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The EU: a true peace actor?

ICIP

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INTRODUCTION

The EU as Peacebuilder: a bittersweet balance sheet

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The European Union is a very particular political actor. It is not a state, yet it has some structures that are similar to those of a state. And as an international organisation, it is a very particular one indeed. Long considered a civilian actor, it has gradually developed security and defence policies and it now has combat-ready battle groups. Furthermore, it is often difficult for citizens to distinguish what it does through its own communitised, majority-decision policies – with prevalence of Community law over national laws – from what it does through intergovernmental policies and from what its 28 member states do.

The complexity is exacerbated by its communicative practices and the growing difficulty in understanding how a really complex institution works. One example is that the resources for foreign policy and security issues, which are civil, are financed through a specific budget while military operations are mostly paid for by participants through a complex system that was launched in 2004. Secondly, it is important to remember that 22 of the 28 member states are also full members of NATO.

The EU is an actor that promotes peace, using its own example as a model of conduct to be followed, but at the same time, many of its member states, individually, are among the world's main arms exporters. And even though the institution has a robust system of controls and restrictions on the export of arms to conflict areas or places where serious violations of human rights occur, it is often not applied firmly enough. And let us not forget the feeling of shame that many of us European citizens and EU enthusiasts feel when we see the EU's inability to act with values of solidarity and strict

respect for the duties of protection in the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, one of the saddest episodes in the recent history of the EU.

This difficulty, and the contradictions arising from the different roles and courses of action of the EU and its member states, becomes particularly relevant in the issue of promoting and building peace, in Europe as well as in the immediate vicinity and in the planet as a whole. And that is why we have decided to address this subject in this issue of the magazine *Peace in Progress*. It is therefore necessary, as the various articles show, to first put the peacebuilding activities in the context of the external action, security and defence of the EU before dealing with the peacebuilding work *per se*.

The common foreign and security policy is part of a wider range of policies and structures of external action, which include trade, development, enlargement policies and humanitarian aid. The idea, in theory, is that all these equip the EU to become a substantial foreign policy actor in the global context. Formally, the principles that guide EU action in the international arena are the same principles that were at the basis of its own creation and that have accompanied its evolution: democracy, the rule of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity and, of course, respect for the principles of international law and for the Charter of the United Nations.

“ Many of us European citizens feel ashamed when we see the EU’s inability to act with values of solidarity and strict respect for the duties of protection in the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean ”

In fact, that is precisely what is stipulated in Article 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has led to significant changes in the external policy approach: 1) a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission; 2) the creation and deployment of a European External Action

Service, a European diplomatic corps that assists the High Representative. Specifically, for 2014, 304.66 million euros of the budget were allocated for the entirety of its policy [1]. As for the tools of foreign policy and security, aimed at promoting international peace and security, they are diverse and heterogeneous. Some, such as the ones that are diplomatic (special representatives) and related to the prevention of violent conflicts, are traditional and historical. Others are more innovative and include civilian and military missions, as well as a mixed or hybrid mission. These are missions aimed at achieving political objectives, either in the immediate vicinity (neighbourhood policy) or in outlying areas. A major role is played by the 139 EU delegations abroad, with 5,400 people, or the resources allocated to humanitarian aid or official development assistance by the EU or member states jointly (over 11 thousand million euros annually).

Missions and actions in Kosovo and in the western Balkans or, more recently, everything related to non-proliferation in Iran are historically noteworthy. As for the specific case of peacebuilding work, recent articles and bibliography clearly show a path defined by the title of this editorial: a bittersweet balance sheet, a fading profile and a clear need to improve, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and quickly.

First of all, there are numerous inconsistencies between what is said and what is actually done. Secondly, the profile of peacebuilding work has been fading since 1995, when Pinheiro, who at the time was Commissioner for Development, established the Commission's guiding principles for the task of peacebuilding: a) appropriation: putting governments and local communities at the centre of the task, with the primary responsibility of decision and execution; b) long-term focus, aimed at solving the structural causes of conflicts; c) coherent focus, which was to be applied in all the stages of conflict cycles; d) focalization and emphasis placed on improving skills of analysis, decision-making and culture of prevention; and e) efficient coordination. It was certainly the wording of a handbook of good practices, but not very consistent with real practice and with changes such as the ones I am about to mention. First of all, the increasing emphasis, since 1999, on the management of crises, as a result of decisions taken in the Cologne European Council which have been interpreted in a way that has prioritised investment in military capabilities suitable to crisis management over supporting the improvement of local partners' grassroots peacebuilding skills. Secondly, because coordination has been worsening, with grey areas in the

peacebuilding activities located in different pillars of the EU.

“ The EU must urgently recover centrality, consistency and an independent and focalized profile of peacebuilding tasks ”

In short, inconsistencies have increased between the objectives of the common foreign and security policy and the policy of security and defence, which are part of the intergovernmental pillar of the Union, and the objectives of the trade and development policies, under the Community pillar developed by the Commission, ignoring the problems arising from the tasks and specific objectives of member states. And, furthermore, everything related to tasks for the prevention of violent conflicts and for peacebuilding has lost steam and interest. Thirdly, these inconsistencies have had an impact on actions on the ground: in Macedonia, for example, we have seen competition between bodies that depend on the European Commission and others from the European Council to control the Police Mission Proxima. The result is that the EU – which could have played a leading and exemplary role in the implementation of the tasks of the UN Peacebuilding Commission since its creation in 2005 – has lost influence and has allowed its own profile of peacebuilding policies to fade. The issue is serious given the importance that EU members have in the international system.

Hence the urgency to recover centrality, consistency and an independent and focalized profile of peacebuilding tasks as Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed in his Agenda for Peace in 1992, taking up a proposal put forward by Galtung in the seventies. The EU must make a decision, and quickly, with the understanding that it will be difficult to return to maximalist agendas that belong to the era of the Balkans: It doesn’t seem like recent examples in Africa or the emphasis on military crisis management capabilities – heirs to the “European fortress” model – are the best way forward. There are possibilities, and the need, to search for intermediate models, directions and policies that really build peace. If we don’t do so, a few years from now our peacebuilding policies will need to be interpreted as an example of Newspeak, the language that

Orwell invented for his novel 1984.

1. Distinguishing between money for missions, special representatives, supporting non-proliferation and disarmament and, finally, for preparatory and monitoring measures.

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– *European Parliament Plenary Chamber* –

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IN DEPTH

Between aspirations and reality

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Against the background of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has recently made the case for a European Army. An army would allow the EU to react in a "credible manner" to threats to peace in a member state or in a neighbouring country, he noted. Undoubtedly, as one of the most experienced politicians on the European stage, Juncker himself knows best, that for an array of reasons there is no prospect for the short-term realization of such an ambitious project as a European Army.

However, Juncker's attempt once more reveals an often observable imbalance of the public and political debate when it comes to question in which way and with what means the EU could and should contribute to peace. The problem is that, once again, the military side receives the utmost attention. We are given the impression that mainly powerful military means are required to sustain peace; however the experiences with the protracted conflicts in weak or failed states tell us another story. To put it simply and to say the least, military means alone are not sufficient to transform these kinds of conflict into a lasting peace. At best, and acknowledging all the severe problems which occur in connection with international law (which cannot be discussed here), military means are only suitable to stop current violence and bloodshed. But the task of conflict transformation and peacebuilding actually begins when weapons are silent. Understood in a broad sense, peacebuilding therefore means the application and deployment of a broad range of civilian and military activities and the application of several civilian means to solidify peace and avoid the relapse into violent conflict. By specifically applying its civilian instruments for peacebuilding, the EU sees itself

already able to influence the deeper root causes of conflict – be the instruments directed at the political, the societal or the economic conflict-dimension of a conflict.

Failure to produce durable peace

Civilian peacebuilding has become a central element of the self-conception and self-description of the EU as a foreign policy actor. At least the EU claims that, with the civilian component of the 1999 founded Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), it has developed a proper instrument for this kind of activity. And one may argue that the gradual development of civilian operational capabilities as a specific element of CSDP "is indeed particular to the EU and has no equivalent in other organizations"[1].

" The EU has failed to produce durable peace in many countries. Afghanistan may serve as the most obvious example "

Be that as it may: In operational terms, civilian peacebuilding of the EU under the CSDP entails dispatching missions with experts who operate in a crisis region committed to a broad spectrum of activities encompassing inter alia the setup of functioning police forces, security sector reform and the construction of constitutional structures. Taken together the EU has launched 22 of these civilian missions in several countries over the last sixteen years. Of these, the Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) probably might have gained the most public attention.

However, the contribution of the EU to durable peace in crisis regions, to peace and security, is contested. Indeed, the record of EU peacebuilding is – cautiously formulated – only a mixed one, since the EU often failed to produce durable peace in many countries; Afghanistan may serve as the most obvious example.

