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Women, Peace & Security: 15 years of 1325 Resolution

ICIP

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INTRODUCTION

A room of one's own is still not a reality

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In *A Room of One's Own*, Virginia Woolf analyses the difficulties a woman faces in establishing a career as a writer; Woolf explains: "A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction." Decades later, and although regarding a very different context, something similar can be said of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security. The resolution recognised the need to create this *own room*, at the international level, as well as within individual states and it has worked hard to collect several reports[1] on this issue. However, as it currently stands, this room has not fully materialised, and it is not a room of one's own, nor is it a space well integrated with the other spheres of international society. There are not enough funds to ensure that fifteen years from now we are commemorating a better situation.

In other words, the signs, fifteen years since Resolution 1325, are both encouraging, and disappointing; as expressed in the child's school report card to the parents: "There have improvements and much progress, but we still need to see a lot of effort." Effort has been made, but in order to have success there needs to be a slight change in approach. In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on this idea. The context since the signing of the resolution has changed; we therefore, must engage in a deeper reading of the text, and emphasise individually, both the overall meaning of the text and its four separate pillars: participation, protection, prevention and relief and recovery. We need to alter our approach, by applying distinctive perspectives and ensuring that we address, the root causes, the structural causes.

We begin by remembering key contextual questions. The UN's founding agreement granted different responsibilities and attributes to its principle organs, including the

Security Council, as outlined in the Charter. The Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, which is buttressed by many UN actions: Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and XII of the Charter). In addition, Article 25 of the Charter establishes the obligations of Member States to fulfil their own resolutions. Resolution 1325 arose in the second decade of the post-Cold War era, in a context dominated by a concern for human security (harm done to individuals and communities), changes in the nature and location of armed conflicts; in a context of liberal-peace and discussions about humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, particularly civilians and vulnerable groups. Concretely, the resolution mentions two other resolutions in 1999 (1261, 1256) and two in 2000 (1296, 1314), dedicated to the rights of the child, the situation of armed conflict and the protection of civilians, promoted by countries including Namibia, Netherlands, Bangladesh and Canada.

“ A full inclusion of women in efforts relating to human security constitutes a positive, necessary and essential contribution ”

The importance of resolution 1325 is therefore, significant, as is demonstrated in the conclusions to the international conference held in Washington, November 2010. Ten years after its adoption there were marked changes in approaches to issues of peace and security, notable changes in international law, the empowerment of women, in the planning and execution of military operations and in the conception of global security.

The best way to perceive these changes is to acknowledge how the resolution pays attention to these underlying questions, to regard its structure. By doing this, we notice that men and women experience security in different ways, and therefore, the exclusion or the insufficient inclusion of different perspectives has a negative impact. If one does not take into account these diversified approaches, made evident through a gendered base analysis, then we exclude the vision and the participation of women in processes related to peace and security. The result, as is demonstrated in several reports

completed some years back, is clear: weakened negotiations and peace agreements, weakened strategies of reconstruction, peace building and development and weakened national economies. The inclusion of women's perspectives and approaches, as well as their experiences and different priorities, shows greater sustainability in processes of peace building. We also have empirical evidence, based on specific cases of negative impacts (exclusion) and positive impacts (inclusion). Having one's *own room* and money, according to Woolf, means success, although neither resources nor following a different approach have become fully realised anywhere.

