Disembedding Terrorists:
Identifying New Factors and Models for Disengagement Research

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ABSTRACT

This paper forms part of a wider MINECO (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad)-funded study on pathways out of terrorism entitled "Rules of Disengagement: Individual and Collective Ways Out of Terrorism in Spain". It aims to synthesise current knowledge on exiting terrorism whilst also researching what more can be learned about the topic from neighbouring fields by identifying relevant concepts and processes. In order to do so it draws on literature from the fields of criminology, armed conflict, labour trends and electoral studies. These key concepts are inserted into a wider discussion which tries to explain disengagement from terrorism from three different levels of analysis: macro, meso, and micro, in turn. This approach was found to be limiting in providing a more parsimonious explanation of exit and so the paper suggests the use of a multi-level analysis model taken from business research and adapted to this context. The use of this layered concept of 'embeddedness' would permit more rounded analysis of the dynamics of disengagement and so several recommendations for further research are made at the end of the paper.

Keywords: Disengagement, embeddedness, exit theories, political violence, counterterrorism

RESUM

Aquest treball forma part d'un estudi més ampli finançat per el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) sobre les vies per sortir del terrorisme, titulat ''Processos de Desvinculació a Espanya: Sortides Individuals i Col·lectives del Terrorisme''. El document pretén sintetitzar els coneixements actuals sobre la sortida del terrorisme, així com investigar que més es pot aprendre sobre el tema des d'àrees properes. Amb aquest objectiu, es basa en la literatura dels camps de la criminologia, els conflictes armats, el mercat laboral i els estudis electorals. Aquests conceptes s'insereixen en un debat més ampli que tracta d'explicar la desvinculació del terrorisme des de tres nivells d'anàlisi: macro, meso i micro. Aquest enfocament ha resultat ser útil, tot i que limitant a l'hora de proporcionar una explicació més parsimoniosa de la sortida i per tant aquest treball suggereix l'ús d'un model d'anàlisi multinivell. L'ús d'aquest concepte en capes d'*embeddedness* permetria una anàlisi més sofisticada de la dinàmica de desvinculació. Per tant, diverses recomanacions de noves vies d'investigació es presenten al final d'aquest text.

Paraules clau: Desvinculació, *embeddedness*, exit theories, violència política, antiterrorisme

RESUMEN

Este trabajo forma parte de un estudio más amplio financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) sobre las vías para salir del terrorismo, titulado' "Procesos de Desvinculación en España: Salidas Individuales y Colectivas del Terrorismo". El texto pretende sintetizar los conocimientos actuales sobre la salida del terrorismo, así como investigar que más se puede aprender de áreas cercanas. Con este objetivo, se basa en la literatura de los campos de la criminología, los conflictos armados, el mercado laboral y los estudios electorales. Estos conceptos se insertan en un debate más amplio que trata de explicar la desvinculación del terrorismo desde tres niveles de análisis: macro, meso y micro. Este enfoque ha resultado ser útil, pero limitante para ofrecer una explicación más parsimoniosa de la salida y por lo tanto este trabajo sugiere el uso de un modelo de análisis multinivel. El uso de este concepto en capas de *embeddedness* permitiría un análisis más sofisticado de la dinámica de desvinculación. Por ello, varias recomendaciones de nuevas vías de investigación se presentan al final de este texto.

Palabras clave: Desvinculación, *embeddedness*, exit theories, violencia política, antiterrorismo

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

The majority of research in the field of terrorism focuses predominantly on *causes* and how individuals engage in political violence in the first place[1]. However, in the fight against terrorism, the most pertinent studies are those which investigate how terrorism ends[2], yet these crucial dynamics remain largely unexplored. During the last decade, observers across a myriad of different fields including criminology, armed conflict, electoral studies and labour trends, have called for a rectification of this lack of research into how individuals *exit* both roles and organisations.[3] This review will argue that there is much to be learned from these fields which could contribute significantly to existing knowledge on 'pathways out of terrorism'.

Jerrold Post (1990), a CIA psychiatrist, first signalled that in the long-term struggle against terrorism, practitioners have to focus on examining ways *out* of terrorism and make efforts to facilitate this process, rather than stepping up security and repression[4]. Since then several important authors including John Horgan, Paul Wilkinson, and Martha Crenshaw, have begun to examine disengagement in more depth[5]. The end of terrorism can be brought about in two ways: either through the demise and collapse of an organisation as a whole, or through mass exit of its members. This paper is concerned with the latter given that, in understanding the demise of terrorism, it is essential to look to factors internal and external to the group which cause members to leave, whether voluntarily or forcibly[6].

This review from here on is thus divided into six sections and structured as follows. Firstly, the paper will give a brief explanation of both deradicalization and disengagement, and

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1 See Pedahzur, 2006; Perliger, 2006; Weinberg L. & Eubank, W. L., 2006; Richardson, 2006; Bjorgo, 2005.

2 Gvineria, 2009, p. 257.

3 Ebaugh, 1988, p. 7; Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 419; Klein and Maxon 2006, p. 154; Kurth Cronin 2009; Decker and Pyrooz, 2011, p. 1; Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero, 2012, p. 3; King, 1997, p. 18; Bovenkerk, 2011, p. 269

4 Post, 1990, p.40.

5 See: Crenshaw, 1991; Wilkinson, 1999; Gupta, 2008; Bjorgo and Horgan, 2009; Barrelle, 2010; Alonso, 2011; Crenshaw, 2011; Dechesne, 2011; Ferguson, 2011; Reinares, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011; Weinberg, 2012.

6 The benefits of conducting extensive academic research to set the foundations for police and security initiatives have proven very fruitful in other areas of policy-making, namely in the fight against gangs. See Wakeling, (2003) for a report on the 'ceasefire' initiative implemented in California and Boston in an effort to crack down on gang related homicides. Its efficacy and success was owed to the partnership of academic research by Harvard University and extensive policing efforts. This innovative approach was highly successful, causing staggering drops in homicides in the following years and such collaborations should be encouraged in combatting a wider variety of social and security problems.

demonstrate why the latter should be at the core of anti-terrorism initiatives[7]. The second section will 'map' the different ways in which research on disengagement has been conducted by key scholars and end by describing the benefits of the multi-causal approach chosen here. The following three sections will thus detail the pertinent exit processes identified in the aforementioned neighbouring fields and in a multi-level approach. Firstly, macro- (or national/global-) level factors will be addressed. These pertain to high-level political or social changes as perceived by the individual. Secondly, meso- (or group-) level factors to do with the internal functioning of the group will be given. Thirdly micro- (or individual) level factors which encompass all explanations associated with change in the personal priorities and outlook of the members will be outlined. Despite this method of categorisation, there is full recognition that these processes seldom occur in isolation but rather in tandem. Therefore, the sixth section will detail a new model of analysis, 'embeddedness', taken from studies on labour trends, which could be adopted in disengagement research to heighten the parsimony and salience of theories of exit. Finally, the review will conclude by citing avenues for further investigations and highlighting which neighbouring disciplines are most informative for terrorism research. Contrary to expectations, the literature on organised crime and civil wars did not add significantly to current knowledge on disengagement from terrorism.

