations.

Secondly, concerning the externally EU induced regional cooperation in the specific field of transboundary water management in the region of Central Asia, it has been agreed that the EU needs to redouble its efforts so that its intervention is effective in an extremely difficult political setting. On the one hand, the EU’s strategy must be to ensure the application of the principles and values set out in the Treaty. On the other hand, nonetheless, its action is not free of ambiguity because, ultimately and beyond the desire to spread EU values abroad,²¹⁹ the Europeanization action seems to respond to much more pragmatic criteria - to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy actions from the regional perspective, to limit external threats to EU security in the areas of immigration policy, security policy, the consolidation of democratization and the rule of law in neighboring States.-

Although water management is clearly a challenge for the region and requires a regional approach, this does not imply that only a regional approach is needed. To the contrary, combining regional activities with bilateral²²⁰, national and local activities is crucial. Indeed, only a comprehensive, multi-level approach can harmonize efforts, adequately reflect the complexity of water resource management in the region and make it possible strategically to go beyond the regional

219 Biscop (2009).

220 The most active member states in Central Asia (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland) have bilateral and regional assistance programmes focusing on education, health care, food safety, access to water, poverty relief, environmental concerns, etc. Other international forums, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank also promote cooperation in these areas. In addition to the most active EU states listed above, Switzerland, Norway, Canada and the United States also have bilateral or regional aid programmes in education, health care, food safety, access to water, poverty relief, the environment, etc.

dimensions of the EU's current neighborhood policy.²²¹ In this vein, it must be remembered that the EU's activities in support of Europeanization do not constitute a single and exclusive model in the particular case of water resource management. Rather, Europeanization must be viewed jointly with actions taken under the auspices of other international institutions; actions undertaken bilaterally by EU member States or by third States of especial relevance in the area and actions taken by private networks and actors with specific expertise²²².

Therefore, it is necessary to establish an effective regional framework that allows improvement of the State's capacities over their natural resources and that facilitates political cooperation, coordination and institutionalization in the field of environment and energy. Such a regional framework should be based on the shared basin approach and covers all issues in a multisectoral and comprehensive way. The 1992 Helsinki agreement should provide part of this framework. Its ratification by all States in the region would be a first step in facilitating this consensus in Central Asia. Therefore, beyond the challenge of attracting external funding for water infrastructure, the countries of the region should focus on developing an institutional environment to facilitate negotiation and implementation of the principles of international law governing this matter.


Thirdly, in the area of establishing a regional cooperation tools order to foster sustainable land management, it may be concluded that the CACILM process between the Central Asian countries neither is a failure, nor a success. The five Central Asian countries have identified shared problems and common interests in the field of sustainable land management and the prevention of land degra-

221 Michael Emerson and Jos Boonstra, "Into EurAsia Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy. Executive Summary and Recommendations", *EUCAM, EU-Central Asia Monitoring, Policy Brief*, No. 13, February 2010, p. 2.

222 Asia-Pacific Water Forum (APWF), *Global Water Partnership for Caucasus and Central Asia (GWP CACENA)*, The national ministries of agriculture and water resources of Central Asian countries, Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, Executive Agency of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea for implementation of the GEF and ASBP Projects, Uzbekistan, Basin water organizations "Amudarya" and "Syrdarya", Coordination Metrological Centre ICWC, International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), UNEP/GRID-Arendal, World Water Council, International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO), Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, Scientific Information Centre of the Interstate Commission on Sustainable Development, Turkmenistan, Coordination Regional Dispatch Centre "Energy", Uzbekistan, Institute of Water Problems, Hydropower, and Ecology of the Academy of Sciences, Tajikistan, NGO Ecoforum, Uzbekistan, Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC), Kazakhstan, Socio-Economic Studies Centre, Uzbekistan, State Water Inspection, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan Su Arnasy, Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company, JSC, KEGOC.

ation and/or desertification for technical cooperation in the region, probably due to its technical and relatively de-politicized nature. Hence, all five Central Asian countries have established structures for cooperation in the process of implementation of their respective international obligations undertaken in the UNCCD. However, the analysis of the preparations for the adoption of the SRAP-CA and the CACILM, as well as the latter's process implementation clearly demonstrate that the Central Asian countries commitment and capacity to sustain a subregional framework of cooperation to combat desertification through sustainable land management depends heavily on international technical and financial support. Yet, the low political profile of the CACILM process, and the lacking will or capacity of the relevant national administrative bodies to engage in a meaningful exchange of information and knowledge hampers the effectiveness of the initiative and does not contribute to create an attractive environment for investment by international donors.

At the same time, national and regional efforts to combat soil degradation and desertification have not yet been properly mainstreamed with other more or less consolidated processes of regional cooperation for the sustainable management of natural resources, such as water resources. At present, the idea of embedding or, at least, associating the CACILM process to IFAS seem to be on the political agenda. If such an initiative were to be successful, a huge step forward would be made in order to integrate two deeply related policy areas relevant for the sustainable management of natural resources. Moreover, it would contribute to politically upgrade the CACILM process and stabilize its institutional arrangements. However, whether the CACILM will effectively be linked to IFAS, and if so, under what conditions, still remains to be seen.



**NEW ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS
OF ANALYSIS IN THE ENERGY
MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA:
CASE STUDIES FROM KAZAKHSTAN
AND TURKMENISTAN**

Section I: Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asian region saw the emergence of an open and empty *geo-energy space*²²³ comprising what are known as the five *stans*: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In terms of the management of its energy resources this region must address a highly particular set of circumstances, which one could argue are unique in the history of international energy relations.

Firstly, there is the matter of creating a new, regional geo-energy space on the remaining foundations of the old Soviet space. The dissolution of the USSR led to a severing of the key segments of energy transmission lines in Kazakhstan, the enormous branches of the network that stretched throughout Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the European Soviet republics²²⁴. This, as Smeenk²²⁵ puts it, was akin to amputating the Soviet *energy value chain* and, therefore, it raised the need either to rebuild regional energy chains or

223 Aurelia Mañé, Hidrocarburos en Kazajastán: nuevas realidades y enfoques para el estudio de las relaciones energéticas de Asia Central. *Revista de Economía Crítica*, 12 (2011): 131-154. This is “a *geographical area with an energy governance structure. To be precise, a geographical space where a precise set of energy relationships take place among different agents – producer states, enterprises and consumer governments – who are active within it*” See Mañé, A.. European Energy Security: towards the creation of the geo-energy space. *Energy Policy*. 34: 3773-3786, 2005. As Kérébel states, these spaces contain “the architecture of institutions and processes – formal and informal, public and private – which contribute to the definition of collective rules and the structuring of energy relations”. See C. Kerebel, Qu’est-ce que la gouvernance globale de l’énergie ? Les termes du débat. In *La gouvernance mondiale de l’énergie*, ed. J.H. Keppler and C. Kérébel, IFRI, 2009. Available online: http://www.ifri.org/files/Energie/Sommaire_Gouvernance_liens.pdf

224 Mañé, Aurèlia and De la Cámara, Carmen, “Asia Central: una región en transición hacia la pobreza energética”, *ICE. Revista de Economía*, No. 857, November-December 2010.

225 T. Smeenk, Russian Gas for Europe: Creating Access and Choice. Underpinning Russia’s gas export strategy with Gazprom’s infrastructure investments. *Clingendael International Energy Programme*. 2010, Available on line: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100622_dissertation_CIEP_Tom%20Smeenk.pdf

to connect to existing ones, such as the emerging Russian, Chinese or ‘traditional’ Western supply chains.

Secondly, this new, regional geo-energy space has to take shape within a region that has a skewed distribution of natural resources, a region which since the time of the Tsars had been centrally managed from the capital but which is now characterized by a series of cross-border and transnational relationships of dependency²²⁶. A qualitative summary of these relationships is shown in **Table 11**.

Table 11. Energy dependencies in Central Asia

Origin	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Turkmenistan	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan		Coal Gas	Hydrocarbon transportation (HT) Oil		HT Oil
Kyrgyzstan	Water				
Turkmenistan	HT				HT
Tajikistan					Water
Uzbekistan	Gas Electricity	Coal Gas		Gas	

Source: WEO, 2010

As was demonstrated in a previous study²²⁷ this severing of the energy network and the interdependencies shown in **Table 11** are driving most of the region towards *energy poverty*. In many debates the proposed solution to this situation, which also has serious environmental consequences, is that the water-rich countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) exchange their water for energy from the countries with an abundant supply of fossil fuel and mineral resources (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). In a way, what lies behind such proposals is the idea, albeit an intuitive one, that the five *stans* can be regarded as a single

226 Mañé & de la Cámara (2010)

227 Ibid.

unit in geo-energy terms, since their shared experience of disconnection from the old Soviet network gives them, in turn, a shared destiny: to replicate on a regional scale the centralized (Soviet) management of these resources so that they all have enough energy and water.

While it is true that this could be one way of managing, at least partially, the energy and environmental problems of the region the present paper starts from the premise that for this to occur it is necessary:

- a) for the region of the five stans, above and beyond its constituent countries, to be perceived as existing as such, and subsequently,
- b) that it is possible for regional stakeholders to manage with regional criteria the natural resources (energy, minerals and water) to be found on and below the surface of their territory.

Previous studies²²⁸ have raised the possibility that regional stakeholders do not regard their regional space as the territory delimited by the borders of the five *stans*. Moreover, it is noted in these studies, as well as in articles by correspondents of the *Central Asia Observatory*, that each of these countries differs in terms of what it understands to be its area of regional alliances. Given this, we believe it is unlikely that condition ‘a’ will be fulfilled, unless the Central Asian region is defined in a wider sense within a Euro-Asian space.