" We need a change in the approach on the four pillars of 1325: participation, protection, prevention and reconstruction "

I therefore contend, that the principle conclusion to be drawn from Resolution 1325, fifteen years on, is that the active and full inclusion of women in efforts relating to human security constitutes a positive, necessary and essential contribution. To achieve this, the next fifteen years require a change in approach, one that focuses on two particular issues. First, there needs to be greater unity and coordinated efforts, between feminist movements and women and men peace movements, as with think tanks and national governments, none should evade the resolution, a resolution which puts emphasis on the different requirements of compliance for each country. Second, it is necessary to address the four separate areas of the constituting pillars: a) participation at all levels of decision making (local and intergovernmental); b) the protection of women, adult, child and adolescent, from sexual abuse and other violence, which is too common in wars, refugee camps and even in peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations (there must be plans to deal with trauma and other severe measures); c) prevention with a multilevel approach, (prevention of violent conduct, the persecution of violations of national law, strengthening the rights of women in national law and explicit support for the significant presence of women in peace processes and reconstruction); d) the adoption of measures to support humanitarian assistance and

post-conflict reconstruction, which is crucial in a time where the humanitarian system is in a crisis worse than in 1945.

With that, I conclude by remembering Alva Myrdal and her work as a diplomat, a peace activist and a feminist (awarded the Nobel Peace Prize), we must not forget the profoundness of Resolution 1325: the urgency to address root causes and to delegitimise any approach that is not inclusive.

1. The most recent report, *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, sponsored by UN Women and presented last October at the United Nations Security Council.

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IN DEPTH

The agenda on Women, Peace and Security: Critical Reflections

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This October marked the fifteenth anniversary of UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, often taken by the specialist literature to be a “landmark decision”. By adopting it, the Security Council recognised, for the first time, that women can be something more than just the victims of armed conflicts.

Thus resolution 1325 is based not only on the different and disproportionate effects of armed conflicts on women, but also on the important — and not always recognised — role that women play in their prevention and resolution, as well as in the consolidation of peace. On the basis of these foundations, the resolution’s conceptual structure rests on three fundamental pillars: “participation”, “prevention” and “protection”, often referred to as “the three Ps”.

So the preamble to resolution 1325 recognises the “importance” of women’s “equal participation and full involvement” so as to achieve peace and security, and the “need to increase” such participation “in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution”. In relation to this, clause 1 — the only one, moreover, which covers the second of the three pillars mentioned — urges Member States “to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels” associated with this prevention and resolution as well as in conflict management. In this vein, in clauses 3 and 4 it requires the Secretary General to “appoint more women as special representatives and envoys” and to “expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel”. Thus, the Security Council adds to its conventional

perception of women as victims of armed conflict, a recognition of them as promoters of peace.

However, these provisions are the target of a significant part of the criticisms to which resolution 1325 has been subjected. These criticisms condemn its defence of the viewpoint of liberal feminism and, in particular, of this viewpoint's idea of equality, according to which this will be achieved when women gain access to the same areas of activity — and on the same terms — as men. The commitment to increasing women's representation referred to in clause 1 of the resolution falls within this context. This commitment is based on two objectives: firstly, to make it possible for women's decisions to embody their priorities and concerns, in second place, for peace and security to benefit from women's contributions and perspectives. Undoubtedly, an increased presence of women in any sphere of activity gives them greater visibility and is important in symbolic terms, but does not guarantee that their decisions will be substantially different from men's, since, to be represented, it is not necessary for them to be present. In short, by establishing a direct causal link between descriptive representation and substantive representation, the resolution adopts a concept of representation that is rather simplistic.

“ Resolution 1325 helps to perpetuate the stereotyped image of women as victims and peaceful, and men as protectors and aggressive ”

After this initial toying with an image of women as active and independent, resolution 1325 reproduces a stereotypical view of women, presenting them — along with girls— as victims of armed conflict who, with their special needs, also require special protection. For example, in its operative section — clauses 9 and 10 — it calls upon the parties to armed conflict to fully respect the rights of women and girls and to protect them from gender-based violence, giving — in clause 11 — responsibility to all States to put an end to impunity for crimes related to this violence and to exclude such crimes from amnesty provisions.