2. Deradicalization versus disengagement

Studies on the end of terrorism often refer to the ways in which individuals exit clandestine organisations. Since there are no clearly established concepts and parameters, scholars often refer to a variety of different processes, which contribute to the existing terminological confusion. Two of the terms that are not always clearly distinguished are deradicalization and disengagement. According to Omar Ashour (2008), deradicalization would be the process that leads an individual (or group) to change his attitudes about terrorism, especially in relation to targeting civilians. As such, deradicalization would entail a change of beliefs, which could go hand in hand with a modification in violent behaviour (although not necessarily). Disengagement, however, would necessarily entail a behavioural modification such as leaving an underground group and ceasing related

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7 See Bovenkerk, 2011, p.267; Reinares, 2011, p780; Noricks, 2009.

activity[8]. From a counterterrorism perspective, disengagement is more important than deradicalization, since the former can occur without the latter.

When aiming primarily to prevent terrorist attacks, disengagement is a more desirable goal than deradicalization. However, more effort and resources have been devoted to developing projects of deradicalization, with varying levels of success. For example, the alleged successes of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni deradicalization programmes, which are based around talks with imams and re-education about Islam, have been heavily challenged[9]. Academic researcher, Mark Dechesne (2011) maintains that measures of successful deradicalization are dubious and unreliable and Matthew Weber (2010) similarly found that the Afghan deradicalization 'Programme Tahkim Sulh' (PTS) only really had success among very low-ranking or barely affiliated Taliban members, suggesting that its success would not be repeated at higher levels[10]. In the same vein, anti-terrorism Forensic Psychologist, Kate Barrelle (2010) also highlighted that most deradicalization programmes only achieve disengagement at best[11] and John Horgan (2009) went as far as to doubt whether deradicalization is even a 'necessary' goal[12]. Such heavy criticism of existing deradicalization initiatives suggests that a change of focus is needed. From a counterterrorism perspective, the primarily goal is to deter terrorist *action* before addressing beliefs and as such more emphasis should be placed on disengagement efforts.

The significant impact of disengagement has been demonstrated in recent research on gang behaviour which has proven that temporarily leaving a criminal group significantly decreases an individual's propensity to commit related crimes. The research has countered earlier notions on criminality put forward by scholars such as Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990), who held that antisocial behaviour was attributable to low self-control[13]. However, this hypothesis cannot account for the significant findings between active and inactive membership which Mons Bendixen et al. were able to explain in their 2004 study. The authors investigated the effect of gang membership on inclination towards antisocial behaviour in a longitudinal survey of 1,203 5th to 7th graders between 1983 and 1985. Essentially, they wanted to ascertain whether individuals act anti-socially regardless of gang membership or whether the active belonging to an organisation perpetuates such

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8 Ashour, 2008.

9 For a variety of discussions of deradicalization versus disengagement, see; Dechesne, 2011; Horgan, 2009; Bovenkerk, 2011, p. 267.

10 Dechesne, 2011 and Weber, 2010, p. 66.

11 Barrelle, 2010, p. 12.

12 Horgan, 2009, p. 28.

13 For a full explanation of the theory see Gottfredson and Hirshi, 1990.

behaviour, a phenomenon otherwise known as a 'facilitation effect'. Thus, to test for this effect, respondents were asked to signal whether they were actively or inactively affiliated with a gang during instances of violent behaviour. The results confirmed the commonplace notion that both active and non-active gang members commit more anti-social crimes than non-gang members do. However, Bendixen et al. also found that such acts are committed significantly less frequently during periods of inactive membership, clearly exposing the 'facilitative' role of the organisation[14]. By differentiating between active and inactive periods, Bendixen et al. were able to find a strong causal link between heightened criminal activity and active gang membership. Their research confirmed that separation from such groups demonstrably reduces the likelihood of correlated criminal behaviour and clearly displays the significance of disengagement for crime prevention.

Such lessons can be directly assimilated in the terrorism context. Indeed, Donatella della Porta's (2009) study on exit from illicit organisations in Italy further proved the facilitative effect of belonging to a group as 44% of individuals she interviewed about their function in Italian underground organisations had solely carried out 'administrative' tasks[15]. These individuals did not wish to actively participate in terrorism but given the importance of administrative support in the coordination and realisation of attacks, they were still able to contribute to the efforts.

Organisations provide a combination of financial support and human capital which enable individuals to carry out actions they may otherwise not be able, or not have the courage to do. Members can participate in a variety of ways without suffering any danger thanks to the logistical as well as active support which operations require. Therefore, the role of the organisation as facilitator of illicit activity is evident as it provides broad possibilities for engagement in an activity in which many individuals would not partake alone. As Barrelle (2010) explains, belonging to such an organisation requires one to think primarily in terms of his group identity and strongly advocate its interests[16]. Thus, as the research by Bendixen et al. showed, when an individual separates from the group this group identity weakens and he is more likely to cease activity.

Having established the importance of the cell in facilitating terrorist behaviour, it is now essential to understand the processes which root an individual into such a criminal group and prevent him or her from abandoning it.

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14 Bendixen et al., 2004, p. 22 – 23, 110.

15 Della Porta, 2009, p. 68.

16 Barrelle, 2010, p. 2.

3. Mapping pathways to disengagement

This section discusses the different methods and angles for analysis which past research has identified as helpful in trying to understand how disengagement occurs. Across the past two decades, many authors have contributed to debates about which factors need to be taken into consideration and how best to analyse these influences. This section details some of the most salient contributions to current knowledge, explaining the progression from singular-level analysis to the more contemporary multi-causal approaches championed in recent research and implemented in this review.