In the present paper, however, the focus is on the possibility of condition ‘b’ being fulfilled, this being considered through the analysis of three case studies: oil and uranium from Kazakhstan, and gas from Turkmenistan. To this end the paper follows a methodological approach suggested in previous studies²²⁹, namely to apply global commodity chain (GCC) or global value chain (GVC)²³⁰ analysis to the energy relationships in the region. This is done with four aims:

- a) to determine whether there are regional value chains that are truly proper to the region, i.e. a geo-energy space which, as stated above, rebuilds the severed network on a regional scale,

228 Laura Huici, “Marco institucional regional y gobernanza”, *Información Comercial Española*, 857: (2010): 97-110; Aurelia Mañé, “Año de crisis: perspectivas y alianzas en Asia Central”. In *Anuario Asia-Pacífico 2009* (edición 2010), AA.VV., 41-48, Barcelona: Fundación CIDOB.

229 Mañé (2011).

230 For a definition of these terms, see Section III.

- b) to identify the energy chains in which the energy resources of Central Asian territories are currently being concentrated, and therefore the power relationships that are in operation,
- c) to consider whether, in light of these power relationships, conflict or cooperation is the most likely outcome between the five countries of the region, and finally,
- d) to suggest which elements the regional energy governance structure should have.

To this end the rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The first sets out very briefly the current energy context in which the energy resources of Central Asia will have to be integrated, a context that is characterized by large transnational (global) energy chains involving new kinds of energy stakeholders alongside the ‘traditional’ international oil companies (IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs)²³¹. The next, conceptual and methodological section explains why, given the current situation, it is appropriate to apply analyses based on GCCs to the question of energy relations. The following section, which is more empirical, analyses the cases of oil and uranium in Kazakhstan and of gas in Turkmenistan (these being resources which are integrated within GCCs), the aim being to determine whether there are regional energy chains and to identify the power relationships that might exist within them. These cases were chosen due to the importance of the two countries as producers: Kazakhstan is the principal producer of oil and uranium in Central Asia, while Turkmenistan is the main gas producer. The final section presents the conclusions to be drawn from the study.

Section II.

The global energy context within which the resources of Central Asia will be integrated

As is the case for all post-Soviet territory the Central Asian energy space is emerging in a very different context to that which would correspond to a *dichotomous energy paradigm* (DEP). According to this paradigm, energy relations are conflictive and antagonistic and developed between two kinds of countries: *consumers* and *producers*. In previous studies it has been explained why it makes

²³¹ See Table 13.

little sense to analyse the role of natural resources in Central Asia within a DEP framework, i.e. it is not helpful to conceptualize, for example, Kazakhstan as if it were a *producer country*²³².

Briefly, and as shown in **Table 12**, this is because the energy model changes as there ceases to be a functional relationship between the economic structure and the existing energy model. Although detailed examination of this point goes beyond the scope of this paper, one might say that the crisis appears when the energy model no longer adapts to the existing paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense)²³³.

Table 12: Function, within capitalism, of countries rich in energy resources²³⁴

	Colonialism (end of eighteenth century-1940)	Bipolar world (1945-1989)	Global world (1990-the present day)
Dominant energy	Coal	Hydrocarbons	Energy mix
Hegemonic economy	United Kingdom	United States	Under construction
Stage of capitalism	Concurrential to monopoly capitalism	Fordism	Finance capitalism
Function of territories rich in natural resources	Supply basic assets or being an enclave	Supply 'cheap' primary energy for the industrialization of the OECD	Supply 'affordable' global energy and finance debtor countries of the OECD through petro-dollars or sovereign funds
Institutions 'with power' within the international energy industry	'Seven Sisters'	OPEC and OECD (IEA)	Large IOCs and the new super NOCs of emerging countries and energies and financial funds

Source: Own elaboration

²³² Mañé (2011).

²³³ M. Sheer, *Autonomía Energética*. Barcelona: Icaria-Antrazyt, 2009. Aurèlia Mañé, "Repensando la política energética. Reflexiones a partir de unas lecturas veraniegas". *Revista de Economía Crítica*, 12 (2011): 226-238.

²³⁴ Although this aspect is referred to in the table a more detailed examination is left for future analyses that will be conducted as part of project RICIP2010.

As can be seen in **Table 12** there have been different stages (energy periods) which are characterized not only by the use of different combinations of energy sources but also by the whole economic, geographical, political and social organization that was an inherent part of each energy model.

Since the invention of the steam engine towards the end of the eighteenth century there have been two hegemonic models of capitalism, and we are now in transition towards a third. The first model, corresponding to the concurrential stage, was based on coal and made possible the First Industrial Revolution²³⁵. The second model was based on oil and corresponds to the monopoly stage, during the first phase of which the privately-owned oil companies, often referred to as the *Seven Sisters*, took control of energy resources and the whole of the energy/oil chain. With the Second World War a new stage emerged in which, from the 1970s onwards, the oil industry, having been one of the pillars of Fordist development ('Bipolar world' in **Table 12**), became subordinated to a strategy of the global energy industry, in which new and old sources of energy co-exist. Thus began the construction ('Global world' in **Table 12**) of a third and more varied energy model.


For the purposes of this paper it will be useful to highlight certain aspects of the current stage of energy relations, not least that it constitutes an *energy transition*²³⁶ which is characterized by a progressive loss of emphasis on oil as the primary source of the hegemonic *energy model*²³⁷. As can be deduced from the data presented in **Figure 1** this transition is being driven by two factors.

235 J. Martínez & J.M. Vidal Villa, *Economía Mundial*. Madrid: McGrawHill, 2000.

236 This concept is defined as the process through which dominant energy sources and their related activities enter into a state of crisis and are replaced by others. We are currently in a long period of energy transition that began in the so-called Western world in the 1980s, when, according to Martin Melosi in his essay *Energy Transitions in Historical Perspective* (2006), what occurred was not so much a shock regarding supply in the long term, but rather a blow to a deep-rooted view of the world: the American way of life.

237 An energy model is the energy basis of the system and is defined as the specific set of primary, secondary and final energy sources and the associated activities of concentration, conservation and diffusion that are used by a given society during a given historical period. More broadly, an energy model includes the whole of an energy chain and implicitly implies a scientific and technical model, an economic structure, a form of political and social organization and a set of values.

Figure 1: Consumption according to type of primary energy source, 2009



Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010

The first factor is that at the combined and global level, the Asia-Pacific region is the world's principal energy consumer. If one adds to this block the part corresponding to Eurasia from the third bar in the figure, then it can be unequivocally stated that the 'international energy world' has shifted from West to East. It is therefore logical to think in terms of a shift in the axis of energy relations towards the East.

The second factor relates to the consequences of this shift, namely the growing presence of energy sources other than oil, which has even led some authors, such as Martin-Amouroux²³⁸, to state that we have entered the twenty-first century with a nineteenth-century fuel: coal. As he points out, it is striking that the great loser in the energy history of the twentieth century (i.e. coal) has become one of today's main protagonists. In light of the crisis produced by the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant, Martin-Amouroux may well be right²³⁹, although

238 Jean Marie Martin-Amouroux, *Charbon, Les métamorphoses d'une industrie*. Paris : Éditions TECHNIP (2008).

239 The principal energy initiatives adopted by some of the world's main energy consumers, such as the USA, the United Kingdom or Germany, following Fukushima have sought to promote clean coal technology. In the USA, President Obama followed up the 2009 launch of the third round of the Clean Coal Energy Initiative (<http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/cleancoal/>) with a State of the Union address in 2011 that reiterated his commitment to this technology, going as far as to state: "We will enter into public-private partnerships to develop five 'first-of-a-kind' commercial scale coal-fired plants with clean carbon capture and sequestration technology". In the United Kingdom, each of the government's

here we will limit ourselves to stating that there is an increasing diversification of primary energy sources within the global energy mix.

In terms of energy production and export the consequences of the above are a substantial shift in the function of the type of territories which are rich in natural resources (penultimate row in **Table 12**), and the possibility that States or national companies become stakeholders on the international energy stage. Until very recently the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were understood to be international energy stakeholders, but one did not think in terms of countries or territories — even were they to exist — that exported coal, uranium or electricity produced by solar, wind or water technology, countries which might therefore seek to establish international relations.

The corollary is that associated with this, another type of international energy company has appeared (final row of **Table 12**), companies which may become key stakeholders on the international energy stage. Some of these are new kinds of national oil company, often now referred to as the *new NOCs*, a good example of which is the Russian Gazprom. However, other companies (both state-run and private) with a transnational vocation are making a strong entry into the market, related, for instance, to the increasing industrial restructuring of coal mining on a global scale²⁴⁰, while among the case studies presented here an example would be the Kazakh uranium mining company KazAtomProm.

The other side of the coin is a shift in the international context of demand and consumption. This is no longer limited to what were traditionally known as the *consumer countries*, principally those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with their governments and ‘their’ transnational energy companies (final row in **Table 12**) clustered around the International Energy Agency (IEA). These were the so-called international oil companies (IOCs), i.e. companies such as ExxonMobil, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, TotalFinaElf or, in the case of Spain, Repsol YPF. Nowadays, however,

energy policies, such as the Plan UK 2050 or Zero Carbon Britain 2030, target an increased use of clean coal technology and state the wish to make the UK a leader in this type of technology. In the case of Germany, Chancellor Merkel’s proposal to shut down the country’s nuclear plants has been accompanied by an increase in coal mining. Furthermore, the International Energy Agency (IEA), which has acted as a cartel of oil-consuming countries from the OECD, has significantly set up its own Clean Coal Centre (http://www.iea.org/techno/iaresults.asp?id_ia=25).