This restrictive conception of women and girls as the victims of armed conflicts has also been the focus of much of the criticism of resolution 1325. There are two main objections to this viewpoint. The first underlines the absence from the text of those women who participate in hostilities and/or play an active role in the emergence and maintenance of gender violence, among other things. The second, on the other hand, blames this viewpoint for the systematic exclusion of women from decision-making processes. Beyond these objections, the criticisms also touch on the image of men given by the resolution. Although the text does not mention them explicitly, their tacit presence is undeniable. Thus, according to the conception promoted by the resolution, we understand that it is men who hold power; men who hold most responsibility for violence — of which they are never victims — and/or for protecting women and girls.

The above considerations also explain the reading that resolution 1325 makes of a conceptual pillar that complements the "three Ps": the incorporation of a gender perspective. Far from being understood as a tool to demonstrate the impact on both men and women of the different stages of the conflict, this incorporation is expressed in a need to prioritise the proactive role women can play in peacebuilding. In this way, the resolution — in its clauses 5 and 8 — demands the inclusion of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, as well as when negotiating and implementing peace agreements. In this context, the commitments taken on call for attention to be paid to the special needs of women and girls during repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction, and for "measures that support local women's peace initiatives." In this way, 1325 helps to perpetuate the stereotyped image of women as victims and peaceful, and men as protectors and aggressive.

" The criticisms of 1325 condemn its defence of the viewpoint of liberal feminism and of the liberal concept of equality "

Resolution 1325 has contributed to the adoption of six[1] other resolutions on the themes of women, peace and security which develop and strengthen some of its aspects. Four

of these resolutions — resolution 1820 (2008), resolution 1888 (2009), resolution 1960 (2010) and resolution 2106 (2013) — focus mainly on the protection of women (as well as of children and possibly of men) from sexual violence. So while clause 13 of resolution 1820 emphasises the need to provide "sustainable assistance," the preamble to resolution 1888 specifically refers to the obligation to ensure "justice and reparations" following conflicts. In a similar vein, resolution 2106 — in its clause 21 — insists on "supporting survivors in accessing justice and reparations". This return to "victimisation" by the Security Council is also evident in the scant treatment given by some of these resolutions to women's participation in decision-making structures. Clause 3 of both resolution 1820 and resolution 1888 relates such participation to their status as persons who are sexually vulnerable or are survivors of sexual violence. Only clause 12 of resolution 1820 does not include this link.

Even so, resolution 1889 — adopted on 5 October 2009 — marks a return to many of the issues dealt with in resolution 1325, while showing a stronger understanding of women's participation than the earlier text, identifying some of the factors that hinder such participation. One sign of this is that in its preamble it relates low levels of women's participation in post-conflict situations to the lack of adequate funding and, in this regard, clause 7 emphasises the need for the "empowerment of women" in such situations. This proposal marks a shift from the idea of representation given in resolution 1325, by directing efforts towards achieving substantive representation, as opposed to descriptive representation. All the same, resolution 1889 retains the discourse of "women" and "women and girls" instead of speaking of gender, presenting both of these categories — as does resolution 1325 — as a homogenous group.

However, resolution 2122 would be the text that deals most intensively with the broad set of issues addressed by resolution 1325. Adopted unanimously on 18 October 2013, this resolution recognises the lack of fulfilment of the commitments taken on concerning the agenda related to women, peace and security. After expressing a *mea culpa*, the Security Council renews its vows, accepting — in the preamble, "the need for more systematic attention to the implementation of women, peace and security commitments in its own work", above all to "ensure the enhancement of women's engagement in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding". In addition, resolution 2122 places the aforementioned agenda in the broader context of

development, noting for example, that “sustainable peace” — as is also pointed out in the preamble — “requires an integrated approach based on coherence between political, security, development, human rights, including gender equality, and rule of law and justice activities”. In the same vein, the resolution adds new issues to this agenda, such as the economic empowerment of women or their access to services for sexual and reproductive health. Despite this broad perspective on peace processes and the consolidation of peace, resolution 2122 does not offer many new ideas when it comes to concrete and practical measures for its implementation.