One of the earliest studies to address issues on disengaging from social organisations was Helen R. F. Ebaugh's (1988) study on role exit among 185 'exiters' from various different roles between 1971 and 1985. Her study examined disengagement from religions, marriages, prostitution and some occupations such as sportspeople and medics, but she also addressed criminality and gangs. According to Ebaugh's analysis, the decision to exit one's role is usually borne from dissatisfaction with one's current lifestyle[17]. This feeling of unfulfillment creates the necessary conditions for the individual to desire identity change and role exit. These research findings are supported by later testimonies from long interviews with gang members, terrorists and those who had recently left the labour market as will be seen later[18].

Multi-causal approaches have been developed in order to ascertain which processes contribute to exiting from clandestine groups. Renowned Political Scientist, Tore Bjorgo (1999) identified a dichotomy he referred to as *push* and *pull* factors in his vast body of gang research to explain the two different spheres of influences which act on individuals' decision-making processes; 'push' factors which come from within the group, and 'pull' factors which are influences from outside the organisation. Later, other authors further conceptualised elements of this binary in their calls for pluralism of research approaches[19]. Speaking of the longevity of political parties, yet clearly with a broader view, Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie (1988) also discuss this dichotomy:

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17 See Eubagh, 1988.

18 See Ngo, 2010; Alonso, 2011; Reinares, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2001; Oswald, 1999.

19 Peggy Giordano et al. (2002) wished to move away from mid-level explanations and towards individual concerns by investigating the common factors which act upon an individual to occasion desistance. They coined a concept, ''hooks for change'', which refers to external pull factors which allow the 'exiter' to wrench himself out of the group, organisation, or simply his own mind-set which was keeping him there.

> Every established organisation, not least a political party, must deal with two different but interrelated sets of pressures, those arising from its internal organisation, and pressures from its external environment[20].

In addition to considering internal and external influences, several terrorism scholars have argued that disengagement factors must be analysed from different levels in order to heighten understanding of these processes. RAND researcher, Gaga Gvineria (2009), implored policy- makers to cease their 'exclusive preoccupation' with the group as the main unit of analysis and instead look *around* the cell in question[21]. Paul Wilkinson (2011) also rejected one- dimensional methods of explanation, calling instead for the consideration of both 'democratic' and 'individual' ways out[22], this is to say national- and personal-level motivations for exit. Fernando Reinares (2011) later expanded this categorisation into 'structural', 'organisational' and 'personal' factors[23], and Neil Ferguson and others[24] divide this stratification further, explaining that 'the process of disengagement from militant extremism is complex and incorporates interplay between micro, meso, macro and exo factors'[25].

Thus, in mapping pathways out of terrorism it is abundantly clear that any parsimonious theory of disengagement must account for different types of factors which can offset exit. As Bjorgo and Giordano et al. highlighted, there are important distinctions to be made between influences from within or outside the group. Moreover, as shown above, these influences can also come from different levels. Therefore, this review will now address significant exit factors from the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of explanation.

4. Macro-level factors

In some cases, the principal explanation for an individual's decision to disengage from terrorism comes from the macro level. This is to say that national or global events can often affect the endurance and lifespan of terrorist campaigns. Examples of high-level

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20 Rose and Mackie, 1988, p. 539-40.

21 See Gvineria, 2009, p. 279.

22 Wilkinson, 2011, p. 201.

23 Reinares, 2011, p. 780.

24 See Schmid and Price, 2011, p. 338; della Porta, 2009; Reinares, 2011; Horgan, 2009, p. 27.

25 See Ferguson, 2011, p. 112.

influences occasioning exit include shifts in the national political arena or changes in global ideology. In such cases, individuals may voluntarily disengage out of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the course of events. However, the most common macro-level factor which causes exit is counterterrorism[26]. These tactics can produce forced disengagement through capture, decapitation or exile. This section discusses these state campaigns and their limitations, suggests alternative approaches, and theorises how unforeseeable macro-level changes can have a significant impact on individuals' decisions to disengage.

4.1 Counterterrorism

Governments are usually keen to thwart terrorism as quickly and effectively as possible in order to minimise the detrimental impact on society. Counterterrorism hopes to raise the cost of participation so much that perpetrators essentially feel that it no longer ''pays off'' to be involved[27]. As Audrey Kurth Cronin wrote in her 2009 book 'How Terrorism Ends', terrorist actors 'consider the costs, benefits, and consequences of their actions just as other actors do'[28]. With this knowledge, counterterrorism efforts aim to tip this balance and diminish the pay offs of terrorism for its perpetrators.

There is certainly widespread agreement that, on occasions, repressive tactics have contributed significantly to the disengagement of militants from organisations such as ETA and even the complete demise of some campaigns like Peru's *Sendero Luminoso*[29]. Fernando Reinares' (2011) interviews with ex-ETA members give us personal insight into reasoning for exit from the organisation. Their testimonies demonstrate clear evidence that stifling government repression (alongside other factors) led the individuals to cease their involvement. Reinares explains how one individual 'anticipated stepped-up cooperation between the police and judicial authorities' leading him to conclude that participation had become too costly and thus disengage[30].

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26 Kurth Cronin, 2009, p.115.

27 Crenshaw, 2011, p. 209.

28 Kurth Cronin, 2009, p. 120.

29 This paper is concerned primarily with disengagement, however, counterterrorism has also led to the collapse of organisations, for example the decapitation of Abimael Guzmán, leader of the Shining Path in Peru. For more information see Kurth Cronin, 2009, chapter 1 and Ross, 2006, chapter 2.

30 Reinares, 2011, p. 787.

However, research has found that repression is usually only successful in thwarting a movement when the campaign hinges on the leadership of one individual[31], and even then this success is usually partial[32]. Repressive counterterrorism may require the implementation of controversial measures such as heightening national security measures like border control and citizen surveillance, immigrant profiling, and expensive drawn-out capture operations; thus, alternatives to these costly and laborious tactics are highly desirable[33].