240 Martin-Amouroux, (2008).

and especially in emerging economies, there are companies that, acting from the perspective of demand and consumption, have a different profile to that of the IOCs. Primary examples of these ‘new’ companies are the consumer NOCs from emerging consumer countries (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC in China, and ONGC in India).

The emergence of new stakeholders, both in terms of production/export and demand/consumption, has gone hand in hand with the growing transnationalization of the global energy stage, a process which, in the case of oil, was considerably reinforced during the 1990s²⁴¹. Therefore, rather than speaking about *producer countries* or *consumer countries* it is now more appropriate to think in terms of integrated international or transnational energy chains²⁴², comprising all manner of NOCs and IOCs that integrate either in the downstream (a producer/export company that enters the demand/consumption field) or the upstream (the reverse). The consequence of this has been an “increase in the number of stakeholders involved in energy markets, which in turn has led to increased power struggles. The rules of the energy game have changed completely in a matter of years”²⁴³.

From this perspective, if one includes a geographical component then the producer territories, in geo-energy²⁴⁴ terms, are becoming integrated within larger energy spaces that do not always coincide with their immediate physical borders.

In summary, the emergence of the post-Soviet space, the changes in the energy needs of the system, the emergence of new energy stakeholders and the rise of large global energy chains implies a colossal shift in terms of existing stakeholders, geography and international energy relations. Within this framework the role of Central Asia as an energy stakeholder will result from the contradiction that arises between the need to resolve regional complementarities (reflected in **Table 11**) and the role of the region’s natural resources

241 Aurelia Mañé, “Territorios ricos en hidrocarburos de Asia Central ¿Países productores, enclaves exportadores o países de tránsito?”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, No. 70-71, 2005; P. Noël, *Transnational anew, competitive at last: The oil market in the globalisation era. IEPE Working Paper*. University of Grenoble, 1999, Kerebel (2009).

242 World Bank. 2009. *The Petroleum Sector Value Chain*. Washing

243 Kerebel (2009), p. 17.

244 See note 231.

within the large global energy chains that ‘serve’ the interests of the global and emerging energy world. How this duality is managed, regionally, will depend on the governance structures that are created in the geo-energy space (or spaces) of Central Asia.

Section III.

The methodological framework for analyzing energy chains in Central Asia: Global value chains

The changes taking place on the global energy stage force us to rethink and develop new frameworks of analysis. In our opinion, a suitable theoretical approach to the topic of this paper is provided by the concept of *global commodity chain* (GCC) or *global value chain* (GVC)²⁴⁵.

a. The methodological framework of global commodity chains

Research into GCCs has its origins in the concept of *commodity chain*, which was defined by Hopkins and Wallerstein in 1986 as:

“a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity”²⁴⁶.

The analytic capacity of the concept of commodity chain derives from its emphasis on process and its close links to world systems theory, as set out by Wallerstein in 1974. This enables the role of commodity chains to be observed within a broader framework, namely that of the process through which capital is accumulated within the capitalist system, as well as observing how the surplus

245 Kaplinsky and Morris replace the concept of global commodity chain, coined by Gereffi, with the notion of *global value chain*; the latter is better suited to a multi-faceted framework of analysis and is used for all kinds of products, including non-commodities, with a high degree of product differentiation and high entry barriers; see Kaplinsky & M. Morris, *A Handbook for Value Chain Research*. IDRC, (2002). This new terminology was widely adopted in the field of GCC research and both terms are now used without distinction, although some authors, such as Bair, consider that there are slight differences between the two; see Bair, J. “Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward.” *Competition and Change*, 9 (2) (2005): 153-180.

246 T.K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, “Commodity chains in the world economy prior to 1800”, *Review*, 10 (1986): 157-170.

produced by the chain as a whole is distributed unequally among the different links of which it is comprised.

At all events, the key point in the development of GCC research was the publication in 1994 of the book *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, edited by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, in which the main concepts and lines of analysis related to GCCs are set out. As stated by Gereffi, the GCC approach reformulates conceptual categories in order to analyse patterns of change and global organization. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz define the global commodity chain as follows:

“A GCC consists of sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to another within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organization”²⁴⁷.

Gereffi goes on to state that:

“commodity chains have three main dimensions: an input-output structure (a set of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding economic activities); a territoriality (spatial dispersion or concentration of enterprises in production and distribution networks); and a governance structure (authority and power relationships)”²⁴⁸.

By integrating these three dimensions within a single concept the GCC can incorporate elements of traditional value-chain studies²⁴⁹ (the input-output flow) and of research into *filières* (chains) and sectorial complexes²⁵⁰ (the analysis of

247 G. Gereffi & R. Korzeniewicz, (Eds), *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 2.

248 Gereffi & Korzeniewicz (1994), p.97.

249 By ‘traditional’ value-chain studies we are referring to those which are basically limited to describing the different productive stages involved in the manufacture of a given product, in line with that set out by Porter; See M. Porter, *Competitive Advantage*. New York: Free Press, 1985.

250 The analysis of *filières* (chains) has been widely applied in studies of agro-food products, especially in France; See L. Malassis, *Economie agro-alimentaire*. Paris: Cujas, 1979. In addition to describing the productive stages of an agro-food product these studies analyse the power relationships that are established between the different stakeholders involved in the *filière*. The aim was to show how the agricultural producer is usually in a relationship of dependency with respect to the industrial sectors of the *filière* (the input supply industry, the transforming industry).

power relationships or governance), at the same time as being able to analyse phenomena such as internationalization and the impact that different links in the chain have on the territory in which they are located (since the concept also takes territoriality into account).

The concept of *governance* is one of the most significant contributions of GCC research. Gereffi makes the distinction between *producer-driven* and *buyer-driven* commodity chains. In a producer-driven chain the high barriers to entry (resulting from economies of scale, the intensive use of technology and high investment costs) make it easier for producers to control the chain. By contrast, a buyer-driven chain presents few barriers to entering the productive sector, and therefore a greater role is played by aspects such as commercialization, design and innovation in relation to the final product. According to Gereffi, one of the greatest transformations in recent years has been the shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven commodity chains in important manufacturing sectors.

At a more micro level (companies) the notion of governance refers to who decides what is produced, and how, within the GCC²⁵¹. Thus, governance implies the ability of 'lead firms' to assign activities of less added value to the other stakeholders in the chain, and/or to exclude them from the chain²⁵². Kaplinsky and Morris also note that the lead firm is able to ignore the demands of other links in the chain²⁵³. This notion of 'lead firm' is a dynamic concept, and changes in terms of who the lead firms are will give rise to a restructuring of the chain, which will, in turn, have important consequences not only for the functioning of the chain and its stakeholders, but also for the territories in which the chain is located.

251 Kaplinsky & Morris (2002).

252 P. Raikes; M. Jensen, M., and S. Ponte, "Global Commodity Chain Analysis and the French Filière Approach: Comparison and Critique", *Economy and Society*, 29 (3) (2000): 390-417

253 Kaplinsky & Morris (2002)

The methodological approach developed by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz has evolved over the last twenty years, with new contributions and new concepts being constantly added to the analysis of GCCs/GVCs²⁵⁴. The outcome of all this is a more ‘compact’ theoretical framework, one that is better structured and more systematic.

Research on GCCs and GVCs has also given rise to a rather similar set of new concepts. Noteworthy among these is the notion of *global production network* (GPN) (Coe et al., 2008), which emphasizes the concept of ‘network’ in order to understand the relationships between different stakeholders, going beyond the more linear view of GCC/GVC analyses. The GPN approach also seeks to incorporate new stakeholders: the State, civil organizations, consumers and workers²⁵⁵. Nonetheless, the concept of GPNs does not differ greatly from that of GCC/GVC research, and studies based on the GPN approach are still relatively few in number.

At all events, studies based on the concepts of GCCs, GVCs and GPNs have been particularly well regarded in recent years, especially when it comes to analysing the value chain of manufactured products²⁵⁶. Furthermore, the versatility

254 See G. Gereffi, “Global Commodity Chains: New Forms of Coordination and Control Among Nations and Firms in International Industries”, *Competition and Change*, 1(4) (1996): 427-439; Kaplinsky & Morris (2002); P. Gibbon, J. Bair, S. Ponte, “Governing Global Value Chains: An Introduction”, *Economy and Society*, 37 (3)(2008): 315-338; Bair (2005); G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Value Chains”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 12 (1) (2005): 78-104; H. Schmitz, *Value Chain Analysis for Policy Makers and Practitioners*. Geneva: ILO, 2005.

255 N. Coe, P. Dicken, M. Hess, “Global production networks: realizing the potential”, *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8 (2008): 271-295

256 See, among others, –Gereffi, G. “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks”. In *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, ed. G. Gereffi and R. Korzeniewicz, 95-112, Westport: Greenwood Press; (1994); Gereffi, G.. “Global Commodity Chains: New Forms of Coordination and Control Among Nations and Firms in International Industries”. *Competition and Change*, 1(4): (1996) 427-439.; Gereffi, G. “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain”, *Journal of International Economics*, 48 (1): (1999) 37-70.; Gereffi, G. “The International Competitiveness of Asian Economies in the Global Apparel Commodity Chain. International”, *Journal of Business and Society*, 4 (2) (2003.)71-110; Gereffi, G. *The New Offshoring of Jobs and Global Development*. Geneva: ILO, (2006); Barnes, J. & Kaplinsky; R.; *Globalization and the Death of the Local Firm? The Automobile Components Sector in South Africa. Regional Studies*, 34 (9) (2000): 797-814; Schmitz H.. *Learning and Earning in Global Garment and Footwear Chains. European Journal of Development Research*, 18 (4): (2006) 546-571; Sturgeon, T. and van Biesebroeck, J.; *Global value chains in the automotive industry: an enhanced role for developing countries?. International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development*. 4 (2011): 181-205; and Lema, R.; *Adoption of*

of this approach has enabled it to be successfully adapted to other spheres, such as agricultural products²⁵⁷ or the service sector²⁵⁸.