Fifteen years on from the adoption of resolution 1325, the Security Council has made it possible for the issues of women, peace and security to be an important part of its agenda. Over these years, the specialised literature has focused above all on studying the challenges faced in its implementation, with hardly any questioning of the fact that — as we have tried to show in this paper — some of these challenges are a result of the way in which the resolution was formulated. In this sense, resolution 1325 is a product and at the same time, the producer of a particular vision of “women”, “peace” and “security”, the analysis of which is essential both to understanding its scope of application and its implications as well as to identifying its shortcomings and recognising what might have been different. This assertion also applies to the subsequent resolutions which, in general, have failed to overcome its deficiencies.

1. This article was written before the approval of UN Resolution 2242. So, now, there are actually seven thematic resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, which complement Resolution 1325.

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IN DEPTH

1325: a useful tool for activists?

Hannah Wright
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When reading about United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, it is very common to see the word 'landmark' appearing in front of it. This is because the passage of the resolution in 2000 was seen as a watershed moment for women's rights activists, many of whom had been arguing for years that gender issues must be taken seriously in all efforts to promote peace. UNSCR 1325 – the first of seven resolutions on women, peace and security[1] – was among the first to be conceived and lobbied for by civil society. And while gender and women's rights had long been topics of discussion at the UN, before 2000 they had never been deemed relevant for debate at the Security Council. I still remember hearing about 1325 for the first time, and thinking it miraculous that these brilliant feminists had convinced the UN's highest authority on international security that women's rights matter for peace and security.

But even among those of us who champion 1325 (and its sister resolutions) and continue to call for faster implementation, there are also reservations. Preparations for this month's UN High Level Review on women, peace and security have prompted a great deal of introspection over the past year among what might be called the 'women, peace and security community'. For some, the concern is simply that governments haven't moved quickly enough to fulfil their commitments, or haven't taken the resolutions seriously enough. For others, the problems run deeper: the language of the resolutions isn't quite right, or simply isn't radical enough to reflect feminist critiques of the international community's current approaches to maintaining peace and security.

In my work as a gender adviser for an international peacebuilding organisation, I work with many women activists both in countries affected by violent conflict and in peaceful contexts. Most agree that 1325 has been an important counterpoint to conventional understandings of what matters in resolving conflict and building peace. As Carron Mann, Policy Manager at Women for Women International UK put it, “The women, peace and security framework challenges ‘traditional’ concepts of conflict, which are heavily masculinised and focused on weaponry and resources. In these concepts, women are civilians caught in the crossfire, who should ideally be protected, but casualties will inevitably happen. This ‘traditional’ concept reflects wider systems of patriarchy which similarly objectify, subjugate and abuse women both in and out of conflict.”

“ For women experiencing violence and oppression in their everyday lives, UN resolutions can seem like a remote concept ”

Yet despite the celebration of 1325 and the huge amount of advocacy happening around it, there are limits to how it has been integrated into the work of women’s organisations working for peace. For example, while there has been much lobbying of the UN and national governments, the resolutions often have less traction at the local level. “Grassroots advocacy is yet to find 1325 a useful tool,” says Mann, “We work with marginalised women in countries affected by conflict, many of whom are essentially confined to their households and not connected to networks or women’s groups. There is little ‘grassroots’ advocacy around 1325 in communities.” Isabelle Geuskens, Executive Director of the Dutch organisation Women Peacemakers Program, agrees: “Usually experts on women, peace and security are very knowledgeable but they’re not always well-connected to the grassroots women. They regularly struggle to reach and mobilise people at community level, which is important to create a constituency that can push for change from the bottom up. For me the future of 1325 will lie in investing in social mobilising space and skills.”

Indeed, for women experiencing violence and oppression in their everyday lives, UN resolutions can seem like a remote concept. While working in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2008 I interviewed a number of women from different organisations and political affiliations about their activism. When asked about the impact of 1325 on her work, one woman told me: “I know Resolution 1325, about women in conflict and wars. It hasn’t really helped us. It’s just a resolution.” For Palestinians, like many other populations who feel left behind by the international community, innumerable laws and policies have been adopted which purport to guarantee their rights but amount to little in practice. It is therefore no surprise that 1325 appears to them as a cruel fiction.