<mark>4.2 Alternative Counter Approaches</mark>

Scholars champion less repressive counter-measures insisting that excessive force should not be the backbone of counterterrorism but rather tactics which differentiate the state from the aggressor, such as intelligence and the judiciary system. Terrorism expert, Martha Crenshaw, (1991) used the case of the Italian government's effective response in combatting the Red Brigades in the 1970s, praising their use of 'sociology, psychology and political science' instead of 'police and judicial repression'[34]. She maintained that such methods were more legitimate and fruitful given democracies' responsibilities regarding the use of violence. States cannot expect to gain notable success through traditional counterterrorist measures as they are subject to a different moral code than clandestine organisations[35]. Jones and Libicki (2008) upheld this view, criticising that the 'war on terror' is a futile way to conceptualise the struggle against Al Qa'ida as it encourages the "wrong" type of action, namely a military perception of the situation when it would be more appropriately tackled with intelligence and policing resources[36]. In the same vein, Paul Wilkinson also encouraged liberal democracies to adopt a more intelligence-based, layered approach over conventional counterterrorism tactics:

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31 See Kurth Cronin, 2009, chapter 2, for the criteria for successfully destroying an organisation through repression and decapitation.

32 One such example was the capture of Kurdish Workers' Party leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999 which led to a near cessation of activity, however, in 2003, the onset of the Iraq war reignited the organization which then strengthened by uniting with Iraqi Kurds. See Kurth Cronin, 2009, p. 21.

33 Kurth Cronin, 2009, p. 115.

34 Crenshaw, 1991, p. 82.

35 Weinberg, 2007, p.77.

36 Jones and Libicki, 2008, p. xvi.

> The key to success against terrorism in a democracy is winning the intelligence war and mobilising the political will and democratic support for a multipronged strategy, carefully calibrated to the specific threat posed by a particular campaign[37].

This repeated calling for alternative counterterrorist measures demonstrates that, at state level, the end of terrorism can more effectively be brought about through an integrated intelligence-based approach rather than military blows. The 'Global War on Terror' (GWT) is unlikely to be successful unless it is complemented by a more considered, low-key government involvement[38] as military counterterrorism is ultimately limiting because states' actions are circumscribed by their responsibility to maintain legitimacy throughout the dealings with the aggressor.

Nevertheless, counter efforts are frequently fruitless until an external factor intercedes and causes a contextual shift. Alterations in the national or global context can extinguish the flame of even the most ardent violent movements or annul their cause leaving the organisation without a purpose. The effects of such high-level changes on exit will be discussed in the following section.

4.3 Change in the Wider Context

Global, national, or local improvements of a socio-political nature can drastically alter the contexts in which social organisations operate. For example, a state or institution may open up to a grievance expressed by a group or organisation hence triggering a process of disengagement. People may voluntarily disengage from their workplace, party, or group, satisfied that the goals are on the right track to fulfilment or, alternatively, exit involuntary because the organisation has disappeared or become obsolete[39].

In Denmark, many gang members experienced such disengagement when the context in which their gang existed altered. An anti-racism gang called the 'Warriors' emerged in the 1980s in order to challenge an established white-supremacy gang, the 'Green Jackets'. Initially, the Warriors used violence as a force of protection for ethnic minorities but the Green Jackets eventually fell apart and violence against minorities dissipated. Seeing that

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37 Wilkinson, 2011, p. 184.

38 Gvineria, 2009, p.266.

39 See Kurth Cronin, 2009, p.105-107; Gvineria, 2009, p.273; Weinberg, 2012, p.9.

circumstances had changed and their rival had been defeated, many senior members of the Warriors exited by the 1990s. In this case, changes in the wider context in which the gang was operating, this is to say the disappearance of its rival, led members to exit as circumstances no longer dictated such action.

Similarly, unforeseen high-level events can reverberate at an individual level and bring about the end of a political party. One such example was the Irish Farmer's Party which had a short lifespan between 1922 and 1932. In the thirties, an internal divide arose between proponents of free trade and protectionists during which the majority of the party's voter base switched loyalties to the incumbent Cumann na nGaedheal government. Here, high-level occurrences, namely the contemporary economic climate which was tending towards free trade, had consequences on a personal level and ultimately marked the end of the party. The party members and voter base alike were divided in their interests, causing the defection of several politicians and the forced disengagement of the rest as the party collapsed.

These cases demonstrate how disengagement can take place due to macro-level circumstantial shifts which change one's outlook or alter individuals' priorities. Unfortunately, macro explanations are unable to shed light on how terrorism subsided in many other cases. The Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (1994-2002) and Harakut ul-Ansar (1993-2002) collapsed due to reasons more internal to the group, and cannot be explained by looking only at the high level[40]. It is therefore pertinent to take the group itself as the unit of analysis to ascertain which mid-level dynamics encourage disengagement.

5. Meso-level factors

Aside from national or global influences, pathways out of organisations also arise due to factors related to the group or organisation itself. The internal functioning and mechanisms of a workplace, terrorist group, political party, or gang can give rise to grievances which encourage exit. Most meso-level factors which occasion disengagement stem from disillusionment with some 'organisational' factor such as; the running of the group, its direction or modus operandi, or conflict with superiors[41]. Such exits find no explanation at the macro level, nor do they pertain solely to individual decision-making,

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40 These groups splintered due to internal problems. See Jones and Libicki, 2008, p. 150, 159.

41 Jacobson, 2010, p.9; Reinares, 2011, p. 802; Alonso, 2011, p. 701.

rather they are direct results of negative group-level dynamics which ultimately incite desistance. This section thus looks to three such factors identified in the neighbouring fields: (1) betrayal, (2) ideological differences, and (3) transformation.

<mark>5.1 Betrayal</mark>

In joining a gang or a terrorist movement, or when fighting on one side in a civil war, individuals can gain a sense of belonging and create fraternal relationships with other members which grant them a strong new social identity[42]. A thorough process of socialization into the new role takes place and the group comes to substitute all other social relationships. However, on occasions the group can fail the individual at a crucial time which sparks disillusionment and eventual disengagement.

In Hieu Van Ngo's 2010 study of gang-involved immigrant youths in Canada, three of the thirty ex-gang members he interviewed spoke of being betrayed by fellow members who informed on them. Interviewees mentioned being ''ratted off'' to the police, stating that such betrayal shattered the internal fraternity among members they had previously regarded as ''brothers'' and ''home boys'' and caused them to leave[43]. Former terrorist members, especially those in vulnerable positions such as gunmen, can disengage after feeling intentionally betrayed by the group. One ETA member was angered by the organisation's vigilante behaviour and its constant checking up and spying on members[44]. These actions shattered the individual's ideals about the organisation and triggered disillusionment. Similarly, another ETA militant was certain that the leaders had purposefully botched her operation in an effort to have her captured[45]. This episode instilled distrust and fear in the member and the feeling of having been betrayed set off the desire to disengage.