Insufficiently prepared, too small and badly equipped

To understand why the EU struggles with peacebuilding, it is firstly necessary to reconsider that CSDP is, to this day and despite all reforms, a field of intergovernmental policy-making. The EU member states are still not willing to abandon their sovereignty in the field of security and defense – they remain the key players in a highly sensitive policy field. Furthermore, there are still large differences between the strategic cultures of the member states, causing severe consequences for civilian EU peacebuilding as well. In short, civilian peacebuilding is not equally important for all EU members: "Many states do not explicitly reject civilian CSDP, but just attribute little priority to it"[2]. Subsequently this disinterest in civilian peacebuilding has repeatedly led to a situation in which the problem has not been receiving the mandate for an operation. The problem has often rather been the insufficient implementation of a once-agreed operation in terms of the limited political and material willingness of EU member states to contribute to these missions in an appropriate manner: "As a consequence, missions frequently are too small, ill-prepared, and badly equipped. Moreover, they then enjoy little political support and therefore have only limited impact on conflict resolution on the ground"[3]. Apart from this, the EU members which have been involved in the implementation of such missions repeatedly have had severe "difficulties in satisfying the demand for personnel, ensuring the required speed, and supplying personnel that can cope with complex mission tasks"[4]. To give only two examples: Both, EUPOL Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo, neither reached their designated manning level.

" The EU needs an effective civil-military cooperation and coordination. Its missions are ill-prepared and badly equipped "

The need for a comprehensive approach

To understand why the EU struggles with peacebuilding, it is furthermore necessary to consider the characteristics of the institutional design or setting of the EU, since the EU is no consistent or monolithic actor in peacebuilding[5]. To begin with, besides the above discussed civilian operations, there are also military operations under the CSDP. With

the deployment of these operations, the EU rhetorically claims to stop violence in a crisis region to create space and time for civilian peacebuilding. However, time and space – if given – have to be used. Taken together the EU is therefore in need of effective civil-military cooperation and coordination as essential conditions for successful peacebuilding. Yet in the past, the EU often failed to coherently implement simultaneously deployed military and civilian operations in the same theatre. All too frequently coherent interaction was hindered by rivalries, disputes about matters of competence as well as coordination difficulties between the different operations. For instance, in its beginnings, the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL BiH) and European Union Force Althea (ÉUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina quarreled about the competence of combatting organized crime. However, military and civilian operations under the intergovernmental CSDP are mainly oriented towards short-term stabilisation efforts.

By contrast, policies and programmes, for example, the development policy of the EU or its humanitarian aid, fall into the realm of the European Commission and are mainly oriented towards longer-term stabilisation; that means towards longer-term sustainable peace. Yet, the interaction between short-term and long-term stabilisation efforts was also shaped by inconsistencies and disputes. In broader terms the problem could be put as follows: “Everybody wants to coordinate, nobody wants to be coordinated”[6]. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the foundation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as the cornerstone of the new EU institutional architecture in its Foreign and Security Policy, has not really altered the picture, since the establishment of the EEAS has not entirely remedied the institutional fragmentation of the EU as a peacebuilder. Again and again we still witness conflicts of jurisdiction and coordination difficulties between the EEAS and the European Commission on matters related to civilian crisis management and peacebuilding. This involves humanitarian aid and disaster relief, but also questions of project funding in a crisis region or planning processes. Furthermore, the EEAS itself has not been working smoothly. The more recent crises in Libya, Mali and Syria as well as the policy of the EU towards these crises are symptomatic of these findings: The EU is still ill-prepared to function as an effective civil-military actor.

Accordingly, as a peacebuilder, the EU is still confronted with the challenge to knit together the short-term-oriented and the long-term-oriented instruments into a comprehensive peacebuilding approach. In order to make good this deficit, the EU has, in the meantime, presented two comprehensive strategies for crisis regions: The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel Zone and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. Yet, neither the Horn of Africa nor the Sahel Zone can speak of effective peacebuilding of the EU.

Between aspirations and reality

No doubt: It is not only the EU which has to be blamed for the absence of durable peace in many crisis regions. The EU is only one actor among a variety of international governmental and non-governmental actors, which are also engaged in peacebuilding activities. Totally apart from this, the core responsibility for peace naturally lies in the hands of the conflict-parties themselves. For the future of the EU as a peacebuilder one consequence should it therefore be more than before, to promote “local ownership” of conflict resolution: The EU should pay more attention to strengthening, fostering and supporting local actors with an active interest in building peace. The EU policies towards South Sudan and the Sahel Zone are already pointing in this direction. However, despite all the good intentions the EU might have and all progress the EU has made, at present there is still a large gap between the rhetoric aspirations of the EU as a peacebuilder and the political reality in the crisis regions in which the EU has intervened and still intervenes. Instead of constantly returning exclusively to the military (as for example in the recurring debate about a European Army), the actual challenge for the EU, which has committed itself to the promotion of peace again and again and which can be understood itself as an internal European peacebuilding project, is therefore still the coherent application and deployment of its different instruments for peacebuilding.

1. Agnieszka Nowak, “Civilian crisis management within ESDP“, in *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*, ed. per Agnieszka Nowak (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2006, Chaillot Paper no 90), 17.

2. Claudia Majo and Martina Bail, “Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management“, in: *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis. European and American Perspectives*, ed. Eva Gross et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 21.

3. Claudia Majo and Martina Bail, “Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management“, in: *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis. European and American Perspectives*, ed. Eva Gross et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 21.

4. Claudia Majo and Martina Bail, “Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management“, in: *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis. European and American Perspectives*, ed. Eva Gross et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 21.

5. On the following cf. also Simon Duke and Aurélie Courtier, “EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, Players and Instruments“, in: *The European Union and Peacebuilding*, ed. Steve Blockmans et al. (La Haia: T·M·C Asser Press, 2010), 15-53.

6. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “The EU as a civil-military crisis manager. Coping with internal security governance”, International Journal 61 (2006): 441.

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IN DEPTH

The EU, Neither a Political Dwarf nor a Military Worm

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In 1991, the then-Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Eyskens famously retorted that "Europe was an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm". This saying is still often cited both by academia and the politicians alike but – is it still true? A cursory glimpse of the daily news tells us that that the European economies are suffering from stagnation, that the EU is far from being a coherent political and military actor. It is difficult not to be pessimistic at this point of overall lack of enthusiasm for the European project but one has also to be fair. Although the Union is punching below its weight in many areas, the Europeans have come a long way since 1991.

In the short timespan of little more than 30 years, we have seen the creation of the European Union that resembles more and more a federal state. It has a complex, multilayered institutional structure, far-reaching policy competencies in some of the most sensitive national policy areas such as home affairs, trade policy and monetary policy, but also foreign policy and defence policy, which albeit still remain intergovernmental. The end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order at the beginning of the 1990s rushed in a short period of euphoria for a new era of peace and democratisation. The European Union, still now the world's most successful peace project, benefited from the atmosphere. The foundation for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as Justice and Home Affairs policies were created during the 1990s.

The 1990s also saw the beginning of the EU's most ambitious enlargement process that would concluded in 2014 with the accession of 11 post-communist states, all of them

turned around into more or less functioning liberal democracies and market economies, as well as Cyprus and Malta. Inspired from its success in exercising 'normative power', the EU launched in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that seeked to further extend the ring of stability, democracy and prosperity to the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbours. The ENP was devised as a kind of an enlargement light policy, with a similar reform agenda and conditionality but without the carrot of EU accession, in belief that closer relations with the EU would provide enough of an incentive for the neighbours to carry out costly economic and administrative reforms. In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, identifying the potential security challenges: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime and (since 2008 reform) cyber security. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty sealed the upgrading of the EU's political nature, strengthening the European Defence Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy, mainly by creating the post of the EU High Representative/Commission Vice-President to give the EU 'one voice' in foreign policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European diplomatic instrument to serve her. So, the EU has emerged as an evolving security actor that commands already now an intricate toolbox. The European foreign and security policies are also widely supported by the citizens- a substantial majority of the Europeans want the EU to exert 'strong leadership in world affairs'[1].

" The EU's responses to international crisis show that it is far from being a coordinated, fully-fledged external actor, though it has also slowly grown to show surprising coherence "

And yet, the dynamic development of the EU's political and security identity has almost come to a halt since the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis, which started from the US but has hit the EU particularly hard. The crisis has accelerated major international trends, including the growing interdependence between the countries, the emergence of new actors and the subsequent erosion of the power of the

US but particularly of the EU. The EU's influence in the world has depended to a large extent from its 'soft power' or 'power of attraction', and the EU's capability to exert such influence has suffered as the world has watched it fighting with fiscal instability and economic problems. With the public funds drying up, less money has been available for external and defence policies too, further undermining the EU's capability to influence what is happening in the world. The EU's economic woes have coincided with major unrest and instability both on the global stage but also close to its own borders. First erupted the EU's Southern neighbourhood with the wave of popular protest that came to be known as the Arab Spring and then also in the East, where old geopolitical frictions have resulted in a fully-fledged war in Ukraine.

The EU's response to the events has suffered from the so-called 'Capability-Expectations gap'. The academic and public assessment has been that its reaction has been delayed, weak and cacophonic. This wide-spread criticism does not only stem from the frustration created due to the EU to live up to the high public expectations to the EU to play a stronger role in the world affairs but should also be understood against the current context of spreading euroscepticism.

It is easy to agree that the EU's responses to the above-mentioned international events show that it is far from being a coordinated, fully-fledged external actor. However, it has also slowly and hesitantly grown to show surprising coherence and consistency in the recent years, especially when compared to its past track record. That even in the most divisive issues among the member states such as relations with the Russian Federation. It is important to remember that as recently as in 2008, at the time of the Russia-Georgia conflict, a common stance of the member states on economic and diplomatic sanctions against this controversial neighbour was unattainable and the current common EU response to the Ukraine war seemed even unimaginable. Further, although Baroness Ashton, the previous High-Representative for CFSP/Commission Vice President (HRVP) can be criticised for many faults, she did achieve something fundamental. Cleverly combining diplomatical and political coalition building skills with economic incentives and the pressure of sanctions, she succeeded in demonstrating that the EU can play an important role at the highest international level using its multilateralist approach, if it makes effective use of tools available to it. Although concerns about durability of the deals should not be taken lightly, it is still fair

to say that she exemplified this by brokering the 2013 peace deal between Serbia and Kosovo, and playing a central role in the nuclear talks with Iran.