“ Some countries, despite experiencing serious instability and violence, are not described as conflict zones and therefore 1325 is often not thought of as applicable to their contexts ”

In some contexts, the barriers to using 1325 as an advocacy tool spring from questions over how the resolution is interpreted. For example, despite the fact that 1325 calls on all UN Member States to increase women’s participation in decision-making on the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, this provision is often implicitly interpreted as referring only to countries currently experiencing or emerging from armed conflict. The nature of today’s conflicts is truly transnational: civil wars such as those in Syria, Libya and South Sudan involve not only their national governments and rebel groups, but global and regional powers such as the USA, EU, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Yet these countries – even those which have National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security – rarely see the increased participation of women in their own foreign and defence policy-making as a priority under 1325.

Some countries, despite experiencing serious instability and violence, are not described as conflict zones and therefore 1325 is often not thought of as applicable to their contexts. In Egypt, for example, women activists have largely chosen not to use 1325 as an advocacy tool. Dalia Abdel Hameed, Gender and Women’s Rights Officer at the

Egyptian Institute for Personal Rights, posed the question, “If you look at the current situation in Egypt, is it post-conflict? Post-revolution? Post-uprising? It’s a very difficult task to describe it. During 2011-13 we witnessed violent clashes, and huge protests and demonstrations. While we are not experiencing this now, it is still hard to say that we are over the violence. The oppression is omnipresent but the forms are different – most of the revolutionary groups are now under a crackdown, and there is a wider climate of oppression. People are trying to convince us to use 1325 in Egypt, but using the resolution first needs civilian rule, rather than military rule, which is not the case in Egypt.”

For some women activists, the stumbling block in using 1325 in their advocacy lies not in its interpretation, but in the content of the resolution itself. While the provisions of the women, peace and security resolutions are an important step forward, and in some contexts have brought real changes to women’s lives, they fall short of the radical re-envisioning of international security which many feminists seek. On this view, the goal is not only to increase women’s participation in existing systems for resolving conflict, but to promote less militarised, less masculinised approaches to security which can help prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place.

Although women, peace and security advocates have tried to use 1325 to promote demilitarisation, the text of the resolution itself is less ambitious. As Isabelle Geuskens puts it, “As women activists we had this vision of how we saw peace, and in 2000 we got this resolution and perhaps we just projected all of our wishes on to it. Good advocacy sometimes means you take a tool and you use it creatively. But there seem to be many limits in terms of how much of what we really want can be achieved via this resolution, and therefore we need to rethink how we are going to reclaim the more radical parts of our vision.”

“ The goal is not only to increase women’s participation in existing systems for resolving conflict, but to promote less militarised and

masculinised approaches to security ”

The worry, then, is that by calling on world leaders to incorporate women and their concerns into the current, militarised international system, we allow ourselves to be co-opted by it. According to Geuskens, “In the past, we have seen strong voices from women’s movements that were redefining what security means, questioning militarisation, the arms race. But so much of the energy around 1325 has been focused on working within the systems of power, to the extent that some people within the women, peace and security community would get very uncomfortable when you would bring up issues of militarism and the need for disarmament.”

But despite these misgivings, most women peace activists still agree on the importance of using 1325 as a point of leverage for bringing women and their concerns to the table. “I definitively don’t want to throw the baby out with the bathwater,” says Geuskens, “I remember what it was like to not have 1325. It has helped women to get a voice. Although women are often still ignored, the arguments to justify their exclusion are becoming more and more thin.” This month’s review provides a crucial opportunity both to ask critical questions about the shortcomings of the women, peace and security framework and how we have used it, and to call on world leaders to make good on their commitments and implement the resolutions in full.