However, in some cases, betrayal can lead to a larger realisation about the reality of an organisation and shatter idealised notions. Being let down by fellow members can bring

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42 See Barelle, 2010, p. 2; Ngo, 2010, p.90.

43 Ngo, 2010, p.90, 97.

44 Reinares, 2011, p. 791.

45 Reinares, 2011, p. 790.

about wider disappointment with the entire ethos or ideology of the group, offsetting disillusionment with the cause and triggering individual exits.

5.2 Ideological Differences

Individuals joining an organisation or cause often do so with specific ideas about the group's ethos and objectives. However, time can sometimes distort the ideational underpinning of an organisation rendering the philosophies of the combatants and leadership somewhat out of sync. Becoming aware of this discrepancy can be extremely disheartening for militants and cause them to renounce their involvement or even defect[46]. Such dynamics have occurred in various contexts, including global terrorist networks and insurgencies.

Some terrorist organisations have a central religious discourse which drives the furthering of their cause. However, the group does not necessarily abide by these principles in practice and this can cause internal disagreements. Noman Benotman, the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) underwent such a process of realization and rejection in correlation with al Qa'ida's September 11th plans. He repeatedly called on Osama bin Laden to cease his actions, believing them to be contrary to the true idea of global jihad. This divergence in ideology led to Benotman's eventual resignation from his leadership position in the LIFG and open renouncement of al Qa'ida's actions[47].

Examining how disengagement occurs as a result of ideological disillusionment is important for two reasons. Firstly, because such disappointment can produce a phenomenon named 'social contagion' on the *inside*, this is to say, the spreading of the practice amongst group members. Matthew Weber's (2010) study on disengagement from insurgencies concluded that individuals in close contact share experiences and so, disillusionment can be ''contaminate[d]'' by others, causing defection to happen in 'clusters'[48]. He explained this social contagion as a 'snowball effect', whereby the more individuals that are contaminated, the higher the rate of further contagion of disillusionment[49]. This is a very important process as Weber demonstrates that social

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46 See Kalyvas, 2008.

47 Jacobson, 2010, p. 9.

48 Weber, 2010, p. 22.

49 Ibid..

contagion is the cheapest counterterrorism strategy available to the state[50]. Secondly, disillusionment is important because of the deterrence effect that it produces on the *outside,* this is to say among non-participants. Disappointed former militants can vocalise their experiences on the outside and help to dispel romantic notions amongst potential newcomers in order to hinder the cause or organisation's possibilities of recruitment. Such lessons learned in counter-insurgency efforts could be invaluable to counterterrorist operations as the effects of individual exit could be exploited by authorities and peace organisations for their deterrence benefits through the establishment of forums where such experiences could be vocalised, expressed and recorded.

However, even when there is no discrepancy over ideology, other factors can come to bear at a middle-level which occasion disengagement (sometimes forced). Some groups may profess a particular goal at the offset but later undergo a process of transformation and become entirely different organisations. This type of transformation leaves militants loyal to the initial cause with the choice of either discontinuing involvement or remaining in the group partaking in a different kind of activity. In both cases, the result is often disengagement from the previous role.

5.3 Transformation and Disappearance of Groups

Transformation of an organisation is a commonly-cited reason for individual cessation of involvement in a particular entity[51]. A group which started out as one type of actor can evolve into another due to circumstances external or internal to the group. This transformation can be caused by financial constraints[52] which complicate operations or simply by the greater allure of leading a criminal life.

In the case of terrorist groups, transformation usually follows one of two routes, politics or crime[53]. This transformation can occur when a group reaches a crucial crossroads whereby it is given an opportunity to further its interests legitimately and democratically,

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50 Weber, 2010, p. 78.

51 See Gupta, 2008; Jones and Libicki, 2008; Kurth Cronin, 2009; Gvineria, 2009; Weinberg, 2012; Bovenkerk, 2011; Rose and Mackie, 1988; Bjorgo, 1999.

52 See Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, p.6.

53 Weinberg, 2012, p. 11-12; Gvineria, 2009, p. 276-277, Crenshaw, 2011, p. 219-221; Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 13-14.

as was the case with the IRA in Ireland and the Tupamaros of Peru. On the other hand, exits towards criminality can occur when a group loses sight of its raison d'être, and subsequently gets taken in by opportunities for personal gain, such as the FARC in Colombia which began in 1964 as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement yet nowadays is involved primarily in drug-trafficking and kidnapping.

To ascertain which groups are likely to transform, one can gain insight by examining Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's important distinctions between 'greed' and 'grievance' as motives for civil conflict. These two scholars theorise how, whilst some parties to civil wars are genuinely motivated by grievances over ethnicity, religion or territory, others are more concerned with personal enrichment and exploit these discourses as a façade to mobilize manpower for their pursuits[54]. These findings help us to explain why certain groups, though their goals may seem to have been fulfilled, or indeed become obsolete due to changes in the global context, remain together exploiting their prior discourses as a disguise for their new objectives.

Research shows that greater group cohesiveness heightens criminality so breaking the strong inter-group bonds may significantly help to prevent transformations into criminal bodies[55]. Tore Bjorgo, observed that two pertinent reasons for gangs disbanding were loss of the external enemy and loss of cohesiveness among members[56]. If a group's cohesion is such that there are strong affective bonds, then increased criminality is likely to be the end product of these obsoleted organisations whose members desire to remain together and pursue extra-legal activities[57].

The same scenario can be applied to terrorist groups which decide to retain ties despite obsolescence or partial accomplishment of their goals. Some members are dissatisfied with anything less than complete fulfilment of their goals and thus splinter off into even more radical sub-groups. Their intimate bonds enable this process and so, in facilitating effective disengagement (i.e. not splintering), there is a lot to be learnt from the tactics employed in disbanding gangs. Bjorgo (1999) and Klein (1995) discuss how cohesiveness is created and thus give clues as to how to deconstruct it. Bonding occurs through contact, and the ability to share ideas heightens cohesiveness and allows like-minded individuals to meet and mobilize. Thus, reducing cohesiveness by complicating group

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54 See Collier and Hoeffler, 2002.

55 See Klein, 1995, p. 43.

56 See Bjorgo, 1999, p. 4.

57 Ibid.

meetings and forcing influential members to dislocate geographically are key factors not only in ensuring complete disengagement of gang members[58] but also of terrorists[59].