“ The European Security Strategy needs an urgent update, since international context has substantially changed ”

The Lisbon Treaty creates ample opportunities for the EU to reinforce its external action so that it could address the complex, multi-actor, multi-dimensional crises and growing security threats – as identified by the European Security Strategy. And yet, the economic crisis years have witnessed a slow disintegration of the EU’s civilian and military capability. The years of booming development and proliferation of the EU’s civilian and military missions have been replaced by an almost complete standstill. Ironically, this process has coincided with the structures’ integration into the European External Action Service, the instrument which was precisely expected to strengthen the EU’s comprehensive approach. That said- despite the member states digging in their heels in the name of defending their sovereignity, with the establishment of the necessary legislation and a policy framework on the EU level, the creation of structures to support this and ongoing investment in research in this field, the ground has been prepared for defence transformation over the longer term.

The EU’s strategic documents, particulary the European Security Strategy – needs an urgent update, since major international events have taken place since the drafting of the document and the international context has substantially changed since 2003. A thorough review of the European Neighbourhood Policy is in order too, as the strategy has clearly failed to achieve its aims both in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods. But most of all, the EU desperately needs to make an effective and coherent use of the vast array of tools and resources that it already has at its disposal, from the European External Action Service and its delegations network to the financial instruments, not to mention sanctions. The issue of relations with the NATO remains on the table as well.

“ Member states should decide to give new life to EU’s security and defence cooperation, to bolster the EU’s relevance as a global actor ”

On a more positive note, the freshly appointed Juncker Commission and the new Italian High Representative/Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini seem to be more interested in the EU’s security and defence policy than had been the case for the previous European executive. Commission President Juncker has recently publicly aired the old idea of a common European army to counter the Russian threat and appointed Michel Barnier, former French Commissioner, as his Special Adviser on European Defence and Security. It is as of yet far from clear what the exact contents of their proposal will be and whether a matter so controversial as pooling and sharing military resources can find support from all the European member states, particularly as increasing capacity would also inevitably mean the need to bring in more money from already strained national budgets. Some member states have already given tentative positive reactions to the idea, though, and we will find out more soon as the June summit of EU Heads of State and Government will be devoted to defence matters. It can only be hoped that the member states decide to give new life to EU’s security and defence cooperation, thus helping to bolster the EU’s relevance as a security actor not only on the global stage but also at its own borders, an issue that has become more relevant than ever. Although the EU has had its feathers ruffled with the years of crisis and its confidence has been undermined, there are no real alternatives to stepping up our engagement externally because there is no escaping the instability that is getting increasingly closer to home.

*Any views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the European Parliament

1. Thomas Renard, “The European Union: A New Security Actor?”. Available here (accessed 21 March 2015)

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IN DEPTH

The EU's sanctions and their contribution to peace

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The use of sanctions as a multilateral instrument has always been linked to the preservation of peace. As early as 1919, just after the First World War had ended, the US president and founder of the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson, saw sanctions as an alternative to war, making the use of force unnecessary. This vision was clearly defined in a famous epilogue written in 1919:

"*Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly method and there will be no need for force. It does not cost a life outside of the nation boycotted but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgement, no modern nation could resist.*" [1]

However, the use of sanctions by the League of Nations was very limited and it didn't contribute to any crisis being solved, while the United Nations only imposed sanctions in two occasions in the first 45 years of its existence, due to the stalemate in the Security Council during the Cold War[2].

It would not be until the end of the Cold War that sanctions would regain their role as a multilateral instrument for international security and the promotion of peace. In the 25 years that have gone by since 1990, not only has the use of sanctions exponentially increased, they have also diversified to include objectives as diverse as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or the fight against terrorism. Their role has also been refined with the use of intelligent sanctions, concentrating their effects on the individuals and the elites responsible for the policies that the sanctions want to condemn, stop or correct, thus avoiding the suffering of innocent people.

The EU and the use of intelligent sanctions

Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has emerged in the international arena as a promoter of peace and regional stability, and in thus doing has made ample use of intelligent sanctions[3]. The sanctioning practices of the EU are of two types: on one hand, the EU implements the sanctions approved by the UN's Security Council, while, on the other, it imposes its own autonomous sanctions. Even if the EU has been implementing sanctions since the 80s, this practice has gradually increased since 1991 (see graphic).

Furthermore, the EU has committed to use intelligent sanctions. These measures include embargos on weapons sales, the prohibition of visas and freezing of accounts held in European banks. In fact, most of its sanctions are within this three-pronged attack, even if other measures have recently been incorporated.

" The use of sanctions consolidates the EU's role in foreign policy and it has become a part of its identity as an international actor "

The EU is the most active regional organization in the imposition of sanctions, followed –by some distance- by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The EU's pre-eminence in this policy is easily explained by the fact that the EU is the most developed regional structure and the only one with mechanisms that can be used in a coordinated foreign policy, while other regional organizations will only act when their own members go against the principles of the organization[4]. Even further beyond the effects the sanctions may have on their objectives, the use of sanctions consolidates the EU's role in foreign policy and it has become a part of its identity as an international actor.

The contribution of sanctions to peace

We can identify three mechanisms by which sanctions mitigate, limit and even help to put an end to armed conflicts.

The first one is that sanctions reduce the resources that are necessary for an armed conflict. A clear example of this is the embargo on the sale and supply of weapons in high-risk zones. This measure helps to limit the supply of arms or, at least, to make them considerably more expensive in the black market. The EU has often used this measure, like in the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Sierra Leone or, more recently in Syria and Libya. Another measure that is often used is the limitation in the provision of technologies and technical assistance and the sale of objects or materials of dual use that could be reused in a conflict.

A second mechanism is to limit the resources available to finance the conflict. This implies a control on the sale of natural resources like petroleum, coltan or "blood diamonds", resources that will help finance the purchase of arms, supplies and mercenaries. On one hand, the EU has contributed to the regulation of markets like the one involving blood diamonds with its support of the Kimberly process, aiming to certify the origin of the diamonds and to control their sale[5]. –On the other hand, the EU dedicates abundant resources to fight against the laundering of money obtained through the sale of illegal natural resources. On the other hand, the EU pressures people or entities involved in a conflict by freezing their financial assets in European Bank accounts. Finally, the EU controls the movements of people imposing restrictions to their visas to impede the movements to and from the EU of people who participate in a conflict.

The last effect these sanctions have is that they generate incentives for certain actors in the affected societies to oppose the continuation of the conflict. The prohibitions and limitations imposed by the sanctions are often a motive of economic ruin for some and a social stigma for many. The generation of this incentive, however, greatly depends in the creativity in the design of the sanctions. For instance, during the Kosovo conflict, the EU created a "white list" to allow those opposed to the Milosevic regime to continue their trade with the EU and to receive preferential aid[6].

“ Sanctions mitigate, limit and even help to put an end to armed conflicts ”

Furthermore, the EU tries to employ sanctions to promote peace even in scenarios where there (still) is no armed conflict. We can consider sanctions imposed to promote democracy and Human Rights as an integral part of the EU’s peace policy, since they contribute to prevent or mitigate internal conflicts before they develop a violent nature.

We must not forget that sanctions are an ambiguous instrument. Even if their application is often the prelude to the use of force, as shown in the sanctions that preceded the military operations in Libya in 2011, their imposition can also help to maintain peace. For instance, the sanctions against Iran have been presented as an effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear question without a military intervention of potential rivals. French Prime Minister François Hollande justified these sanctions as a way of preserving peace in the Middle East[7]. These sanction are considered as efficient because the popular discontent they generated played its part in helping Roshani, the moderate candidate who had promised the sanctions would be lifted, to win the elections. Their success, however, is also related to the fact that, thanks to them, the EU managed to convince the USA and Israel not to intervene military in Iran for nearly a decade.

“ The efficiency of sanctions tends to be modest. They must always be a part of a wider strategy and be combined with incentives ”

In other words, the importance of the EU as a generator of sanctions to promote peace is based on the power of its markets and in its power to regulate them to achieve its goals. It must be stressed, however, that the EU has not made use of its economic power

in its economic sanctions, prioritizing measures that did not affect the civil population. On the other hand, the recent cases of Syria, Iran, Cote d'Ivoire and Russia have signalled a point of inflection in this policy, with the EU showing more audacity.

Conclusion

The preservation of peace is the UN's most important power. However, the polarization of institutions often contributes to making its supreme organ, the Security Council, incapable to act. It is in this situation when actors like the EU make the difference in the achievement of peace.

At the same time, we must be aware of the limitations that sanctions have in international politics. The efficiency of EU sanctions tends to be modest, because they can be easily avoided with the intervention of other actors. Due to this, and contrary to what Wilson suggested nearly a century ago, sanctions are not adequate as a single weapon in a military conflict. Sanctions need months, and even years, to have an effect, while military conflicts take place with extreme velocity[8]. Sanctions must always be a part of a wider strategy, to be combined with incentives and to leave a margin for the agreements with other regional actors. Bearing in mind the growing importance and audacity of the sanctions policies, in the next decade it will be important to invest more material and intellectual resources to increase their efficiency[9].