1. This article was written before the approval of UN Resolution 2242. So, now, there are actually eight thematic resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.

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IN DEPTH

Creeping Militarism: A Critical Challenge to Gender Justice and Peace

Abigail Ruane
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On 11-13 January 2014, 50 diverse Syrian women devised a peace plan to end the conflict in Syria. None of the men who participated as part of the official peace negotiations came up with such a plan. Yet it was the men with guns — rather than the women peace leaders — who were provided with access, hotels, meeting space, and political and media recognition to the Geneva II peace talks. And it was the men with guns who failed.

Almost two years later, over 220,000 Syrians have been killed; more than half displaced from their homes; and the Syrian situation is now being called the worst humanitarian crisis of our time. How can we take action to address this please and hold the international community accountable for commitments on the Women, Peace and Security agenda? The Syrian case illustrates both opportunities for transformative change in progressive women's voices, and also continued and emerging challenges for effectively realizing women's participation, protection, and rights across the conflict spectrum.

Mapping Opportunities and Obstacles

In the last 15 years, the Women, Peace and Security agenda has made substantial gains. There is now a recognized normative framework in Women, Peace and Security issues with seven[1] (maybe soon be eight) Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013)). Beyond this, institutions — not just norms — are being recreated. UN missions now have dedicated staff with Women, Peace and Security portfolios; UN

Women is now a consolidated gender entity; and in 2014, 9 out of 17 peacekeeping missions had gender advisors. In 2013, Mary Robinson became the first woman chief mediator as UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Yet, we still have not created the world of peace and gender justice that we envisioned. The old challenges remain the same: how can we go beyond paper to move from commitments to accomplishments? How can we move beyond incremental progress in a world where women's rights and peace are always seen as secondary to men's priorities and military security? How can we overcome key obstacles including lack of political will, ad hoc systematization, and voluntary, shoestring financing?

The most dangerous obstacle is that militarism is spreading. Terrorism and countering violent extremism are giving new justifications to military responses to conflict. They are providing new cover for prioritizing investment in economies of war over economies of peace. New forms of militarized spaces justify bombing towns in the name of combating terrorist threats, while we fail to do what is needed to demand a political solution to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Syria. Meanwhile political space for civil society actors – who are key to promoting peace and gender justice and eliminating violence of many forms – are becoming each day more curtailed.

“ Terrorism and countering violent extremism are giving new justifications to military responses to conflict and providing cover to prioritize economies of war over economies of peace ”

Where do we go from here?

When will we go beyond the medieval narrative of masculine heroes and feminine victims, to make decisions based on evidence rather than stereotypes? When will we create a new normal – one that cultivates women's rights and voices and prioritizes comprehensive long-term investment in just and resilient communities over “quick

fixes" that fail again and again?

Reactive military responses to terrorism and countering violent extremism assume both old and new security challenges have nothing to do with gender. In doing so, these responses recreate the failed and patriarchal status quo. Moving forward requires addressing key obstacles around political will, operational mechanisms, and financing:

1. Political will

First and foremost, moving forward requires taking women's rights off the back burner and prioritizing gender equality as an issue of primary importance. This means women's participation and rights can no longer be an issue of personal preference rather than obligation.

So far, this has not been the case. In the case of Syria, this was particularly evident with the former Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. Brahimi gave lip service to women's participation and rights when presented with the peace proposal developed by Syrian women in 2014. Yet he literally walked out of the room without even providing an excuse during a high level Geneva meeting oriented around amplifying the voices of Syrian women and ensuring their inclusion in the planning for peace processes. Not much of an assurance of women's political inclusion!

This is not an issue that affects only Middle Eastern men. In New York, we see the same pattern: after months of preparations, in September 2015 Spain changed the 15th annual Women, Peace and Security debate from the originally scheduled October 22nd to October 13th — 10 days earlier at than planned. They prioritized the presence of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy over the voices of women worldwide, who have been key to creating and continue to be key to implementing the Women, peace and Security agenda in local communities. What better example of patriarchal systems in action?