However, whereas traditional value-chain studies have commonly been conducted to analyse energy products²⁵⁹, the GCC/GVC/GPN approach has rarely been applied in this context. Noting this circumstance, Ciccantell and Smith²⁶⁰ argue that GCC studies tend to focus on the final stages of the value chain and ignore the processes of extracting and transporting raw materials. Therefore, it is necessary to 'lengthen' the value chains and give due weight to the analysis of primary resources.

Open Business Models in the West and Innovation in India's Software Industry. *IDS Working Papers*, 62,(2010).

- 257 See Ponte, S.. "The Latte Revolution: Regulation, Markets and Consumption in the Global Coffee Chain". *World Development*, 30 (7), (2002): 1099-1122; Pelupessy, W. and van Kempen, L.; "The Impact of Increased Consumer-orientation in Global Agri-food Chains on Smallholders in Developing Countries". *Competition and Change*, 9 (4), (2005): 257-381; Gwynne, R.; Governance and the wine commodity chain: Upstream and downstream strategies in New Zealand and Chilean wine firms. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, 47 (3), (2006): 381-395; Humphrey & Memedovic (2006); Kaplinsky, R. "How can agricultural commodity producers appropriate a greater share of value chain incomes?". In *Agricultural Commodity Markets and Trade: New Approaches to Analyzing Market Structure and Instability*, ed. A. Sarris, A. and D. Hallam, 356-379. Cheltenham: Ed. Edward Elgar, (2006); Vagneron, I. , Faure, G. and Loeillet, D.; "Is there a pilot in the chain? Identifying the key drivers of change in the fresh pineapple sector". *Food Policy*, 34 (5), (2009): 437-446; Soldevila, V., Viladomiu, L. and Francès, G.; "Catalonian pork value chain's resilience: ready for environmental challenge?". *AgEcon Research in Agricultural an Applied Economics*. Available online: <http://purl.umh.edu/58134>, (2009); Patel-Campillo, A; "Transforming Global Commodity Chains: Actor Strategies, Regulation, and Competitive Relations in the Dutch Cut Flower Sector". *Economic Geography*, 81(1), (2010): 79-99.
- 258 Clancy, M., "Commodity Chains, services and development: theory and preliminary evidence from the tourism industry". *Review of International Political Economy*, 5 (1), (1998), 122-148; Sokol, M., "Space of flows, uneven regional development and geography of financial services in Ireland". *Growth and Change*, 38 (2), (2007): 224-259.
- 259 World Bank (2009); T. Smeenk, "Russian Gas for Europe: Creating Access and Choice. Underpinning Russia's gas export strategy with Gazprom's infrastructure investments", *Clingendael International Energy Programme*, 2010, Available on line: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100622_dissertation_CIEP_Tom%20Smeenk.pdf. Smeenk, 2010).
- 260 P. Ciccantell & D. Smith, "Rethinking Global Commodity Chains: Integrating Extraction, Transport and Manufacturing", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 50 (3-4) (2009): 361-384.

“Thus, starting at the beginning of commodity chains not only provides a more comprehensive and complete story of contested transformations sequences, but it also reveals new ways in which geographic and spatial disarticulations and ecological inequalities are integral to the global economy”²⁶¹.

In our opinion, the minimal attention paid to GCC analysis as a way of studying energy products is also due to certain methodological difficulties. As will be pointed out below, certain concepts within the GCC approach need to be redefined if they are to be suitable for the study of energy products. Nevertheless, and as is set out in the next section, we believe that the analytic framework provided by the GCC approach is well suited to the topic of the present study.

b. Justification and suitability of the GCC/GVC approach in relation to the study topic

Traditionally, studies of energy products were based either on an analysis at the level of the nation state (in which case a distinction was made between producer and consumer countries, as in the dichotomous energy paradigm), or on an analysis of stakeholders (mainly transnational energy companies). GCC/GVC analyses, however, can go beyond this partial view, since one of their main advantages is precisely their integrative nature, which enables them not only to overcome the limitations of other analytic frameworks that focus on the nation-state level, but also to integrate different theoretical developments that include macro, meso and micro-economic aspects:

“the analysis of GCCs provides a bridge between the macro-historical concerns that have usually characterized the world-systems literature, and the micro-organizational and state-centered issues that have stimulated recent studies in international political economy”²⁶².

Indeed, the combination of these three levels of analysis (the macro, linked to world-systems research; the meso, linked to studies of value chains; and the micro, addressing the functioning of stakeholders in the chain) in a single methodological instrument helps to avoid partiality and enables the present study to achieve greater analytic richness.

261 Ciccantell & Smith (2009), p. 363.

262 Gereffi & Korzeniewicz (1994), p. 9.

Moreover, the three dimensions of the GCC (input-output flow, territoriality, governance) are readily adaptable to the concept of geo-energy space, as defined above: the input-output flow is represented by the integrated energy chain; territoriality corresponds to the chain's geographical space; and governance is represented by the institutional structure of power relationships that exist between different stakeholders in the chain.

The first dimension, the input-output flow, enables us to describe the chains that develop around energy products and observe the similarities and differences between them. Thus, in the value chains involving energy products it is possible to distinguish between three productive stages: *upstream*, *midstream* and *downstream*. The upstream includes activities of exploitation, development and production of the primary energy source (in the case of oil, for example, this would include the search for oilfields, initial explorations, engineering projects, etc., and especially the extraction of crude oil). The midstream refers to all infrastructure related to the transportation and storage of the resource until it reaches the processing facilities. Finally, the downstream covers those activities required to transform the oil, gas or uranium into the final energy product, as well as the activities linked to its commercialization.

As will be seen in the case studies below, the different companies may cover one or more of these production stages in the chain.

The second dimension of GCC analyses is territoriality. This is an aspect that cannot be overlooked in the study of energy products, since energy resources (oilfields, mines, etc.) are specific factors that cannot be delocalized. In other words, they are tied to a particular geographical location and, as Bunker and Ciccantell²⁶³ point out, the local (geological features, the indigenous population, conflicts over access to resources, etc.) will determine the global (the strategies of companies and nation states) in the GCC of basic products; we would add, however, that the global will also determine the local. At all events, the GCC methodology is able to address these issues and locate the territorial aspects of global productive processes at the heart of the analysis²⁶⁴.

263 S. Bunker & P. Ciccantell, *An East Asian World Economy: Japan's Ascent with Implications for China*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007.

264 Ciccantell & Smith (2009).

The final key dimension of GCCs is governance. The value chains of energy products are becoming increasingly complex and include a greater number of links (or productive stages), with the companies involved also having different interests. Furthermore, the relationships between the different stakeholders in the value chain of energy products are not symmetrical, and not all stakeholders are able to exert the same influence over the chain as a whole. By using the concept of governance it is possible to observe how economic activity within the chain is coordinated and to identify which links (upstream, midstream and downstream) and which stakeholders (lead firms) have the greatest capacity to control the chain. A large part of the contribution to a territory's development and of the interrelations between different territories depends on how energy value chains are structured and on the 'power' of the stakeholders located in different countries. In this regard, the concept of governance is crucial for the present analysis.

In sum, the integrative nature of the GCC approach, the incorporation of territoriality and the emphasis on power relations make the GCC methodology well suited to addressing the questions that were posed in the introduction to this paper. However, and as pointed out in the previous sub-section, certain concepts within the GCC approach need to be redefined if they are to be suitable for the study of energy products. In particular, the governance dimension has a number of defining features that need to be incorporated. The next section addresses this.

c. Adapting the GCC approach to the energy context

Having justified the suitability of applying GCC analysis to the question of energy resources the next step is to set out how this methodology will be adapted to this context. The starting point for this adaptation is that in the context of international energy chains, companies (i.e. the micro-level stakeholders defined in the GCC) may be of two types: private (IOCs) or national (NOCs). As the motivation of these two types of company will not be the same there is a significant difference with respect to non-energy GCCs, where companies seek to achieve governance of the chain with a single objective: attaining as much as possible of the economic surplus generated by the chain. In the energy context, however, while the main objective of IOCs is to obtain the maximum possible profit (as much surplus as possible) from the value chain, the priority objective of NOCs will be defined in terms of the country's 'general interests'. There is also the case which we define as hybrid (see **Table 13**), which is usually a private company that the government uses as if it were an NOC.

More specifically, we believe that the potential motivations of companies involved in energy GCCs are follows²⁶⁵:

1. to attain as much as possible of the surplus, which may be turned into national income or profit;
2. to ensure a safe and constant supply of energy for ‘their’ economy; and
3. to achieve greater influence as a stakeholder on the international stage.

Methodologically, the analysis of these two questions (i.e. that there are two types of stakeholder and that these may have up to three objectives, ranging from the micro level (more profit for the company) to the global level (being an important or hegemonic regional or global stakeholder)) is favoured within the GCC framework, since the latter integrates both micro/meso and macroeconomic aspects.