Taking the group as the main unit of analysis certainly adds explanatory depth to exit processes by demonstrating how group-level dynamics drive disengagement. Transformation into a less desirable alternative or disappearance of the group itself forces many members to disengage, whilst others do so voluntarily as a result of disillusionment with the reality. However, human beings are selfish actors. Their reasoning usually centres most weightily on individual considerations. Therefore, whilst no analysis would be complete without examination of national and group factors, it would be similarly handicapped without discussion of the individual level.

6. Micro-level factors

Micro-level explanations are the most frequently cited for disengagement in research on exit strategies[60]. Looking to the individual level is pivotal in filling in the blanks left by the examination of macro- and meso-level factors as personal considerations are frequently the most important in individual's decision-making. In order to avoid falling into common pit-falls of micro-level analysis, it is paramount to firstly reaffirm the salience of Uggen and Piliavin's (1998) concept of 'asymmetrical causation' which holds that the reasons for entry into a group may have nothing to do with the reasons for exit[61]. Thus, the tendency, when looking at the personal level, to simply attribute the reverse mechanisms of entry to the explanation of exit is not useful in disengagement investigations.

Individuals who join criminal organisations are sometimes driven by material self-interest but their membership can be unaffected by the disappearance of economic incentives. Criminologists David Pyrooz and Scott Decker (2011) illustrate this in their path-breaking study of exits from gangs among 84 juvenile arrests in Arizona. They used asymmetrical

58 See the discussion by Ngo (2010) on exit strategies where forced geographical dislocation of a gang member (usually enforced by parents) is cited as an effective pathway to disengagement.

59 See Reinares, 2011, p. 796 where he highlights how serving a prison sentence and being removed from the group frequently brought about the necessary cognitive shift to encourage individuals to disengage.

60 See Reinares, 2011; Ngo, 2010; Alonso, 2011; Chawdhury Fink and Hearne, 2008; Noricks, 2009; Bjorgo, 1999; Hastings et al., 2011; Jacobson, 2010; Decker and Lauritsen, 2002; Decker and Pyrooz, 2011; Pyrooz and Decker, 2011; Pyrooz, Decker and Webb, 2010.

61 See Uggen, C. and Piliavin I., 1998 and Ebaugh, 1988, p.8; MacRae-Krisa, 2011, p. 5; Decker and Lauritsen, 2002, p. 51.

causation to explain that individuals who join a gang due to perceived opportunities for financial gain will not simply disengage if this possibility dissipates[62]. Once involved in an organisation, many other factors, such as new-found emotive bounds, become more important than profit, and can occasion exit even if financial incentives still abound. One pertinent example of this is when members of a particular organisation create external social ties which substitute the dependence on the group for personal relationships[63].

6.1 New Social Relationships

Research shows that the development of new or existing social relationships is a significant reason in individual decisions to leave an organisation[64]. When looking at patterns of labour market entry and exit, Christiane Oswald (1999) found that many people make decisions to exit the labour market prematurely in order to synchronize with a partner or to provide care for another individual[65]. Whilst these findings may be counter-intuitive as individuals do not usually forgo possibilities for profit, they show the importance of social relationships in decision-making. Similarly, gang members frequently cite reasons of belonging to new social institutions as the motive for their disengagement[66]. A third of interviewees from Pyrooz and Decker's (2011) study cited 'family or employment' considerations as crucial to their exit from gangs[67]. Among female ex-members, parenthood and relationships were the most common reasons[68]. Thus, programmes such as the Saudi initiatives to marry off detained terrorists and encourage them to have a family[69] seem to be acting wisely according to these findings, despite dubiousness of their success in achieving deradicalization[70]. Admittedly, the likelihood of

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62 Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 423.

63 Hastings et al, 2011, p. i; MacRae-Krisa,2011, p.11-12.

64 See Grekul and LaRoque, 2011; Ngo, 2010; MacRae-Krisa, 2011; Hastings et al., 2011; Noricks, 2009; Chawhury Fink and Hearne, 2008; Alonso, 2011; Reinares, 2011, Bovenkerk, 2011; Ebaugh, 1988.

65 Oswald, 1999, p. 23.

66 See Hastings et al. (2011) and MacRae-Krisa (2011). For a gendered approach see Grekul and LaRoque (2011), and for an explanation of how these factors vary depending on ethnic background see Ngo (2010).

67 Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 421.

68 Grekul and LaRoque, 2011; MacRae-Krisa, 2011.

69 Noricks, 2009, p. 307.

70 Dechesne, 2011, p. 289.

being "pulled" out of the organisation through a new social relationship depends on context as some surroundings prevent the creation of 'positive' bonds[71].

Nevertheless, there are two significant stumbling blocks which inhibit individuals' possibilities to create new positive bonds: the way they perceive life to be on the outside,[72] and the social exclusion they suffer as a result of their former identity[73]. Due to these significant impediments, some exiters do not manage to form external ties to break the socialization and pull them out of their group; rather an internal factor can cause a cognitive change which *pushes* them out of the organisation instead. This process usually occurs when members suffer trauma.

6.2 Fear and Trauma

A personal or proximate experience of violence or trauma commonly causes disengagement[74]. Various interviewees have described experiences which offset a cognitive shift and created the desire to disengage from their respective groups. One such individual was a former gang member who saw his friend get 'shot up in his SUV'[75]. The occurrence sparked a sudden realisation about the dangers of involvement and caused him to exit. Similarly, fear can also be a strong push factor. One ex-etarra vocalised this process explaining how 'the fear was in me and so I left'[76]. In some cases, this fear can arise at the mere prospect of violence as with Tawfik Hamid, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1980s. Upon being asked to participate in a murder, he underwent a moral crisis and left the organisation due to an overbearing sense of fear[77].

If a group member feels that the danger becomes greater than anticipated when joining, s/he will desire to exit this lifestyle out of considerations of personal well-being. In short,

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71 Prison is problematic for creating new bonds as it provides geographical dislocation from the gang but nonetheless is a closed environment where different but likewise negative processes of socialization can take place. See Decker and Lauritsen, 2002.

72 Hastings et al., 2011, p. i.

73 See Ebaugh, 1988, chapter 1.

74 Chawdhury Fink and Hearne, 2008, p. i; Reinares, 2011, p. 790-91; MacRae-Krisa, 2011; Hastings et al., 2011, p. i.

75 Ngo, 2010, p. 92.

76 Reinares, 2011, p. 799.

77 Jacobson, 2010, p. 11.

trauma and fear often lead to doubts over commitment and, ultimately, exit. If experiences such as these render hardliners just as likely to disengage as newcomers[78], then questions of *who* is likely to disengage surface once again. Despite general recognition across the disciplines that there is no fixed profile of a potential exiter[79], certain characteristics could be helpful in aiding predictions.