Even if sanctions do not always manage to avoid the armed conflict, at least they make its development more complicated or limit its area of influence. We must also bear in mind that the utility of sanctions is not only in avoiding, limiting or resolving armed conflicts. They mould the EU's identity as an international actor and they define the limits between what is acceptable and unacceptable in international relations.

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– Greens/EFA asks for respect of EU arms embargo –

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IN DEPTH

Minorities and the prevention of conflicts. A role for the EU?

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> "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it."
>
> Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950.

The EU needs another Robert Schuman.

More than 50 years ago with Europe still deeply scarred by the horrors and traumas of the Second World War, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented a proposal for deeper cooperation between European states "primarily for peace and to give peace a chance". This initial Schuman plan for cooperation – and for the prevention of new conflicts in Europe – began in 1951 in the shape of a treaty between six countries (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) for a common management of their heavy coal and steel industries[1]. This would, it was believed, prevent any of these states from making their own war weapons that could be turned against the others.

It was also the first step towards economic and political cooperation, and what would eventually become the European Union, a union whose origins are intimately linked to the prevention of conflicts.

The world has changed dramatically since the Second World War as have the institutions which took shape as a consequence of the Schuman Proposal. Even the very nature of violent conflicts itself has changed radically. Most conflicts until second half of the 20th Century had been, as in the case of the Second World War, between states. This is no longer the case: most of the wars today are not wars between countries. They are mainly ethnic conflicts, conflicts against the national government of a country which more often than not involves on the other side a minority (and in a few rare cases members of a majority such as in Syria), usually cultural, linguistic or religious. Some studies suggest at least 70% of the world's conflicts in the last 60 years are in this category. The point that must be kept in mind is that the origins of the EU are intimately connected to avoiding conflicts between states, the prevailing form of conflicts at the time. But this is no longer the case: the vast majority of threats to world peace are conflicts between states and their own minorities.

Source: 'The Global Conflict Barometer', in *From early warning to early action?*, Ed. A. RICCI, Publications Office, European Parliament, 2008.

" The vast majority of threats to world peace are conflicts between states and their own minorities. The EU appears unable and unprepared to confront this reality "

For Schuman, peace needed to be safeguarded by the "making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it." Those creative efforts led to the union between countries of Europe, and the EU has been successful in ensuring peace between member states.

Yet the contemporary dangers which threaten world peace are no longer inter-state conflicts as they were in the days of Schuman's efforts. They are now for the most part conflicts with minorities – and here the EU appears unable, unwilling or unprepared to confront a reality which no longer fits a state-centered paradigm designed for the mid-

20th Century. There is perhaps more than ever a need to make new creative efforts for the new reality of the threat to peace.

Why conflicts and minorities

This evolution in the nature of conflicts worldwide has been reflected in the direction of organisations dedicated to peace and stability. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in the pursuit of its mandate for stability, prosperity and democracy, has established the institution of the High Commissioner on National Minorities as a conflict prevention tool. Various sections of the United Nations, including its Secretary General, have also recognised the direct connection between conflicts and the treatment of minorities, since the tensions must be seen for what they are: a symptom of underlying problems. As the then UN Secretary General indicated in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, the threat of ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic conflict cannot be solved unless the "deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression" are addressed. Combating discrimination and the "protection of minorities are also key factors in the prevention of conflict"[2].

While the connection may seem obvious to many, it still needs to be emphasised. Most conflicts involving minorities are more often than not associated with grievances, as identified by the UN Secretary General, and arguably not mainly about identity claims. While identity serves as a convenient rallying flag, and may be instrumentalised by political entrepreneurs for their own purposes of these grievances of discrimination, marginalisation and even exclusion, it is not the proximate cause of a conflict pitting an ethnic, linguistic or religious group against the central authority of the state: it must also be emphasised that this is now the main type of conflict in the world. Though there is no absolute consensus on this point, it would seem fairly clear that the "disregard for minority issues lies at the heart of these conflicts (…) Conflicts that could have been prevented flare up, as warning signs provided by minority rights violations go unheeded."[3]. Minority rights are also human rights – just as are those of women, children and other vulnerable groups in society – and as the Council of Europe recognised in its *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.*

Why no minorities?

While minority issues are to a degree discussed within EU structures, particularly within the European Parliament[4], they are essentially absent from any of the legal instruments framing the Union[5]. More telling, even disturbing, however, is the almost complete omission of any reference to minorities in the peace and stability initiatives outside the EU. For example, the Peacebuilding Partnership[6], which has the objective of strengthening international and regional capacity to analyse, prevent and respond to violent conflict and disasters, makes no mention of minorities whatsoever – though refers to almost everything else including gender equality on a number of occasions. Similarly, the European Commission's Instrument for Stability (IfS) refers in its annual reports to various areas of action or concern – including human rights, women, children, climate change, etc. – but there is not a single mention of minorities, who are usually one of the parties in most conflicts[7].

“ It is necessary to reflect and reshape the EU's (lack of) acknowledgement and approach to the causes of conflict within and without its borders ”

This omission is not merely odd; it appears to fail to acknowledge the changed nature of conflicts since the end of the Second World War, the EU's own historical origins, and the need to take imaginative measures to prevent future conflicts which more likely than not will involve minorities. It also fails to recognise the “underlying causes of conflict”, despite the claimed recognition of the importance of addressing them:

Long-term engagement in peace and state building and long-term sustainable development are essential to address the underlying causes of conflict and to build peaceful, resilient societies. The overall objectives of sustainable peace and development must be at the core of the EU's response from the outset – the EU must also have a long-term vision for its short-term engagements and actions[8].

It finally ignores the sad fact that Europe itself has experienced conflicts which involved minorities within a state, and continues to do so even today, often because of perceived unaddressed grievances which could be with violations of their human rights. The violent conflict known as the Troubles in the United Kingdom involved a Catholic minority in Northern Ireland claiming to be victims of discriminatory practices and continued for decades until a few years ago; the war which shook Macedonia in the 1990s was only settled once the Albanian minority were guaranteed tertiary education in their own language and a fair proportion of employment opportunities in municipal and other state institutions; and, in Italy, the growing threats of more terrorist attacks by a few extremists from the German-speaking minority in the 1960s subsided thanks to an autonomy arrangement which guaranteed their language, employment and other rights. The increasing disquiet for minority communities in parts of Spain has much to do with the sense that some of the gains made under the constitutional autonomy guarantees of 1978 in areas such as education, language and culture are no longer as secure as they once were thought to be. France itself – while denying the existence of minorities on its territory – still faces a conflict with elements of the Corsican population, while the Ukrainian Government's mishandling of minority issues in 2014 in its aborted attempt to remove legislation on language rights provided perhaps the perfect ground for Russia's moves to claim the Russian minority needed to be protected.

These, and numerous other situations of conflict as shown in the table below, show the need to reflect and reshape the EU's (lack of) acknowledgment and approach to the causes of conflict which it continues to experience, both within and without its borders.

" Only by acknowledging that discrimination and the protection of minorities are key factors in the prevention of conflicts can the EU truly play the role of world peace safeguarder "

Source: 'The Global Conflict Barometer', in *From early warning to early action?*, Ed. A. RICCI, Publications Office, European Parliament, 2008.

Conclusion

Schuman's vision has succeeded in that peace between European member states has been achieved through a closer economic, political and legal union. But peace today is no longer threatened by conflicts between states: the dangers are mainly intra-state, usually involving ethnic, linguistic or religious communities with grievances of discrimination, marginalisation or exclusion by their own governments. This is true in all regions of the world, including Europe.

What is now needed, in the words of Schuman, are "efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten [peace]." Internally, the silence and weakness of the human rights of minorities need to be more solidly positioned in EU directives, as has been done for the rights of women and the fight against racial discrimination. Externally, it is not helpful to "address the underlying causes of conflict" if EU initiatives shy away from admitting that most of them involve minorities which claim of violations of their rights. Only by acknowledging directly, consistently, and comprehensively- as does the OSCE, the UN and most other actors in the field- that discrimination and the protection of minorities are key factors in the prevention of conflicts can the EU truly play the role that was called for by Schuman of world peace safeguarder with the making of creative efforts to prevent the dangers which threaten it.

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4. Such as the Intergroup on Traditional minorities, National communities and Languages, the 2013 Alfonsi Report on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union, etc.

5. The "minority provision" in the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (*Art. 22: 'The Union* shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.') is unfortunately a weak, minimalist section – unless unexpectedly it is interpreted in a very imaginative, proactive way.

6. "The PBP is just one of the EC's tools in relation to an overall strategic approach to peacebuilding that encompasses both 'long-term' approaches – supporting the adaptation and targeting EU instruments to address the causes of conflict – and 'short-term' approaches – improving the EU's capacity to react quickly to conflict risks – as well as cooperation with international partners." European Commission – External Relations 2009.