As a result of the particular characteristics described above it is necessary to redefine the *producer-driven* and *buyer-driven* categories of the energy GCC, although the need for such a redefinition in no way invalidates the use of the rest of the conceptual framework implicit within these categories. In particular, the concept of *lead firm* will be highly useful for our analysis of regional power. Indeed, in the case that concerns us here we consider that the type of governance which prevails in the chain (i.e. producer or buyer driven) depends, principally, on the type of company that establishes itself as the lead firm. For energy products the lead firm determines not only ‘what’ is produced, and ‘how’, as in Kaplinsky and Morris’s definition of GCC governance, but also ‘for whom’ and ‘for where’ the final product is destined.

These considerations are reflected in the classification of companies shown in **Table 13**. The categorization is based on the case of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and will then be adapted, as far as possible, to the case of uranium, as these are the three sectors addressed by the case studies analyzed in section four.

265 In fact the present study is also premised on a fourth motivation, since by proposing the analysis in terms of whether or not the States in the region will be able to manage their natural resources according to regional criteria, and by including within these criteria the possibility that energy may be exchanged for water resources, it is assumed that one of the objectives of NOCs in Central Asia, as instruments of public intervention, is to exploit their natural resources with a view to the possibility of such an exchange.

Table 13: Categorization of energy companies (oil and gas)

NOCs	State-owned national oil or gas companies
<p>'Old' NOCs If the lead firm is an 'old' NOC the value chain is usually characterized by producer-driven behaviour.</p>	<p>These are upstream companies, some of which will also engage in midstream activity, that serve as an instrument of national, public intervention, their main objective being to generate as much national income as possible for the producer country. Secondary objectives include helping to ensure a stable supply of energy and being a relevant stakeholder on the international stage.</p>
<p>'New' NOCs If the lead firm is a 'new' NOC the value chain may be characterized by producer-driven or buyer-driven behaviour.</p>	<p>These are integrated companies with a broad scope (they act upstream, midstream and downstream) and are commonly found in what are known as emerging economies. They serve as an instrument of national, public intervention. The objective of 'new' NOCs is not always the same and, depending on the nature of national requirements, it is not always clear which is the primary objective. In general, some of these companies will have an objective similar to that of 'old' NOCs (national income), while the objective of others will be to ensure the final supply of energy to the country. In both these cases what 'new' NOCs have in common is that they are used as instruments to gain power on the regional or international stage.</p>
IOCs	Integrated, private and transnational energy companies
<p>'Western' IOCs If the lead firm is a 'Western' IOC the value chain is generally characterized by buyer-driven behaviour, although depending on the company's profit maximizing strategies it may be producer driven.</p>	<p>These are the large, integrated, private and transnational energy companies that have been established in the Western countries of the OECD and which are clustered around the IEA. The majority of the most important ones are direct descendants of the 'Seven Sisters'. These companies are associated with what are known as consumer countries, although their objective is that of private firms, i.e. to maximize profits in the value chain as a whole. Depending on the circumstances they may act more as extractors/producers or as demand/consumer companies. In both cases their objective is to obtain as much profit as possible.</p>
<p>'Hybrid' IOCs With the exception of Russian companies, if the lead firm is a 'hybrid' IOC the value chain is generally characterized by buyer-driven behaviour.</p>	<p>These are integrated energy companies, generally in the East or in emerging economies, that are privately owned but which directly serve the interests of the government of their respective country. In this regard, and as in the case of 'new' NOCs, their objectives will depend on national priorities. However, unlike the 'new' NOCs hybrid companies are not usually strong enough to become significant regional or international stakeholders.</p>

Source: Own elaboration

For the case study analysis we start by assuming that the degree of power a company has in the context of international energy relations does not depend on whether it is an NOC or an IOC, but rather on how integrated it is (the more stages it is involved in the more influence it will have), on the number of territories in which it is present and on the amount of product (primary, secondary or final energy) it controls.

Thus, it is assumed that when a company forms part of a value chain it is more likely to become the lead firm if: a) it is an integrated company (i.e. its acts upstream, midstream and downstream); b) it operates in different countries (i.e. it is transnational, and therefore its raw material sites and/or markets are located in different places around the world); and c) it is among the world's top-ranked companies in one or more of the three stages. Conversely, a company is unlikely to be the lead firm in the GCC if: a) it is only present in one of the three stages; b) its sphere of activity is national; and c) it is not among the top-ranked companies for any of the three stages.

Thus, in general terms, the four kinds of stakeholders defined above can be classified, as shown in **Table 14**, according to the amount of power they would have within regional or global energy chains.

Table 14: Possibility of being the lead firm among energy companies, according to category

	Integrated	Transnational	Top-ranked	Power in regional/global chain	Possibility of being the lead firm
'Old' NOCs	No	No	Yes (upstream)	Medium to low	Weak
'New' NOCs	Yes	Yes	Yes (up-, mid- or downstream)	High	Strong
'Western' IOCs	Yes	Yes	Yes (mid- or downstream)	High	Strong
'Hybrid' IOCs	Yes	No	No	Low to medium	Very weak

Source: Own elaboration

d. Adapting the GCC approach to the specific case addressed by this study

In the analysis of the three case studies (oil, gas and uranium) it is assumed, setting aside any constraints imposed through government or international regulations, that in energy GCCs the ‘new’ NOCs and the ‘Western’ IOCs have, *a priori*, more power than, in this order, the ‘old’ NOCs and the ‘hybrid’ IOCs. Given that our case studies are centred on the territory of Central Asia the only possible scenarios are those set out in **Table 15**. For the analysis of hydrocarbons the scenario involves an ‘old’ NOC becoming integrated in chains formed by one or more of the other types of company, while for the analysis of uranium the possibility considered is of a ‘new’ NOC becoming integrated in other chains. Under current circumstances the other combinations seem highly unlikely.

Table 15: Who can be the lead firm in a value chain?

If an ‘old’ or ‘new’ NOC becomes integrated in a chain with:	‘Old’ NOC	‘New’ NOC	‘Western’ IOC	‘Hybrid’ IOC
‘Old’ NOC	C1: Increased possibility of being the lead firm	C2: Lead firm is the ‘new’ NOC	C3: Lead firm is the ‘Western’ IOC	C4: Outcome unclear
‘New’ NOC		C5: Outcome unclear. Different objectives?	C6: Outcome unclear. Different objectives?	C7: Lead firm is the ‘new’ NOC

Source: Own elaboration

Thus, although the degree may vary:

- In scenario C1 there may be a tendency to form alliances of producers, with the aim of influencing the chain.
- In scenarios C2 and C3 the nature of the chain (producer or buyer driven) and the objectives of the companies of which it is comprised will be determined by the priority objective of the lead firm. Scenario C7 could end up being assimilated to one of these two.
- In scenario C4 neither of the two stakeholders would be able to impose its strategy and, therefore, it is difficult to establish the outcome, unless we in-

corporate into the analysis other factors such as the weight of the respective countries within international agreements. However, it is highly likely that what emerges will be a certain complementarity of objectives (a producer forming an alliance with a final consumer).

In scenarios C5 and C6 different types of alliance may emerge, as in the game of possible objectives it seems likely that these kinds of companies will only become integrated within the same chain when it is mutually beneficial for them to do so (for example, when one company's objective of gaining influence or ensuring the energy supply is compatible with the other's objective of maximizing profits).

Having established these kinds of power relations, incorporation of the geographical component into the analysis means that the following hypotheses can be proposed:

- a) In the event of scenario C1 there could be a regional alliance of producers that — relatively strong but in a position of inferiority — become integrated within a Euro-Asian or global governance structure whose centre is far from the region (such a scenario would resemble the OPEC/IEA situation). This alliance of producers would not be the lead firm, but it would have a certain negotiating capacity (scenario C7 would once again be the reverse).
- b) In scenarios C2 and C3 the governance structure and relations are asymmetrical. The natural resources or stakeholders from the territory of the 'old' NOC become integrated in a 'position of inferiority' and, therefore, have limited decision-making capacity within the institutional structure that develops in their geo-energy space. To put it another way, the centre of the geo-energy space will move away from where the natural resources are located. In this case the negotiating capacity of the 'old' NOC is extremely limited and it is therefore difficult for it to impose its objectives.
- c) In scenarios C4, C5 and C6, relationships within the governance structure are more symmetrical. The conditions under which the stakeholders become integrated within the GCC are more equitable and, therefore, their capacity to influence the institutional structure of the geo-energy space will be more similar. Thus, one can expect relations to be more cooperative, or extremely conflictive. In this case the centre of the geo-energy space will be more diffuse and widely spread.

Section IV: Case studies

The three case studies to which GCC analysis will be applied are as follows: oil from Kazakhstan, gas from Turkmenistan and an outline of the case of uranium from Kazakhstan. In each case an attempt is made to analyse how the country's energy and/or mining companies and its natural resources are integrated within more extensive value chains. The analysis seeks to answer two of the questions that were posed at the beginning of this paper, namely, to determine whether there are regional value chains that are truly proper to the region, and to identify the power relationships that are present within the energy chains in which the energy resources of Central Asian territories are currently being integrated.

To this end it is necessary to state that we are assuming the following:

if the stakeholder that becomes integrated within the GCC is not a lead firm then it will have limited capacity to impose its own strategy; and

if the stakeholders of the region (i.e. the territory of the five *stans*) that become integrated within the GCC are not lead firms then it is unlikely that any resulting chain will have a regional centre.

Here we will base our approach on the most simplified version of the integrated energy chain, one involving three elements: upstream, midstream and downstream. In this case the analysis focuses on the companies that are involved in the upstream and midstream of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

a. The chain for oil from Kazakhstan

Table 16 shows the relative influence of the different stakeholders that operate in the upstream (extraction of oil from Kazakh oilfields) and the midstream (transportation of this crude oil to other countries). The analysis is limited as it is static, providing only a short-term snapshot.