<mark>6.3 Age</mark>

Membership of a criminal organisation has a timer. Exit is a 'natural process' in gang life and so programmes in this field focus not on *who* to target but simply *when* to do so. Moreover, not only do all members certainly exit at some point, research also shows that the likelihood of their exit can also be predicted depending on the duration of membership, with newer members being less entrenched in the group than the 'foundational' ones[80]. Similar processes can be traced when examining labour trends as the most natural and frequent exits also come about through age via the retirement process[81]. Thus in the trajectories of both gang members and working individuals, exit from the role is a given which roughly corresponds to a predetermined age range.

In the case of terrorism, such findings are yet to be made or ruled out. Research has found that 'burn out' is a significant factor in occasioning disengagement. Be that as it may, this concept is more 'linked to the stress of a commitment' rather than a natural age-related process[82]. Italian ex-terrorists spoke of the realisation of the 'impossibility' of achieving their aims and experiencing 'incredible tiredness' as the factors which caused them to 'burn out'[83]. However, these processes can happen to an individual of any age, having more to do with the intense commitment that is pledged to the cause than there being a roughly traceable age limit for participants. Indeed, whilst most gang members start to wind down their commitment and separate themselves from the organisation in

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78 Decker and Pyrooz, 2011, p. 6.

79 Jacobson, 2010, p. 8.

80 Decker and Pyrooz, 2011, p. 14.

81 Oswald, 1999, p. 4.

82 Della Porta, 2009, p.80.

83 Ibid.

their twenties, there seem to be no comparable discernible limits among terrorists. Some of the most notorious leaders continued well into middle age, such as Osama bin Laden, whose involvement was curtailed at 54 when he was killed. The less time an individual has spent in an organisation, the less profound the socialization process is, and the easier it is for him/her to be pulled out of the group. Therefore, duration of membership and age are two essential factors for further Quantitative research into whether there is an age limit on terrorist activity would be an invaluable addition to current knowledge.

This study has looked at explanations derived from macro-, meso-, and micro-levels to identify relevant new factors for research. Although this approach enables scholars to conceive more precise and nuanced theories of disengagement, such segregated analysis has limitations in its explanatory and predictor power. Factors for disengagement do not work in isolation, rather in tandem with each other and often spanning all three levels in producing the ultimate exit of an individual from his role. Such a reality demands a more dynamic analytical approach which simultaneously considers all three levels of analysis.

7. Reaching an integrated analysis approach: Embeddedness

John Horgan appreciated the complexity of parsimoniously theorising exit, denying that it could be done with single-level analysis approaches. Instead, he called for the creation of a 'multi- level model that describes the properties of the disengagement process'[84]. Such a model would provide practitioners a more comprehensive explanation of how disengagement is produced and aid in conceptualising more focused initiatives. This section therefore looks to a pertinent study in labour market trends to suggest how the dynamic model of 'job embeddedness' could be fruitfully adapted to the terrorism context. This tri-part model enables concurrent consideration of personal-, mid-, and high-level factors in individuals' decisions to exit their jobs, and could therefore be an extremely valuable contribution to this review and the field as a whole.

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84 Horgan, 2009, p. 18.

One of the basic assumptions of orthodox economic theory is the concept of *homus economicus*. From this rationalist perspective, human beings reduce most decisions down to a simple cost-benefit analysis. Contemporary labour research confirms this commonplace notion as studies show that individuals continue to work as long as the benefit of doing so outweighs that of unemployment[85]. Moreover, desistance programmes for gang members are found to be far more successful when they 'provide at least some of the same benefits' as the organisation from which the individual is exiting: these are usually financial perks[86]. However, reliance on simple economic pull factors is too superficial to capture the layered logic behind individuals' failure to disengage from terrorism.

Mitchell et al. (2001) signal the importance of pluralism in attributing explanations to individual reasoning as they hold that there are many *non-*economic factors which intertwine and cause 'networks of forces' which root people into their jobs[87]. For companies, knowing why people choose to stay or leave is a paramount concern. In an effort to try and identify what these networks of forces are, the authors created a tri-part model to explain why people remain in their jobs despite counter-incentives. The three parts loosely pertain to the three aforementioned levels of analysis: the first taking micro-level concerns into account, the second referring to meso-level factors, and the last relating to macro-level considerations. Essentially, 'job embeddedness' refers to

> Individuals' 1) links to other people, teams, and groups, 2) perceptions of their fit with job, organisation and community, and 3) what they say they would have to sacrifice if they left their job[88].

Firstly, *links* describe how an employee is part of a complex web of social and affective ties to his or her job[89]. This is to say that the individual becomes socialized in their specific work environment and builds up a large personal infrastructure there. Leaving this position would require the severance of at least some of these *links*, and many individuals are unwilling to take this step. Thus this element of the model deals with individual-level explanations of why people stay in their jobs.

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85 Oswald, 1999, p. 5.

86 Hastings et al., 2001, p. i.

87 Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 1118.

88 Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 1102.

89 Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 1104.

Secondly, *fit* refers to how well an individual feels that he or she integrates and is integrated into his/her professional surrounding, including ethos and corporate mentality. Decisions made at management level can affect this feeling conditioning an individual`s perception of *fit* within their company. For example, an environmentalist may choose to work in a company with a 'green' reputation. However, if the company later acts in a non-environmentally friendly way this employee may no longer feel that he fits with the organisation and seek a different employer.

Thirdly, *sacrifice* deals with the perceived cost of leaving a job in terms of losses and gains. Here, not only rational choice factors like cost-benefit analyses come in, but also the perceived ease or difficulty of finding another job. Therefore, *sacrifice* pertains to high-level factors and how the individual's perception of them moulds decision-making. If the employee perceives the job market to be particularly difficult, or if he believes that his interests are better served in his current job, then he may remain despite other drawbacks. Mitchell et al. hold that these three factors combine to produce the job embeddedness model. The more *links* an individual has at the workplace, and the higher his perceptions of *fit* and *sacrifice,* the lower the probability is that s/he will leave the job.