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– *Portrait of Robert Schuman* –

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IN DEPTH

The EU and Peacebuilding in the Mediterranean: a critical view

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The EU has undertaken a number of valuable initiatives to promote peace and to cope with the many instability and insecurity ramifications of the Arab uprisings since 2011. First, EU mechanisms have reacted rapidly in response to the radical changes in its southern neighbourhood by issuing a number of important documents, most crucial of which are the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in March 2011 and the new release of the European Neighbourhood Policy (from now on ENP) in the following May. Second, the EU has been recurrently allocating humanitarian aid as means to contain chaos and instability factors in a number of cases. These include the case of the sudden influx of Tunisian migrants to the Italian Island in Lampedusa in 2011, the case of the worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen in 2011-2012, and the ongoing case of the prolonged conflict in Syria and the refugees' crisis it has generated in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. Third, the EU exhibited a practical willingness to engage in a number of ignited spots in the region. For example, the EU has envisaged in April 2011 an EU military operation for humanitarian assistance in Libya (EUFOR-Libya), though it was never launched, and the EU has effectively launched EUBAM-Libya in 2013 with the aim of supporting the Libyan authorities in better monitoring and securing the country's borders. Besides, the EU continues to be rhetorically loud in advocating peace and stability in the numerous hot spots of the region. Most recently, the EU has been pursing diplomatic efforts aiming at initiating a constructive political dialogue in Libya, which is done in cooperation with neighbouring Arab countries. Also, the European Commission has issued a regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, as well as the Da'esh threat, in February 2015.

Notwithstanding all these efforts, the various EU attempts in peace-building in the Mediterranean area have not been only receiving little attention, but have been widely criticized.

A main shortcoming in the EU's role as a peace promoter has been the question of credibility. During the past four years, the EU's credibility in the region appears to be significantly undermined for three main reasons:

1. Lack of coherence in EU policies, actions and rhetoric, something that has much to do not only with the struggle for consensus among competing EU member states' policies in the Arab region on the one side and EU institutions on the other, but also inconsistencies as results of developing rivalries among EU institutions themselves. The particular case of Libya in 2011, which came under much scrutiny from this coherence prism, has worked to highlight the considerable impact of internal coherence on the general perception of credibility.

" Despite all efforts, the EU attempts in peacebuilding in the Mediterranean area have been widely criticized "

2. Lack of a comprehensive strategic vision. This vision should necessarily enjoy the support of key member states and identify an aspired "European" approach to the many challenges that face the Arab region. In fact, sceptics about the credibility of the EU as a peace promoter in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings did not question its instruments and tools as much as they questioned the real existence of an EU's independent vision, internal coherence and ability to speak one voice. As a result, a general image has been constructed in the region, which views the EU as increasingly dependent on the United States for setting the priorities and for deciding on the general political orientation, or at least governed by Washington's strategic choices, especially when it comes to dealing with hard security challenges in the Arab region. This image also views the EU's various actions as scattered reactions, which are solicited every now and then by the

necessity to act or the urgency to prove presence.

3. The dilemma of the "size". While the EU has relatively succeeded in constructing itself as a rising global pole that could act as an element in transforming the budding structure of the international system into a multipolar one, its actions in its immediate neighbourhood since 2011 compared to its size have been constantly provoking frustration. The new European Neighbourhood Policy has been widely criticized for being under-funded, particularly when contrasted to the heavy social and economic plights of the southern Mediterranean, and the follow of EU assistance funds to the region has been stagnating for many political instability reasons. Moreover, the generous flow of Gulf States' assistance funds all over the MENA region has worked to further dwarf EU contributions by wiping out their intended impact as incentives for undertaking political reforms. The dilemma of the size did not only appear in the most important case of the new ENP, but in almost every singly EU initiative. Consider for instance the case of EUBAM-Libya, which appears to be indeed a case in point to highlight the dilemma of the size. Another example regards the recently released document by the European Commission on "Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat" in February 2015. It light of the region's actual needs, it is highly doubted that the EU would be able to act as an influential peace promoter, considering the amount of the allocated funds for the implementation of this exceedingly ambitious strategy (only EUR 1 billion from the EU budget for years 2015 and 2016). It is actually striking to compare aid provided by Saudi Arabia alone to Lebanon in the course of 2014 ($4 billion) in order to enhance the Lebanese state's capacity to confront the threat of the IS, with the EUR 1 billion promised by the EU to the entire region over 2015 and 2016.

" A general image has been constructed in the region which views the EU as increasingly dependent on the United States "

The question of credibility, again, is key in assessing the EU's role in peacebuilding in the region, or in envisioning its potential to enhance this role. The EU has indeed a wide range of instruments and tools, which enables it to perform competently. Yet, much of the weight is placed on Arab partners' trust and their general perception of those instrument's efficiency and impact. In the same vein, therefore, one of the important tests for the EU currently and in the near future would be its ability and capacity to reach out to influential actors in the region. This includes as well its ability to enhance its region-to-region contacts with rising regional Arab organisations, which is particularly necessary in the case of any future EU engagement in countries with severe internal armed conflicts, namely Syria, Iraq and Libya.

Photography : UK Department for International Development / CC / Desaturated.

– *Syrian refugees in Lebanon* –

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RECOMANEM

Materials and resources recommended by the ICIP

Web
EPLO platform of organisations

One of the elements that characterise the European political process is the existence of so-called lobbies or pressure groups. So much so that the EU has developed a register of lobbies specifying what their interests and budgets are.

In light of this reality, in 2001, seventeen European peace movement organisations decided to join together to create the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in order to influence the European Union so that it becomes more active and effective in promoting peace and preventing violent conflicts worldwide. Currently it has 32 European member NGOs.

EPLO carries out analysis activities of European policies, prepares documents in order to make political action proposals and facilitates dialogue between civil society peacebuilding organisations and European political decision makers. Among its information tasks, EPLO has a newsletter that is distributed by subscription in which it regularly informs of its activities and publications. It also has a compilation of publications which includes all the recent news of member organisations.

But, among the relevant materials, the digital publication "Power Analysis: The EU and Peacebuilding after Lisbon" stands out. Bearing in mind the intricate nature of European institutions, this document is an excellent guide. A first section compiles a list of the various abbreviations that are so often used in EU jargon. But its value lies mainly in its analysis, institution by institution and unit by unit, of what their

responsibilities are regarding armed conflicts, the possibilities of advocacy and the difficulties entailed. The review is exhaustive and meticulous, including the Directorate Generals of the Commission, parliamentary committees and groups, and European agencies (the EU institute for Security Studies and the European Defence Agency). It also contains the main documents related to the activities of the EU in countries affected by armed conflicts. In short, it is a very useful tool for any organisation intending to approach the European Union: to understand its political process and how decisions are made but, more importantly, to know how to put pressure on the institutional labyrinth that the EU often seems to be.

Web
The Observatory of European Foreign Policy

Created in 2001 as a research group, the Observatory of European Foreign Policy is recognised as a consolidated Research Group by the Generalitat. The group's perspective is academic and scientific. Directed since its inception by the professor of International Relations Esther Barbé, the group includes experts from various research centres and universities, both Catalan (UAB, IBEI, UOC, CIDOB, IEMed, UB, URV) and from other countries (University of Maastricht, College of Europe in Natolin, Poland). The diversity of group members' scientific interests has often resulted in studies on the external action of the EU from multiple perspectives.

The publications and research developed by the Observatory include a wide range of topics with the aim of promoting debate and deepening knowledge of EU foreign policy. The compilation of the records within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the analysis of successive Spanish presidencies, transatlantic relations or the participation of the European Parliament in EU foreign policy are just a few of the topics examined by the Observatory and that have resulted in different types of publications (books, articles in specialised journals, working papers), many of which are available on their website. The monographic book "La Unión Europea en las Relaciones Internacionales" (The European Union in International Relations), published in 2014, is especially significant. The book is divided into three main sections: "Institutions, processes and instruments," "Cartography of foreign affairs" and "Actor in global governance." It offers a global analysis of EU foreign policy that is accessible to

both university students and people who are well versed in the subject.

The group currently maintains two lines of research: EU neighbourly relations and the EU in an international system in transition. These lines are based on research projects and one of them even has its own website which compiles all the latest developments and contents of the project.

Therefore the website of the Observatory of Foreign Policy of the European Union is an advisable place to go to for all those who wish to broaden their knowledge of how EU foreign policy works.

Book

***Un mundo en cambio. Perspectivas de la política exterior de la Unión Europea*, by Camilo Villarino**

"A book like this one is necessary." This is how the foreword by Diego López Garrido begins. And it certainly is. The European Union is a volcano of documentation and data but, at the same time, it is a project that is perceived by its citizenry as distant. The EU is a political experiment that started 50 years ago to bring peace to the Old Continent. But much of what it does remains unknown to the general public or, in the words of the author, Camilo Villarino, "it is difficult to offer support to something that is unknown. And it is impossible to reform or improve what one ignores." Therefore this book aims to fill this gap and educate about Europe; a task that is essential and successfully achieved.

The book's main objective is to lay out the biggest challenges facing the European Union with respect to becoming a relevant international actor. The author suggests that the European Union has lacked, since its creation, the structures needed to develop a consistent external action. Therefore we could place the book within the tradition of critical pro-Europeans: those who are aware of the limitations of the institution but wish to see them overcome. However, Camilo Villarino, who is well versed in international affairs and, more specifically, in European international affairs, devotes the first part of his book to refuting the idea that the EU still doesn't have the appropriate instruments to engage in international politics. Using limited technical jargon, the author goes over the main changes that the Treaty of Lisbon introduces in

terms of foreign policy: Presidency of the European Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the External Action Service. These are what he calls instruments. Therefore, in the author's own words, there are no longer any excuses: Europe must choose between making peace and being left in peace. And again, according to Villarino, in today's complex world Europe must necessarily choose to make peace. And, in order to do so, it must define its own interests as soon as possible: (1) the peace, stability and development of Europe; (2) achieving a stable and prosperous geographical environment; and (3) facing global challenges.