Table 16: Principal upstream and midstream stakeholders for oil from Kazakhstan

	Upstream		Midstream	
Stakeholders	Predicated production 2013	%	Total transportation 2013	%
NOCs	KazMunaiGaz (KZ)	25.14	KazMunaiGaz (KZ)	11.08
Total 'old' NOCs Central Asia		25.14	Total 'old' NOCs	11.08
IOCs	Chevron (USA)	20.75	Chevron (USA)	8.74
	ExxonMobil (USA)	12.98		
	ConocoPhillips (USA)	2.07		
IOCs	BG Group (UK)	5.01		
	ENI-AGIP (IT)	9.15		
	Shell (NL-UK)	4.14		
	Total (FR)	4.14		
Total integrated 'Western' IOCs		58.24	Total integrated 'Western' IOCs	8.74
Hybrid	Lukoil and LukARCO	4.08	LukARCO (Russia)	7.29
Hybrid	Inpex	1.87		
Total 'hybrids'		5.95	Total 'hybrids'	7.29
NOCs			Transneft (Russia)	63.92
Total 'new' producer NOCs			Total 'new' producer NOCs	63.92
NOCs	CNPC	10.67	CNODC (China)	8.97
Total 'new' consumer NOCs		10.67	Total 'new' consumer NOCs	8.97
Total Euro-Asian (without KZ)		16.62	Total Euro-Asian (without KZ)	80.18

Source: WEO 2010, EIA *Country analysis, Kazakhstan* and own elaboration

The oil stakeholders in Kazakhstan correspond to the four types described in **Table 13**:

- 1) The national oil company of Kazakhstan is KazMunaiGaz, a state-run company involved in the extraction and export of oil; its behaviour is therefore equivalent to that of the ‘old’ NOCs. The company is one of the Kazakh government’s main instruments of public intervention and its basic function is to be a key instrument for generating national income. Therefore, we assume that it fulfils the conditions described in **Table 13** for this type of company. In our most recent calculations²⁶⁶, KazMunaiGaz came 63rd (near the bottom) in the world ranking of oil and gas companies.
- 2) A consortium of large, ‘Western’ IOCs, almost all of which are ranked within the world’s top ten according to our calculations²⁶⁷.
- 3) Two types of ‘new’ NOC, which according to our calculations are between 10 and 20 in the world ranking:
 - The Russian companies have a more producer-driven behaviour, with two objectives: to obtain maximum income from the sale of oil on the international market, and to use their role of ‘exporter’ to continue being a significant stakeholder on the Euro-Asian stage.
 - The Chinese companies have a more buyer-driven behaviour, also with two objectives: to ensure the supply of energy required for the growth and development of their (enormously voracious) economy and, as a result of the autonomy (from the hegemonic Western energy model) that this supply would give them, to become a world power.
- 4) A few ‘hybrid’ IOCs, all of which are Euro-Asian.

In line with the explanations given in the previous section the combined presence of these four types of company in the extraction, export and transportation of Kazakh oil suggests that the lead firms in this context are most likely to be of types 2) and 3) above. Therefore, the final behaviour (producer or buyer driven) of the value chain in which KazMunaiGaz is integrated will depend on the role played in that chain by the ‘Western’ IOCs and the Russian or Chinese NOCs. This idea is corroborated by the information presented in **Table 17**, which shows the relative position of Kazakh oil reserves within the global context.

266 Mañé (2011).

267 Ibid.

Table 17: Reserves, production and export of oil and gas in Central Asia

	Oil			Gas		
	Proven reserves (1000 barrels) 2009	Production (1000 barrels/day) 2009	Export (1000 barrels/day) 2006	Proven reserves TCF 2009	Production TCF 2008	Export TCF 2008
Five stans	41,046	1,996	1,249	244.40	5276.71	2568.14
Central Asia	48,081	3,030	1,799	274.7	5849.09	2764.63
Worldwide	1,333,127	79,948	63,057	6254.364	109788.55	34644.22
Top ranked/worldwide	KZ (9)	KZ (16)	KZ (19)	TKM (14)	TKM (11)	TKM (8)
% five stans	3.10%	2.40%	1.90%	3.90%	4.80%	7.41%
% world's top five	59.3	43.7%	35.59%	69.00%	52.90%	57.30%
% world's top ten	81.30%	61.3%	54.34%	84.60%	65.30%	77.60%

Source: ENI (2008) *World Oil and Gas Review*, BP (2010) *Statistical Review of World Energy* and EIA (2010) *International Energy Statistics*.

Taken together, the world ranking of KazMunaiGaz and the relative weight of Kazakh oil in the global context suggest that when this company becomes integrated within a chain its capacity for influence will be very low, except, perhaps, if it were to control all of Kazakhstan's oil production.

This idea is confirmed by the data in **Table 16**, where it can be seen that the main stakeholders in Kazakh oil production are the consortiums of 'Western' IOCs. These are followed by a heterogeneous group of Euro-Asian companies, in which the minimal presence (just 4%) of Russian companies is noteworthy. This information alone would suggest that most Kazakh oil is destined to end up in the West's *great pool*, that which is acquired, refined and commercialized by the Western IOCs in the *consumer countries* of the OECD. This situation would be very similar to what occurs in most OPEC countries and would imply a 'typical' relationship between

producer country and *consumer country* companies. There are some differences, however, most notably the presence of the Chinese ‘new’ NOC.

In terms of the present analysis, and regardless of whether Kazakh oil becomes integrated within Western channels or the Chinese chain, its situation and that of the NOC KazMunaiGaz would correspond to an asymmetrical power structure whose centre has shifted towards the ‘Western’ IOCs or the Chinese ‘new NOC. The midstream information (in **Table 16**), combined with that regarding the oil routes shown in **Table 18**, adds greater detail to this conclusion.

Table 18: Oil routes from Kazakhstan

Pipeline	Origin	Transit route	Destination
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)	Tenguiz Karachaganak	Novorossiysk (Black Sea, RU) Turkey	Western consumption
Kazakhstan-China Pipeline	Aktobe Kumkol	Atyrau (Caspian Sea, KZ) Alashankou (Xinjiang, CH)	Consumption in China
Atyrau-Samara Pipeline	Atyrau (KZ)	Samara (Volga, RU)	Western consumption
Kenyaq-Orsk	Kenyaq (KZ)		Russian consumption
Others	Various	Black Sea (RU) Azerbaijan Turkey Iran Turkmenistan	Western consumption

Source: WEO 2010, EIA *Country analysis, Kazakhstan* and own elaboration

The situation of Kazakh oil is very atypical. The upstream seems to be dominated by Western consortia, whereas the key players in the midstream are the ‘new’ NOCs. Most of the transit route for this oil passes through the Russian network (controlled by Transneft), with, since the construction of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, an increasing volume heading for China. This means that Kazakh oil mainly goes, at least in an initial stage, towards Eastern Eurasia rather than to the West, with this route being controlled by the ‘new’ Russian and Chinese NOCs.

This produces a curious energy chain, in which the particular combination of upstream and midstream, and the final destinations of the crude oil that leaves

the Kazakh oilfields, result in the lead firm changing as the scenario shifts from something akin to a **C3** to a **C5** and **C6**. In the first link of the chain, power is on the side of, firstly, the ‘Western’ IOCs and, secondly the Chinese NOC, whereas in the second link (**Table 16**) power clearly shifts towards, firstly, the Russian NOC and, subsequently, to the Chinese NOC. In none of these scenarios is KazMunaiGaz the lead firm, and therefore it will not have any decision-making capacity over what is produced, for whom and for where.

Joining the two stages would create a structure that is a mixture of **C5** and **C6**. From this point of view, Kazakh oil could come to form part of two geo-energy spaces: the Russian-Western space or the Chinese one. In the former the centre of the GCC and, therefore, of decision making within the governance structure would be the result of agreement (conflictive or cooperative) between the producer-driven logic of Russia and the buyer-driven logic of the ‘Western’ IOCs (described in **Table 13**). In the latter the centre of the GCC and, therefore, of decision making within the governance structure would be determined by the buyer-driven objectives of the Chinese NOC.

The corollary of all this is that, according to our premises, the centre of the GCC for Kazakh oil shifts from the heart of Central Asia. Thus, who decides what, for whom and for where oil is produced will be a stakeholder from outside this space. Decisions will be made within a governance structure like the one we have already described for these cases.

b. The chain for gas from Turkmenistan

As in the case study above, **Table 19** shows the different stakeholders that operate in the upstream (extraction from gas fields in Turkmenistan) and the mid-stream (transportation of this gas to other countries). Once again, the analysis is limited by being static, providing only a short-term snapshot.

The stakeholders involved in Turkmenistani gas correspond to three of the types described in **Table 13**:

- 1) As in the previous case study, Turkmengaz can be considered as an ‘old’ NOC and, to date at least, its behaviour has been very similar to that of the investment companies of OPEC countries (Tomillo, 2011). However, it is much less relevant on the global stage than are these companies, it being at the bottom of the top 100 companies worldwide. This is despite the fact

that the discovery of the giant Yolotan Sur gas field has seen it move up the rankings.

Another stakeholder in relation to Turkmenistani gas is the Iranian National Oil Company, which is a prime example of an ‘old’ NOC; however, due to the economic sanctions affecting Iran it has been unable to invest enough to renew its infrastructure and develop its gas sector.

- 2) The same type of ‘new’ NOCs that invest in Kazakh oil, and with the same objectives and priorities.
- 3) ‘Hybrid’ IOCs, although in this case new kinds of company have recently entered the sphere of international energy relations. On the one hand, within a more European framework, there are electricity companies who are seeking to enter the upstream, examples being the Central European firms RWE and OMV. On the other hand, there are ‘small’ companies from the Middle East whose final objective could be to develop a ‘production’ alliance.