The usefulness of this model is evident, having been adopted in other fields of study, including insurgency and criminology. Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero employed it in their 2012 study on the levels of entrenchment of 226 members of gangs and found convincing evidence that higher levels of embeddedness increase gang membership time[90]. Following their robust results, these authors called for its application to other fields of criminological study[91]. The model could certainly be fruitfully transposed into the terrorism context to fill a significant gap in current analysis tools. Minor readjustment of the points of reference of the three elements of the model renders it seamlessly adaptable to terrorism research.

In the case of terrorist organisations*, links* refers to individuals' personal relations within the group. These types of extremist groups isolate all other external points of reference, involving the individual in a profound socialization process and accentuating his/her need for the organisation as substitute for community, friendships, and sometimes even family. *Fit* evokes the individuals' commitment to the cause, ability to carry out the necessary tasks, and perception that belonging to the organisation is akin to the attainment of these goals. Lastly, *sacrifice* pertains to the terrorists' perception of the global or wider context

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90 Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero, 2012, p. 16.

91 Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero, 2012, p.3; p. 22.

and how his exit from the organisation would reverberate in this setting in terms of what would be lost[92].

Therefore, the aggregation of the embeddedness model to the bank of tools implemented in disengagement research would be an invaluable contribution. The model permits simultaneous analysis from several different levels and its tri-part structure enables observers to test the effect of different level factors on the degree of individual embeddedness in an organisation. Such measures would be infinitely useful to practitioners given that higher embeddedness usually equates to lesser probability to disengage[93]. Therefore, policy-makers could focus their attention on less-entrenched members, putting the possibility of exit on the table with much higher possibilities for success.

As Weber's (2010) study highlighted, exit often produces a social contagion effect so properly- pitched policy initiatives could occasion widespread disengagement by targeting only a few individuals. The greater parsimony of this model not only allows for a better focus of such programmes but also gives practitioners increased possibilities to predict *who* is likely to disengage. Ultimately, using this model could help research to take a large step towards finally conceptualising a 'readily discernible profile...for dropouts'[94]. The feasibility of this achievement depends on which direction future research takes and the issues to which it gives greatest importance. This study will conclude with a few recommendations on this point.

8. Conclusion

This literature review has identified under-developed areas of research on disengagement from terrorism whilst also highlighting pertinent explanatory factors from other fields and

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92 Other observers have also created similar three-part models with different explanatory functions. David C. Pyrooz and Scott H. Decker (2011) conducted a life-course study of key desistance concepts in gangs holding that motivation, method and ties are three crucial factors in shaping our understanding of what the quality of an individual's disengagement will be. These terms address the subjective reasoning of the decision to disengage, the way in which a member exits, and the personal and social bonds which persist after disengagement from the group. Whilst this may also be an interesting concept to consider, the slight shift in focus renders it more apt for theorising the probability of genuine disengagement as opposed to periodical inactivity or lapses. See Decker and Pyrooz, 2011.

93 Pyrooz, Sweeten & Piquero, 2012, p. 1-2.

94 Jacobson, 2010, p. 8.

disciplines. Through the examination of a wide range of texts from criminology, electoral studies, armed conflict and labour trends, exit theories could now be enriched with the key factors discussed above. This investigation has suggested that research on gangs provides the most useful parallels to terrorism studies. The civil war literature did not contribute as significantly as expected and examination of the mafia was found to have minimal relevance due to the intriguing findings that Mafiosi seldom voluntarily disengage, rather their exits are commonly a result of involuntary arrest or death[95].

Firstly, there have been repeated calls for counterterrorism efforts to be reconceptualised and diverted off their typically repressive route. Many researchers provide convincing evidence of successful intelligence- and policing-based strategies and call for a new modus operandi in state counter efforts. The fairly limited success of conventional state counter tactics show that these efforts to raise the cost of participation using forceful repression are missing the mark. Research on gangs showed that intelligence-based and academically-backed initiatives reap far higher results and such partnered initiatives should be replicated in combatting terrorism[96].

Secondly, age is an extremely important factor in determining the likelihood of role exit. In addition, the length of time an individual has been a member of a group also greatly influences the probability of their exit as newer members disengage more readily given their less thorough process of socialization into the organisation and fewer number of binding *links* to the group. Thus, literature on political violence and terrorism would benefit from further investigation into these variables and clarification of the effects of age and duration of membership in an organisation on the disengagement processes.

Thirdly, the major addition to terrorist disengagement studies in this review is the 'embeddedness' model. Taken from labour market studies, it contributes to understanding of the impediments to exit and can inform policy-makers about the dynamics they are combatting. Composed of three elements which combine together to predict the level of entrenchment of an individual into his/her organisation, the model heightens knowledge of how to weaken the sway of these forces. Its dynamism is pertinent to terrorism research as it enables examination from several levels of analysis in tandem. Essentially, the model demonstrates that the incentive for exit can originate at any level, but the probability of success ultimately depends on the degree of embeddedness. This is an essential conclusion given the myriad admonitions by observers that it is impossible to isolate

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95 Bovenkerk, 2011, p. 269.

96 See Wakeling, 2003 on the 'ceasefire' initiative.

analysis of influences to just one level. Thus, using this model would allow researchers to analyse the relevance of several factors identified as important in the neighbouring fields and test their possible influence in the terrorism context.

Lastly, research shows that embeddedness is not a fixed state. Although the most embedded individuals are the hardest to dislodge, this state of entrenchment in an organisation also fluctuates depending on internal and external pressures. It is crucial for practitioners to therefore seize the opportunities presented when individuals go through periods of lesser embeddedness. Ebaugh's early study showed the difficulties that some exiters experience when abandoning an identity as society does not accept their disengagement but continues to see them as a member of particular group or identity. This is yet another factor which must be borne in mind in developing exit programmes given that widespread acceptance of disengagement from a role is crucial to its success.

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ICIP WORKING PAPERS
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International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP)
■■ The principle purpose of the ICIP is to promote a culture of peace in Catalonia as well as throughout the world, to endorse peaceful solutions and conflict resolutions and to endow Catalonia with an active role as an agent of peace and peace research. The ICIP, seeking consistency between ends and means, is governed by the principles of promoting peace, democracy, justice, equality and equity in relationships between individuals, peoples, cultures, nations and states. It holds the aim of working for human security, disarmament, the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts and social tensions, and strengthening the roots of peace and coexistence, peace building and advocacy of human rights.

Objectives of the Publication
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