Afterwards, the book goes over the EU's global challenges and it is in this section where the author's analytical capacity is demonstrated. The book was written six years ago, yet all the challenges brought up are still current or have even moved up to the forefront of our main international concerns. Villarino mentions failed states, international terrorism, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic and financial crises, climate change, natural resource management (including energy), regional conflicts and relations between Europe and other powers. In all of these areas, the author suggests that the EU has its own way of facing challenges and that it should put it into practise. Villarino concludes: "The EU has [...] the capacity and, what's more, the responsibility to contribute to the design of its future, our future and our children's future."

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TRIBUNA

Companies and Human Rights: voluntary vs mandatory?

Maria Prandi
Director of Business Human Rights

The negative impacts of companies on Human Rights on a global scale are yet again in the centre of international debate. Is it or isn't it necessary to establish a mandatory treaty to regulate their activities? It is not a new debate and there have been – since the 70s – numerous initiatives stemming from the United Nations. One of the first organs that was established in this field was the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1974. It was formed by 48 Member States and its main goal was to elaborate a Code of Conduct for transnational societies that never went past the draft table. Other initiatives followed, culminating in the last decade with the Council of Human Rights refusing to approve the *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights*. These norms effectively wanted to become the foundation of a future binding treaty.

It was not until last year that the Council of Human Rights adopted a new resolution that allowed the creation of an intergovernmental work group whose mandate was to "elaborate a legally binding international instrument to regulate the activities of transnational companies". This resolution came after more than 500 organizations from the civil society and social movements made a worldwide call to the states, entreating them to control and regulate the operations of commercial companies within their national jurisdiction, and also the activities that took place outside of their national territories as seen in the report on *Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*.

Presented by Ecuador and South Africa, the resolution was adopted with 20 votes in favour, 13 abstentions and 14 against, including the United States and the members of the European Union. According to some media, the USA, the UK, Japan and the EU were strongly against the proposal and did heavy lobbying on other countries like Norway, Russia, Australia, Argentina and Turkey. In any case, the resolution excludes "the local registered companies" and, according to some organizations like the International Federation on Human Rights (IFHR), this restrictive definition is a first obstacle for companies taking full responsibility. This caveat would, to put just one example, leave out the companies and workshops in Accra, Ghana,

In any case, this resolution came in a context in which the Guiding Principles over Companies and Human Rights approved by the Council of Human Rights in June 2011 had become hegemonic worldwide among companies, governments and multilateral and intergovernmental organizations. These guiding principles, with a mostly voluntary nature, are listed in the 2011 revised version of the Guiding Principles for multinational companies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the chapter on the Directives on Social Responsibility of the International Normalization Organization (ISO 26000) and in the Environmental and Social Performance Standards and Guidance Notes of the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank). They have also been endorsed by the European Union in its communiqué about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on October 2011.

" The Guiding Principles over Companies and Human Rights has become hegemonic worldwide among companies, governments and multilateral and intergovernmental organizations "

Elaborated by John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Human Rights and Transnational Companies, these Guiding Principles clarify and specify the three pillars of the United Nations' frame of "protect, respect and remedy" (from now on, "Frame") based on:

1) The obligation of the State to protect from Human Rights abuses from third parties, including companies;

2) The responsibility the companies have of respecting Human Rights;

3) Guaranteeing a wider access to –judicial and extrajudicial- reparation to the victims.

According to John Ruggie himself in his book Just Business? *Multinational corporations and Human Rights*, the Guiding Principles place in the same table the two main actors with responsibilities in this field: companies and governments, in what aims to be a new frame for international governance. The Guiding Principle presents a frame aiming to –in a non-binding way- fill a "governance gap" in international governance. This situation is due a to globalization process that has diminished the rights of many citizens and shown the limits of an international system based on states and incapable of solving global challenges. Ruggie also says that globalization has shown starkly the disconnection between the economic, legal, social and political agendas and, with this proposal the aim is to bring –voluntarily- elements that allow the reconstruction of connections between the different ecosystems in order to face present and future challenges. In fact, Ruggie bypasses the main legal theories and tendencies and moves the purely legal debate about the legal responsibilities of the companies in Human Rights to the arena of International Affairs.

" We can identify some interesting advances in the incorporation of Human Rights to the management of companies; however there are still systematic and serious abuses "

But this must not make us forget that the debate opposing Voluntary vs. Mandatory has a wide range of positions in the relation between Human Rights and transnational companies. In general terms, the companies that have been embroiled in some kind of scandal in the last decade now defend more advanced positions. This means that some

sectors, like the mining industry, have developed different systems to manage their risks, while others are still in an extremely immature stadium in their comprehension of the risks and the action needed to put in practice preventive and corrective systems.

In this sense, and if we analyse some of the news published in these past months in the media of various countries, we can identify some interesting advances in the incorporation of Human Rights to the management of companies. An example of this would be that the three main supermarket chains of Brazil – Carrefour, Wal-Mart y Pan de Azúcar – have decided to suspend their business with the farming industry that has links with the deforestation of the Amazons; the US Senate is working on a law destined to avoid that mineral commerce with the RD of Congo that helps to finance armed groups in this country; the Chilean Parliament has unanimously approved a law expressing the right to equal salaries between men and women; a campaign with the support of the main Investment companies in the world will fight against forced labour in Brazil; 80.000 clients of the Co-Operative have defined the new RSE policy of this British finance institution; the Norwegian public pension funds have gotten rid of their share in the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold, after it was discovered that they were causing serious environmental damages in Papua New Guinea, and of their shares of the American Textron because they were building cluster munition; the World Pact between the United Nations and the International Finance Corporation to entreat the finance sector to incorporate sustainability criteria in their investment decisions; in the shareholders meetings of Rio Tinto, Respol and Occidental Petroleum NGOs bring to the vote – with different measures of success –Human Rights policies and strategies, indigenous people and environment.

These examples, however, coexist with many reports of systematic and serious abuses of companies in all kinds of sectors, as published by many local and international prestigious organizations.

“ UN has not been able to articulate a minimal consensus to a binding weapon of this calibre in

the field of companies and human rights ”

The challenge is to determine what is the margin of trial-error between voluntary and mandatory, in order to advance in this field, without thinking that any of these paths has to be mutually exclusive. The adoption of the Guiding Principles as a frame of reference by many Governments – like the UK, Colombia, the Netherlands or Finland – has led to the adoption, in the past two years, of National Action Plans (or NAP) of companies and Human Rights, aiming to – especially and with a varying degree of success – improve the coherence of public policies in this field and to regulate some specific issues. On one hand, the frustrated experience of the legal path shows us that this field, in particular, is very controversial and the UN has not been able – to date – to articulate a minimal consensus when it comes a to a binding weapon of this calibre. The path of the treaties is long and, very often; it offers scant tangible results depending as it does from the posterior sanction of the different governments. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples took 26 years to overcome all these obstacles. The binding route, however, could be fruitful to regulate some particular sector or region like, for instance, the development of a treaty regulating the activity of companies in a context of armed conflict.

We are, in other words, facing a false debate, because experience shows –and the present demonstrates it continuously- the possible coexistence of these two approaches: one based on the so-called “pragmatism with principles” by John Ruggie, that will be defended by companies and governments, and another centred on the classic legal doctrine embraced by international NGOs. Or, in other words, the maximalist version of achieving a binding contract or the optimist alternative of trying to find mechanisms, binding or not, that are capable of altering the modus operandi of the companies. In any case, the efficiency of both ways is yet to be determined and maybe the fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Ruling Principles in 2016 will be a perfect occasion to evaluate the impact of this instrument in the face of the intrinsic difficulties that any legal procedure of this magnitude will inevitably entail.

Photography : Rainforest Action Network / CC / Desaturated. – *An Indigenous Dayak woman weaving a basket from jungle vine she collected in the rainforests* –

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TRIBUNA

The other version of the crisis in the Central African Republic

Johnny Vianney Bissakonou
Journalist

Religious war, ethnic cleansing, a country about to be torn in two... The media deals with the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) in these terms. And, even though it is undeniable that religious massacres have been perpetrated in these past months, reducing the conflict there to religious terms is a simplifying vision that hides other essential aspects of the problem. This bipolarization has distracted the attention of the world from the origins and instigators of the Central African drama, those responsible for thousands of deaths that will sadly escape without trial.

Where should we start to explain what is happening now in the Central African Republic? Before this conflict, hardly anybody even knew that the country existed.

In the mid-20th century, the territory of Ubangui-Chari was part of French Equatorial Africa and the congressman Barthélemy Boganda was its representative in the French National Assembly. Boganda decided to found the Central African Republic, which he proclaimed on the 1st of December 1958. But he died in a mysterious plane accident on the 29th of March 1959. David Dacko succeeded him as the head of the RCA, obtaining the country's independence on the 13th of August 1960.