In terms of stakeholder involvement the case of Turkmenistani gas is a complete exception, unlike what was noted above for Kazakh oil, where the upstream appears to be a ‘typical’ case of a producer country. Specifically, Turkmenistan is an extractor/producer territory which is opening up to foreign investors, among which the large ‘Western’ IOCs are almost completely absent. In terms of energy relations, therefore, this is a completely new scenario with an as-yet undefined geo-energy space, although what seems likely to emerge are energy chains across a region stretching, west to east, from Central/Eastern Europe to the Pacific, and, north to south, from Russia to the Indian Ocean.

Whatever the nature of the future geo-energy space that is created the final behaviour of the value chain in which Turkmenistan becomes integrated will — as in the case of Kazakh oil, and on the basis of current data — depend above all on the role played within this chain by the Chinese and Russian NOCs. This idea is corroborated by the information in **Table 17**, which shows the relative position of Turkmenistan’s gas reserves within the global context. As in the previous case study, both the world ranking of Turkmenistan and the relative weight of Turkmenistan’s gas reserves in the global context suggest that when this company becomes integrated within a value chain its capacity for influence will be low.

Table 19: Principal upstream and midstream stakeholders for gas from Turkmenistan

	Upstream		Midstream	
Stakeholders	Production		Transportation	2010
NOCs	Turkmengaz (TK)		Turkmengaz (TK) Uzbekneftgaz (UZ) KazMunaiGaz (KZ)	
Total 'old' NOCs Central Asia		Yes	Total 'old' NOCs Central Asia	
IOCs			Via 'others' (see Table 7)	?
Hybrid	RWE (GER) OMV (AUS)			
Total 'Western'		No	Total 'Western' IOCs	
Hybrid	Petrofac (UAE) Gulf Oil & Gas (ME)			
NOCs			Iranian National Oil Co.	
Total Middle Eastern 'hybrid'		Yes	Total 'old' NOCs	
				31%
IOCs	LG (KOR) Hyundai (KOR)			
Total 'Eastern' consumer IOCs		Yes		
NOCs	Itera (RU) Zarubezhneft (RU) Rosneft (RU)		Gazprom (RU)	
Total 'new' producer NOCs		Yes	Total 'new' producer NOCs	
				43%
NOCs	CNPC (China)		CNPC (China)	
Total 'new' consumer NOCs		Yes	Total 'new' consumer NOCs	
				26%
Total Euro-Asian (without Central Asia)		Yes	Total Euro-Asian (without Central Asia)	
				100%

Source: WEO 2010, Tomillo, 2011 and own elaboration

Although the information available regarding Turkmenistan is less detailed than that for Kazakh oil the data provided by the World Energy Outlook 2010 and Tomillo²⁶⁸ (2011) help to interpret tables 19 and 20. Despite Turkmenistan

²⁶⁸ U. Tomillo, *Tukmenistán en la escena energética internacional*. Master Thesis. Máster en Estudios Arabes e Islámicos. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2011.

being a closed and hermetic country the most important upstream stakeholders are the Russian NOCs and the Chinese company, CNPC. At present, Turkmenistan's strategy seems to be aimed, as far as possible, at freeing itself from Russian influence in its energy sector, with greater priority being given to the Chinese and Iranian companies, as well as what we have classified here as the 'hybrid' IOCs. As Tomillo points out, this is producing a diversification of energy alliances, which in turn is promoting three scenarios:

- a) an asymmetrical situation when an 'old' NOC becomes integrated in a chain with the 'new' NOCs;
- b) a symmetrical relationship between 'old' NOCs with similar objectives; and
- c) a symmetrical relationship between an 'old' NOC and the Eastern and Western 'hybrid' companies.

Observation of the midstream and the information shown in **Table 20** confirms that this is, *a priori*, a diverse and diversified situation.

Table 20: Gas routes from Turkmenistan

Pipeline	Origin	Transit route	Destination
CAC - 3	Dauletabad (TK) Okarem (TK)	Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Alexandrov Gay (RU)	Western consumption
Turkmenistan-China Pipeline	Bagtyarlak (TK) Yolotan Sur (TK)	Uzbekistan Kazakhstan	Consumption in China
Dauletabad - Salyp Yar	Dauletabad (TK)	Iran	Consumption in Turkey or the West
Korpezhe - Kart Kui	Korpezhe	Iran	Iran or Turkey or the West
Others			
TAPI (signed October 2011)	Yolotan Sur?	Afghanistan Pakistan India	Consumption in India and Pakistan
Nabucco	?	Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey Bulgaria Romania Hungary Austria	Consumption in Central and Eastern Europe
South Stream	?	Black Sea (RU) Bulgaria Serbia Hungary Austria Slovenia Greece	Consumption in Central and Eastern Europe

Source: WEO 2010, Tomillo, 2011 and own elaboration

In the case of gas from Turkmenistan, comparison of the upstream with the midstream and the (existing) exit routes reveals greater coherence than in the previous case study. Here the strong influence of the Russian and Chinese NOCs, combined with (as in both case studies) the country's maintenance or creation of its own pipelines (the CAC-3, which passes through post-Soviet space, and the Turkmenistan-China pipeline, with its clear links to the *Celestial Empire*) corresponds to a (dual) **C2** scenario, which over time could become a **C5**.

Whether or not the other two energy-chain options we have noted will become consolidated will depend on the outcomes of projects currently on the table regarding the transportation of gas from Turkmenistan.

The alliance between Turkmenengaz and the Iranian NOC is, at present, one that would correspond to a **C1** scenario. This alliance is the result of Iran's need to fulfil its gas contracts with Turkey. It remains to be seen if this alliance will continue in its present form or whether it will join with the as-yet hypothetical Nabucco pipeline. Were the latter to occur a curious **C4** scenario would be produced, in which one or more of the 'old' NOCs would become integrated within an energy chain of 'hybrid' IOCs (which in geographical terms are European). This could lead to highly complex stakeholder games, as the imaginable **C4** scenarios would see the entry of numerous stakeholders, ranging from European electricity companies through Turkish intermediaries to producers in the Caucasus, especially the Azerbaijani company SOCAR.

In the present context, gas from Turkmenistan corresponds to a **C2** scenario with a clearly asymmetrical power structure. This structure could become a **C5** were the energy chains to shift from the Russian producer-driven logic to the buyer-driven model of Chinese firms. In both cases, however, the centre of the geo-energy space will shift towards the East (north-east or south-east of Turkmenistan) and beyond the strict territory of the five stans. In neither scenario would Turkmenengaz seem destined to be the lead firm, and therefore the decisions about what is produced, for whom and for where will be made in a GCC whose centre has moved away from Central Asia.

The remaining possible **C4** scenarios, linked to hypothetical energy chains which would shape more westerly geo-energy spaces (whether Turkmenistani-Iranian-Turkish, Turkmenistani Caucasian-European or, in the case of TAPI, Turkmenistani-Afghan-Indian), are far from clear in terms of who might be the lead firm and, therefore, what kind of governance structure any GCC would have.

What these scenarios have in common, however, is that the type of stakeholders involved in the energy chains and the space in which such chains develop will make them very different to the ‘Western oil’ scenario.

c. Uranium from Kazakhstan

The case of uranium has certain commonalities with the cases of oil and gas. It is also a specific energy resource that cannot be delocalized²⁶⁹ and in which three stages can be identified: the upstream (extraction of uranium and manufacture of yellowcake [U₃O₆]), the midstream (transportation, refinement, production of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF₆) and preparation of fuel pellets from uranium oxide powder [UO₂]) and the downstream (enrichment of uranium and the generation and commercialization of electricity)²⁷⁰. Therefore, as in the case of hydrocarbons the companies involved in the international energy chains may be integrated, i.e. present in all three stages, or specialize in just one of them. Thus, although the terminology used below differs from that of the previous case study the types of stakeholders are comparable.

For the purposes of this paper a national mining company (NMC) is considered to be equivalent to an ‘old’ NOC, an integrated producer (IP) is comparable to an international IOC, a Western demand company (WDC) would be akin to a ‘hybrid’ IOC and, in this specific case, an Eastern producer (EP) and a Russian producer (RusP) are equivalent to a ‘new’ NOC. In the case of uranium these categories are diffuse, since the final behaviour of each of them is subject to restrictions originating in the bipolar energy model imposed by the world order that resulted from the Yalta Conference. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the countries which have developed a nuclear industry are those with a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

269 In this case study it is only considered as an energy asset.

270 For a detailed account of value chains and stakeholders related to the energy produced from uranium, see the World Nuclear Association (<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info3.html>) or A. Cirera, J. Benach, and E. Rodríguez, *¿Átomos de fiar? Impacto de la energía nuclear sobre la salud y el medio ambiente*. Madrid: Ed. Los libros de la Catarata, 2007.

The consequence of the above is that only a select group of countries can enrich uranium and, therefore, only an even more select group of companies are able to perform this task. For our purposes, these restrictions have two consequences:

- 1) It is impossible for NMCs to integrate in the upstream unless they belong to the group of countries that are authorized to enrich uranium or carry out nuclear fission; and
- 2) The lead firms will always be those companies that produce and commercialize enriched uranium, as it is they which give 'value' to the uranium ore.