" Women's participation and rights can no longer be an issue of personal preference rather than

obligation ”

No individual man should have his personal preferences count for more than women’s participation and rights. But moving away from this as the default requires changing institutional processes away from militarized blinders and toward creative and flexible learning systems that iteratively push toward gender equitable processes and outcomes from personal to international levels.

2. Operational Mechanisms

While commitments in principle have moved forward, their translation into practice has not – many times due to lack of integration into systemic processes. For example, when Syrian women demanded years ago to be included at the peace table, it threw the system into confusion, as it had simply not been considered. The obvious questions as to modalities were unexplored. Does “women at the table” mean a couple of token women being added to each militarized side? Does it mean building a women’s party – separate from the main opposing sides – such as in the case with Ireland? Does it mean creating a consultative body for women-led civil society? Does it mean having gender experts to provide input into mediation white papers? And where should these women be — at the table? in the audience? in a separate room? a separate building? a separate city? Failure to have standard but flexible mechanisms to work through and prioritize these options in a way that prioritizes women’s participation and rights provides yet another form of inertia in moving away from militarized solutions toward gender equitable change.

Moving forward requires creating alternative and gender equitable mechanisms and standard operating procedures that support gender equality and overturn outdated and failed models of ‘business as usual that assumes as functional the dictum of military security as equivalent to peace.

3. Financing

Implementation of Women, Peace and Security commitments is also hindered by the embarrassing level of financing allocated to realizing this agenda. While globally we

invest $1.7 trillion in militaries and weapons, there never seems to be enough money for women's rights or peace. Recently, as part of a push for strengthened member state commitments on implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda, UN Women brought attention to the fact that only about two percent of aid addressing peace and security issues is allocated to gender equality. Two percent! They then campaigned to raise this to meet the UN's Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security, which had as its 2014 target dedicating 15 percent of such funding to gender equality.

Both of these are a far cry from the 50 percent that seems at least arguable under the (1979) Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Yet even a small increase would help: a mere one percent of the global arms trade ($8.8 billion) would ensure universal public education for girls and boys. In addition to raising the numbers, we need to change our priorities for investment: Scholars have recently demonstrated that feminist movements are the number one predictor of reducing violence against women. Where does that leave us? We need to move the money and invest in feminist movements for violence prevention and peace.

“ Implementation of Women, Peace and Security commitments is hindered by the embarrassing level of financing allocated to realizing this agenda. ”

Next Steps

Following the development of a peace plan some of the same women met with the Security Council in a historic Arria formula meeting on 17 January 2015. Here, one speaker made a passionate plea: “Do not leave these resolutions in a drawer. They are your resolutions, not our resolutions.” At the 15th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, it is critical to recognize the militarism creep and prevent it from lulling us into allowing the failed status quo to continue.

1. This article was written before the approval of UN Resolution 2242. So, now, there are actually eight thematic resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.

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IN DEPTH

For a peace that is ours

Montse Cervera
Feminist and antimilitarist activist (Dones x Dones)

I write this reflection at a time when the culture of war invades us more than ever; at a time when, in Western states, speaking about refugees does not mean speaking about human rights or stopping wars, despite the warnings and the outrage of the pacifist and antimilitarist movement. They are also times when, in the context of tension with Russia, NATO is conducting maneuvers in Spain, reminding us that the priority of security continues to be the military, war and rearmament. In other words, reminding us that militarism is security.

This context highlights the dark side of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, precisely now, 15 years after it was adopted: the darkness caused by militarism. But one must also be optimistic and recognize that this resolution, as well as the ones that followed in order to develop other aspects, is a small beacon of light. Small if we take into account the limitations of laws or resolutions in and of themselves.