Soon after that, this small country started to get attention from the media due to the rise to power of Jean-Bedel Bokassa. A former officer of the French Army, Bokassa had returned to his native country to form the national army. In the night from the 31st of December 1965 to January the 1st 1966, he gave what became known as the coup d'état of Saint Sylvester. Once he became president he was initially France's protégé, being

even allowed to crown himself as the Emperor of the Central African Empire. But Bokassa started to become increasingly a nuisance, due to his multiple extravagances. He was finally deposed in the Operation Barracuda of the French Army, on the 21st of September 1979. David Dacko was once again put at the head of the Central African Republic, but he wasn't able to lead the country out of the crisis and he was forced to give the power back to the army on September 1981.

General André Kolingba, aided by the Military Committee for the National Recovery, became the man in power. He created the only legal party (his own, obviously): the Central African Democratic Rally. A decade of calm followed, with the country receiving thousands of refugees fleeing from neighbouring Chard, torn by a long civil war. There were close ties between the two countries, and Centro African citizens from the north would mix with the Chadians from the south. The Chadian merchants started to become a key element in the economy of the Central African Republic.

André Kolingba was one of the heads of state that was not able to elude the 1990 discourse of François Mitterrand, La Baule 1990. Submitted to the road map set by the French president —multiparty, democracy, elections—Kolingba lost the 1993 elections, in which Ange Felix Patassé was elected as the president of the Republic.

“ Reducing the conflict to religious terms is a simplifying vision that hides other essential aspects of the problem ”

The start of the conflict

As soon as he became president, Patassé insisted on revising all the country's foreign agreements, even the Defence ones with France. But the Barracuda (name given to the French military after the operation Barracuda) had large bases in the CAR and they participated in the fight against poachers and road robbers who had come from the Sahel and the Sudan.

The real problems started then. The CAR is a country with an extension of 623.000 km2, with a population of 4.5 million and with very desirable riches under its surface. The French Military, who had looked out for the security of the country, left for Chad and Patassé had an army of 2.000 soldiers, most of them still loyal to the deposed general. Under Patassé's regime there were several uprisings, two failed coupes d'état and finally, a successful one on the 15th of March 2003, led by François Bozizé, Patassé's former Army Chief, who had Chad's support. Thirteen years before that, on the 1st of December 1990, Idriss Déby had led a successful coup d'état against Hissein Habré in neighbouring Chad.

During the army mutinies, under Patasse's regime, the Central Africans got to know the MISAB (Mission Monitoring the Bangui agreements), that became the MINURCA (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic), which finally decided to leave the country.

Bozizé, the Seleka and the anti-Balaka

François Bozizé created his own political party (KNK) and he organized elections in 2005, two years after his coup d'état. Despite his incapacity to lead the country to stability, he won those elections and the following ones on the 23rd of January 2011.

In order to obtain power, Bozizé had used "Zakawa" mercenaries from Chad who lived in the Central African Republic. Instead of paying them and ridding the country of these outlaws willing to shoot at the slightest provocation, he kept them with him and incorporated many of them into the national army. His personal guard was also formed by these same elements that had been fighting in Chad for long periods of time. They had more in common with the Chadian traders and other Central Africans of Chadian origin and they often committed abuses against the other part of the population. Frustration led to an increase in tensions between the two communities.

In his ten years in power Bozizé's policy was basically to stay in power thanks to foreign armed forces. He did not fulfil his promise of restructuring the army and he never made it a Republican Army. After a rift with Idriss Déby and having lost France's support, Bozizé asked Jacob Zuma and the South African Army for support. His aim was to exploit the petrol that was in the same basin as Chad's. He also allied himself with

China and gave to India the control of the cement production.

And then came the Seleka! Michel Djotodja, Nourradine Ahmat, Mohamed Daffane and other warlords who had helped Bozizé achieve power now wanted their piece of the cake. The words of Abakar Sabone in the process of political dialogue initiated by François Bozizé still resound today: «*The Christians have been directing this country for 50 years and the results are catastrophic. They have failed, a Muslim must be given the opportunity to take the reigns of the country.*»

“ It is not a religious war that’s going on in the CAR, it is two sides trying to find the necessary support to retake or keep power ”

Seleka- Islamic rebel forces- found their perfect ally: the marginalized Muslim minority. Djotodja used the support of the Islamists to gain power by arms and, once he reached it, proved incapable of imposing rule of law – as had proved all previous Central African governments. Quite the contrary; during his nine months in power, Seleka committed abuses of power over the civil population, and Michael Djotodja was forced to resign by the international community.

The anti-Balaka had their origin in a group of self-defence –formed years before the Seleka arrived- by the inhabitants of the villages in order to protect their scarce properties from the bandits known as Zaraguinas. As things got worse, with the abuses committed by the members of the Seleka, who burned their villages, raped their daughters, etc. they became more radicalized, in order to confront their attackers with rudimentary weapons. Finally, this self-defence group was adopted by the entourage of Bozizé’s old regime and transformed into a systematic murderer of Muslims. They adopt the strategy of the warlords: Leading the non-Muslims to believe that the Islamists want to take control of the country by force and that they must fight to expel them.

A religious war?

Bozizé got rid of Patassé with the help of soldiers from Chad and now Djotodja did the same thing to him, sending him to neighbouring Cameroon. It was then that Bozizé went all-out: he wants to return whatever the cost. In fact, he only wants two things: to recover power and discharge all the hate he feels towards those who deprived him of it. To achieve this, he will stop at nothing. Bozizé and Seleka are not fighting for Muslims or Christians, only for power. In the Central African Republic there are atheists, animists, etc. You can, after all, be a non-Muslim without being a Christian. It is not a religious war that's going on in the CAR, it is two sides trying to find the necessary support to retake or keep power. Before being deposed by Bozizé with Chad's support and France's blessing, Patassé signed a contract ceding exploitation rights to the country's petroleum with Jack Grynberg, the owner of RSM Petroleum. This contract expired on the 23rd of November 2004. Bozizé had to renegotiate it but he decided to up the ante and sell the oil to the highest bidder. There was also the contract for the exploitation of the uranium in Bakouma. This is a very complex matter, very difficult to summarize in just a few lines. As in so many other aspects, the ones paying the highest price are the French and the Central Africans. The French Government paid 1.800 million euros from taxpayer's money to buy the Bakouma mines that were then owned by the Canadian company Uramin. But then Bozizé's government considered that the agreement between AREVA and Uramin was treacherous. Matters went to court and it was then that the mayor of Levallois Perret, Patrice Balkani, intervened, after allegedly having earned 5 million dollars as his commission for mediating in the negotiations.

Nowadays, despite the embargo put in place by the Kimberly Process, the militias continue to exploit the diamond and gold mines in the areas under their control. They move these stones to other countries and they are, through them, able to sell them. The militias are still heavily armed and they keep the population hostage. Many Central Africans barely survive in refugee camps in the capital while others, in the interior of the country, have fled from the hostilities and live like animals in the savannah, waiting desperately for the disarmament to come and with it a return to normality and to their homes. Meanwhile, the warlords, other than having been admonished and threatened with having their assets in France frozen, enjoy full liberty and run free through various African countries. These people continue to arm, finance and motivate people to commit massacres, using them only as an instrument of pressure in order to keep on

running the country or to recuperate power.

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INTERVIEW

Interview with Dorly Castañeda, doctor in Political Science and International Affairs

Eugènia Riera
International Catalan Institute for Peace

Dorly Castañeda***, doctor in Political Science and International Affairs (Sciences-Po, Paris)***

Colombia is one of the countries in which the Euopean Union has been working for years in peace programs, but the role it has played in the resolution of the conflict has been criticized and has laid bare its limitations as a peace agent. How would you value the EU's peace strategy in Colombia and what role could it have in the conflict's aftermath?

We talk about the EU's role in Colombia with Dorly Castañeda, doctor in Political Science and International Affairs who has worked with organizations from the civil society and the Colombian government. She is now a counsellor in peace building for the World Bank and she has recently published The European Approach to Peacebuilding. Civilian Tools for Peace in Colombia and Beyond (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).

For years, the EU has given support to peace initiatives in Colombia through the so-called Peace Laboratories and later through the New Peace Territories. Can you talk us through these initiatives?

The Peace Laboratories are development programs for the construction of peace that started when there was armed conflict in six of the areas most affected by violence, aiming to promote profound social transformations. The Laboratories were a product of the interaction between the EU, the Colombian central government (mostly during Álvaro Uribe's rule) and organizations from Colombian and international civil societies. It had a budget of 90 million euros during ten years, an insignificant amount in terms

of national public investment but very valuable in local-level political initiatives. The present program of New Peace Territories is based on the experience of the Peace Laboratories to support peace-building processes in four strategic regions. The European budget is of 30 million euros in five years.

Has the result been positive?

The main achievement of the Laboratories has been in giving support to processes started by the civil society in areas where the democratic state is hardly present and that could have disappeared in the middle of the war. That and having promoted dialogue with public institutions. In other words, specific actions – productive, education, health or formative projects – the Peace Laboratories managed to bring closer two vital yet antagonistic actors for peace in that era: the organizations of the civil society in war zones and the Sate's institutions. But the EU fell short of its goals. The Laboratories generated many expectations in these regions, in the civil society organizations, in the government, among the donors, etc. and the EU failed them all. That goes to show its capacity for building bridges but also its failure when it comes to taking a firm stance. For instance, nowadays, the experience of the Laboratories has been crucial in the implementation of Habana agreements and the EU doesn't seem to be capitalizing on its ten-year experience.