Thus, in the current nuclear order only the IPs, the EPs and the RusPs can be lead firms, which means that KazAtomProm, by virtue of being an NMC (assimilated to an 'old' NOC), will have few opportunities for power within the uranium governance structure. However, there are three reasons why we wished to include this case study:

- 1) In 2010 Kazakhstan was the world's top producer of uranium (33% of the worldwide total), it was ranked second in recoverable reserves (12.14% of the worldwide total, behind Australia) and, in terms of volume produced, KazAtomProm was among the world's top three, after Cameco and Areva (WNA, 2011). Therefore, we do not consider KazAtomProm to be a minor stakeholder.
- 2) In the USSR, Kazakhstan was the Soviet nuclear territory par excellence, with nuclear weapons testing being carried out in the Kazakh region of Semipalatinsk. This is most likely why, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, that Semipalatinsk was the site chosen for the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ), which binds together the five stans. Kazakhstan also declared that it would not enrich uranium within its territorial borders. However, in the last year KazAtomProm has entered into agreements with all the world's large producers and it has even signed agreements to enrich uranium in Russia or produce fuel in (or with) China and Japan.
- 3) Although the production of enriched uranium is highly regulated at the international level, the information available regarding Kazakh uranium points towards a complex set of alliances within the Euro-Asian energy space that is emerging following the disappearance of a bipolar world order. This process of forming alliances, were it to continue, would transform a national mining company into a national integrated producer, or in the principal terminology of this paper, an 'old' NOC into a 'new' NOC.

Table 21: Principal upstream stakeholders for uranium from Kazakhstan

	Upstream		Midstream	
Stakeholders	Uranium extraction	%		%
NMC	KazAtomProm (KZ)	45.59	KazAtomProm (KZ)	34
Total national mining Central Asia		45.59		
IP	Areva (FRA) Cameco (CAN)	9.53 5.52	Cameco (CAN)	
Total 'Western, integrated' companies		15.05		
WDC	UraniumOne (CAN)	10.04		
Total 'Western' companies		25.05		
EP	CGNPC (CH)	2.68	Jianzhong Nuclear Fuel (CH)	
EP	OSSC (IND)	0.03		
Total 'emergent, integrated' companies		2.71		
EP	Japanese consortia (JAP)	4.28	Kansay Electric & Sumitono Corp (JAP)	
Total 'Eastern' companies		6.99		
RusD	UraniumOne (RUS)	10.04	TVEL (RU)	
RusP	ARMZ and others (RUS)	12.29	TENEX (RU)	
Total Russia		22.33		
Total Euro-Asian (without KZ)		29.32		

Source: World Nuclear Association and own elaboration

In light of these reflections there would appear to be two possible broad scenarios:

No significant change occurs in the nuclear world order. In this case two separate scenarios, a **C3** and a **C2**, would emerge, the first led by Areva and including Cameco (IP) and the Japanese consortia (EPs), and the second led by the Russian NOCs. In both cases the value chain would be buyer driven and, therefore, Kazakh uranium would be integrated within two asymmetrical power structures that would give rise to two separate geo-energy spaces which would strongly resemble those of the bipolar world; as in that world there would be some other stakeholders, such as the demand/producer companies of China and India.

If there is a change in the nuclear world order, KazAtomProm would become a 'new' NOC and, therefore, we would be faced with a **C5** and/or **C6** scenario in which this company could be the lead firm (due to its importance in terms of production and the possibility that 'its' government would erect entry barriers) and where the GCC would shift towards a producer-driven logic. This situation would be unprecedented in the world of nuclear relations (at present only Canada is in a position to aspire to such a situation), but it could occur if things develop along the lines described above.

Among all the possible scenarios described in the three case studies it is only the latter which would see the centre of a geo-energy space being located within one of the five *stans*. However, even if we accept that KazAtomProm could become the lead firm the future of international energy relations based on nuclear energy is highly uncertain.

Section V.

Final remarks

The process of reconstructing energy chains and exploiting natural resources in Central Asia following the break-up of the Soviet Union is unfolding in a global context of energy transition, one in which a new geo-energy space is taking shape in the Central Asian region.

Application of GCC methodology has provided a suitable analytic framework for studying the value chains of energy products. The analysis shows that the behaviour of chains is determined by the type of company ('old' NOC, 'new' NOC, 'Western' IOC, 'hybrid' IOC) that becomes the lead firm in the chain. Depend-

ing on the type of company, the objectives will range from merely economic to geo-political in nature.

The three case studies (oil and uranium from Kazakhstan and gas from Turkmenistan) reveal different energy value chains and a high degree of uncertainty over the direction these chains will take. In the case of Kazakh oil the upstream is controlled by 'Western' IOCs, although their dominance is under threat from the arrival of the Chinese 'new' NOC, CNPC. The midstream is in the hands of Russian and Chinese NOCs, such that Kazakh oil mainly ends up heading for eastern Eurasia. The Kazakh 'old' NOCs occupy a marginal position in both the upstream and the midstream, it being almost impossible for them to become lead firms and control the chain.

Western IOCs have a completely marginal role in the chain for gas from Turkmenistan, and although the Russian NOCs have some influence in the upstream it seems likely that the Chinese NOCs (and perhaps the Iranian NOC) will become established as the lead firms in this chain.

In the case of uranium from Kazakhstan the future nature of the energy chain is far from clear. Although KazAtomProm controls almost 50% of the uranium extraction process the important hurdles it faces in terms of accessing the downstream (uranium enrichment) make it difficult to imagine, at present, that the Kazakh 'old' NOC could control the chain.

The results of the case studies enable a number of conclusions to be drawn in relation to the four objectives set out in the introduction (to determine whether there are regional value chains that are truly proper to the region, to identify the power relations that operate in these energy chains, to consider whether, in light of these power relationships, conflict or cooperation is the most likely outcome between the five countries of the region, and to suggest which elements the regional energy governance structure should have). In the context of these objectives we sought to answer the initial question regarding the possibility of regional stakeholders using their own criteria to manage the natural resources (energy, minerals and water) that are to be found on and below the surface of their territory. The conclusions to be drawn are as follows:

The three case studies show that the GCCs which are now developing extend beyond the borders of the territory comprising the five *stans*. With the exception of the hypothetical case of Kazakh uranium, the GCCs described in this paper

are characterized by asymmetrical power relations in which the local ‘old’ NOC is always the weakest link in the chain. Hence, in all the scenarios described the centre of the value chain has shifted beyond the region’s borders, through the shaping of a larger Euro-Asian energy space.

It is therefore difficult to predict whether the resulting scenario will be one of regional conflict or cooperation, although one can state that since neither Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan have the capacity to decide how their energy resources are managed (neither the ‘what’, the ‘how’, the ‘for whom’ nor the ‘for where’) it is highly improbable that they will, above and beyond an expressed wish, be able to make a commitment to a regional policy based on the exchange of energy for water.

From this point of view, and given that the scenarios we have described imply the integration of ‘old’ NOCs and local energy resources within GCCs whose lead firms are rarely Western but rather almost always Euro-Asian companies (especially, Russian, Chinese and, perhaps in the future, Iranian and Turkish), we believe it would be advisable for these stakeholders and their respective governments to be included in any regional governance structure that is developed to manage the region’s energy, water and environmental problems.

Therefore, and in response to the initial question, we do not believe that regional stakeholders will be able to use their own criteria to manage their natural resources.

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L'**Institut Català Internacional per la Pau - ICIP**, creat per al Parlament de Catalunya per a fomentar la recerca, la formació, la transferència de coneixements i l'actuació de prevenció de la violència i promoció de la pau fomenta, a través d'actuacions diverses (convocatòria de projectes, beques, seminaris...) la recerca de base i aplicada en els estudis de i sobre la pau. La col·lecció ***ICIP Research*** recull resultats d'aquestes activitats sobre temes com conflictes armats, seguretat humana, resolució i transformació de conflictes, relacions internacionals, dret internacional i construcció de pau. Totes ells però amb un evident eix vertebrador: la recerca per la pau i la noviolència.

Els objectius de la col·lecció son difondre i oferir textos que poden ajudar a la reflexió i formació. Especialment adreçada tant a l'àmbit acadèmic, com a les persones treballadores de pau, els textos es publiquen en qualsevol de les tres llengües de la col·lecció: català, anglès, castellà o francès.

The **International Catalan Institute for Peace - ICIP**, created by the Catalan Parliament to foster research, training, the transfer of knowledge and the prevention of violence and the promotion of peace, fosters applied research of peace studies through diverse actions (calls for projects, scholarships, seminars...). The ***ICIP Research*** collection gathers the results of these activities focusing on subjects such as armed conflicts, human security, resolution and pacific transformation of conflicts, international relations, international law and peace building. All maintain a clear leitmotif: the research for peace and nonviolence. The aims of the collection are to present and publicise texts that may help to stimulate reflection and training. Addressed specifically to academia and to peace workers, the texts are published in any of the three languages of the collection: English, Catalan, Spanish or French.

El **Instituto Catalán Internacional para la Paz –ICIP**, creado por el Parlament de Catalunya para fomentar la investigación, la formación, la transferencia de conocimientos y la actuación de prevención de la violencia y promoción de la paz fomenta, a través de actuaciones diversas (convocatoria de proyectos, becas, seminarios...) la investigación de base y aplicada en los estudios de y sobre la paz. La colección ***ICIP Research*** recoge algunos resultados de estas actividades tratando temáticas como los conflictos armados, la seguridad humana, la resolución y transformación de conflictos, las relaciones internacionales, el derecho internacional y la construcción de paz. Todos ellos mantienen un evidente eje vertebrador: la investigación por la paz y la noviolencia.

Los objetivos de la colección son difundir y ofrecer textos que puedan ayudar a la reflexión y la formación. Especialmente dirigida tanto al ámbito académico como a las personas trabajadoras de paz, los textos se publican en cualquiera de las tres lenguas de la colección: castellano, inglés, catalán o francés.

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