There has been criticism about the EU's role in Colombia based on the fact that it has a limited capacity, with a low profile, based only in cooperating in its development (a payer more than a player). Does the EU have its own peace strategy in Colombia? Does it have a coherent policy?

If by coherence you mean that commercial policies, defence, diplomacy and development cooperation are coordinated to achieve peace in Colombia, the answer has to be no. This would be what you'd have in an ideal scenario, but that is not the case in Colombia or anywhere else in the world. There has, however, been clarity in one aspect: the EU supports the peace process with civil means; it has always stated that it aims to build a peace based on democratic principles and civil instruments like economic development. It's a position based on European values and the EU's *raison d'être*.

“ The experience of Peace Laboratories has been crucial in the implementation of Habana agreements and the EU doesn’t seem to be capitalizing it ”

There has also been criticism about how European cooperation has brought negative consequences and conflict in some regions, because it didn’t take into account the nature of their pre-existing social structures. Up to what degree do you think this has been so?

It’s true that European cooperation has been criticized for not respecting the local tempos and the internal functioning of some organizations. There are two reasons: the abundance of strict procedures in the execution of the programs of Official Aid for Development (AOD) and the incompatibility of the tempos of the donors with those of the populations. And, even if it may sound contradictory, these difficulties are a consequence of how the cooperation policies were established. In the late 90s, European cooperation did not have strict regulations, allowing it to adapt to national and local circumstances. This flexibility, however, brought with it scarce transparency. Later, with Prodi’s and Barroso’s reforms there was an increase in transparency but a whole range of procedures were introduced, with the subsequent loss in flexibility. This rigidity marginalized many local structures that had received support before, while also redirecting the efforts of the people in charge of putting the programs into effect.

What has been the relation between the EU’s strategy (as a commission) and th0se of its member states?

International cooperation has to be understood as an instrument of foreign policy and, as such, the defender of the interests of a “nation”, and in this case this “unidentified political entity” is the European Union. The member states still use the AOD to suit their own national interests. This is obvious in Colombia, where the countries with a stronger presence (Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, Holland, France, Sweden) did not contradict

the EU policy but they did not coordinate with it either or present itself as a unified block to the Government of Colombia.

The EU says it is worried about the violence and the violation of Human Rights in Colombia. Other than giving diplomatic support to the Colombian government, should it have a more active role in the on-going peace process?

The communiqués of the EU's council, its Parliament and its High Commissioner have an important symbolic value; it's true that they do not bring changes on the ground but they do support the defenders of Human Rights, the social organizations, the minorities or the public policies that try to achieve peace through peaceful means. It is a way of giving voice and empowering the people and the policies that promote peace. The EU has participated in other peace negotiations and in the agreements reached there (Middle East, Philippines, Indonesia, Sudan). But it can only participate in peace talks if it is invited to the table and, up until now, the Colombian government has not invited any country –or actors like the EU, the OEA or even the UN- to have a seat in the negotiations. It has however made constant pleas for support in the implementation of the eventual accords. The EU could play an important role there.

" The EU has stated that it aims to build a peace based on democratic principles and civil instruments "

Being things as they are, can we consider the EU as a relevant actor in international peace negotiations?

I think we can. The UE is a relevant peace actor, destined to support peace in different scenarios. The difficulty is for the EU to step up to this role, but it has the civil instruments to help in the different peace efforts now in place. And it is in the civil aspects where the EU's added value lies, not in it's capacity for military response.

Its internal difficulties – a sui generis actor in politically complex foreign affairs – are an obstacle to this role as a peace agent?

Yes and no. Yes, because it makes decision-taking slow and it limits its capacity of reaction. And no because its advantage in relation to other international actors is the UE's uniqueness as a commercial associate, donor and an organization of multiple states.

Is political integration in Foreign Policy and Defence a necessity for the EU?

Integration would make it easier to define a focus in peace building and would allow the EU to react accordingly to the changes in local conditions. It is however not a necessary condition for the EU to act with the instruments it already has at its disposal.

And going back to the Colombian case, can the EU be a relevant actor in the aftermath of the armed conflict?

Most definitely, the EU's experience in Colombia will be extremely useful in the aftermath of the conflict. Nowadays, if you look at who is present in the regions with a sufficient capacity to support the implementation of peace agreements, there are the organizations of the civil society (by themselves or with public institutions) that have received the support of the EU at some point, with its cooperation programs. For instance, the Programs of Peace and Development undertaken by the Peace Laboratories and now the New Peace Territories could now become key actors in peacekeeping in the regions. The way the EU managed to create spaces of a dialogue between the civil population, the organizations of the civil society and the central institutions – and in some cases, local ones as well – has left many useful lessons for the donors and the government. Furthermore, with the treaty of free commerce, there can be long-term perspectives in one of the most critical aspects of the conflict's aftermath: the creation of employment.

“ The Colombian peace process is on the right path but an agreement in Havana will not lead to the end of armed conflict ”

How do you value the present perspectives of an end to the armed conflict?

The negotiations with the FARC in Havana and the potential negotiations with the ELN guerrilla are an opportunity to downscale the armed conflict, strengthen democracy and launch the reforms that are necessary to level the inequalities in the country while generating a sustainable development. Never before had negotiations with the FARC gone this far and the structure we have put in place seems to work. It’s normal that there are moments of crisis like the present one, because not all the fractions within the FARC support the dialogues and – in the same way – not all of the government agrees with what is happening in Havana. Despite all this, I think the process is on the right path. However, a peace agreement in Havana will not lead to the end of armed conflict in Colombia. The armed conflict involves multiple national and international actors who will not lay down their weapons after the dialogue with the guerrillas. These actors include the so-called criminal bands (BACRIM) at the service of illegal economic markets (drugs, gold, emeralds), the narcos, dissidents within the guerrillas, etc.

Despite all this, are we closer to peace in Colombia?

In order to build peace we require a drastic change in how the central government deals with the regions. The aim is to establish the conditions that will allow the construction of a democratic state from the regions. And this is what the negotiation in Havana is about: how to do an institutional change that will strengthen direct democracy, diminish inequality and bring the two Colombias closer: the prosperous Colombia who wants to be a member of the OCDE and the poor Colombia that’s deeply scarred by five decades of armed conflict. The road is long and it also requires mid and short term actions like disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, reparations to victims, the strengthening of security, the creation of jobs, an improvement of justice; with the clear

long-term perspective that will lead to the change of the game rules that make the cycle of violence endless.

Photography

– *Cover of "The European Approach to Peacebuilding. Civilian Tools for Peace in Colombia and Beyond"* –

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SOBRE L'ICIP

News, activities and publications about the ICIP

ICIP
International Catalan Institute for Peace

Call for nominations for ICIP Peace in Progress Award 2015

The International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP) has announced the call for nominations for the fifth edition of the ICIP Peace in Progress Award. This prize aims to publicly recognize individuals, entities or institutions that, in an outstanding and extensive manner, have worked and contributed to the promotion and building of peace.

The ICIP Peace in Progress Award is granted by agreement of the Governing Board of ICIP and consists of public recognition, a sculpture created by the Nobel Peace Prize winner, artist and activist Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, called *Porta del Sol*, and a financial prize of 4,000 euros. The award is presented at an institutional award ceremony which takes place annually at the Catalan Parliament.

To be considered for the award, nominations must be submitted until June 30. For more information on the call for nominations process, see the award criteria and the award application form in the ICIP website, or please contact ICIP by sending an email to icip@gencat.cat or by phoning 93 554 42 70.

A new service which gives access to more than 1.250 specialized academic journals

The ICIP Library has increased users access to full text articles on specialized academic journals. The service provided by the Taylor & Francis Social Science and Humanities Library gives its users access to 1.250 journals and their old repository.

The subject areas are divided into two packages: “Politics, International Relations and Area Studies”, which deals with Political Theory, Globalization and Diplomacy amongst others, and “Strategic, Defense and Security Studies”, with articles on Intelligence, Peace Studies, Terrorism or Strategic Studies. Also, amongst the most relevant materials are the Military Balance, the Adelphi Series, African Security, Democracy and Security, and the Journal of Peace Education.

You can access the full publications list here. All journals are accessible from the ICIP Library, which has moved to a new location in Carrer Tapineria, 10, 1st Floor (Barcelona).

ICIP Latest publicacions

Políticas para la paz. Políticas Públicas y Sociales para la Ciudadanía con Plenos Derechos de la Población BGILT en Colombia, by Luz Nelly Palacios (ICIP Working Paper, in Spanish)

Qatar during the reign of Hamad Al Thani (1995-2013): from soft power to hard power, by Món Sanromà (ICIP Working Paper)

Perspectivas y aportes empresariales para la construcción de paz , report by ICIP, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá and Fundación Ideas para la Paz of Colombia.

New edition of the ICIP Reading Group

ICIP is organizing a new session of the Reading and Reflection Group, this time focusing on Gene Sharp’s book *De la dictadura a la democràcia: un sistema conceptual per a l’alliberament* (From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation), published in Catalan by ICIP and Líniazero as part of the series ’Tools for Peace, Security and Justice’.

The group will be coordinated by Vicent Martínez Guzmán, a Doctor of Philosophy and honorary director of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace at Jaume I University in Castelló. The sessions will take place on the following Tuesdays: May 26 and June 2, 9 and 16, from 6 to 8pm at the ICIP Library (Carrer Tapineria 10, 1st floor, Barcelona). Those interested in participating must pre-register by sending an email to activitats.icip@gencat.cat.

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