The light is there because many feminist women managed to get resolution 1325 drawn up and approved to express a vital necessity to achieve “a peace that is ours,” as we feminists say, without inequality and where the bodies and knowledge of women were present. In the adoption of resolution 1325, we must take into account two fundamental events. The first one, the two great wars of the 90s: Bosnia and Rwanda, where, for the first time, we witnessed, first-hand, mass rapes of women used as a weapon of war. Secondly, the Beijing Platform for Action, which, for the first time, demanded that crimes committed against women and children in the context of an armed conflict be considered crimes against humanity.

“ Resolution 1325 has greatly improved the participation of women in peace processes and in the armed forces, but sexual violence, femicide, and abuses against women and children continue to rise ”

Many activists have demanded that their governments carry out resolution 1325 and allocate budgets for action plans that some countries, such as Spain, committed themselves to. They have worked hard so that the resolution would become a tool of transformation, and not a worthless bureaucratic measure to pay lip service, which is what is happening. There are assessment reports[1] of the first years of implementation of resolution 1325, such as this excellent document by Women in Black, Serbia. And the most optimistic conclusions are that the resolution has slightly improved the participation of women in peace processes, the armed forces and security; but sexual violence, femicide and abuses against women and girls have not decreased and actually continue to rise in “peacetime,” in conflicts, in post-conflicts and in refugee camps. In fact, in some cases, as has already been reported, these crimes have been committed by UN Blue Helmet forces.

Another dark side to the 15 years of resolution 1325 are the resources allocated to its implementation. Hardly any country has allocated a decent budget to its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

The interpretation made by government institutions is also a cause for concern. This interpretation is based on the initial premise of a militarized and militaristic world where the culture of peace is minimal and marginal and where practically the only thing they seem to understand is formal equality in what they consider to be fundamental for “our security”: armies and weapons. Hence they opt to add more women to the processes of militarization. In other words, the perspective of gender is understood especially as equality with men (which doesn’t exist either) and protection with a little

more participation (even if it's formal) and more rearmament; in other words, the preservation of their status quo.

Spain is an example. It has decided to focus on the participation of women in the armed forces – which has increased slightly, up to 12%. According to the government, all the demands for training are being met and there has been no news of assaults in peacekeeping missions. In the reply to the letter Women in Black sent to the minister of defense at the end of last year, no mention was made concerning the allegations in the armed forces of Captain Zaida Cantera, who finally (after she had already left the army) received judicial confirmation that she had been the victim of harassment.

“ Many activists have worked hard so that the resolution would become a tool of transformation, and not a worthless bureaucratic measure to pay lip service, which is what is happening ”

Also, although the resolution presents women as subjects of peace and the creation of life, in practice, it continues to place the emphasis on women and children as victims that need protection or as witnesses to enforce the law. It is also worth mentioning that “women” is a generic term that is too broad because it is not the nature of women that makes us peaceful and creators of peace, but rather a feminist consciousness. It is the practice of our situation as creators of life that makes us put all of this universal experience of caring for life and for the planet above any other consideration. In other words, the contributions of women go hand in hand with feminism; an active feminism committed against the patriarchal, capitalist, fundamentalist, racist and neocolonial system.

If we don't go to the roots of the capitalist and hetero-patriarchal system, which places the profits of multinationals and the very rich at the center of its policies rather than people's lives, more reasons will be found to reinforce militarism by incorporating more

women into the armed forces. It must be reiterated that armed forces have never brought peace and that we believe they should disappear. In antimilitarist feminism we have worked on the concept of security and we can state that resolution 1325 is a good instrument to meet the challenges we face and to demand the participation of women (feminists and pacifists) at the negotiating table. However, what has done the most for the empowerment of women and for their security are truth commissions: processes that give voice to women and give visibility to their pain and their needs, as recounted by the women of Colombia, for example. In that country, civil society and feminism networks have, in addition to demanding justice and reparation, stood by women and considered them protagonists of their lives.

Because, for feminists, security[2], in addition to our demands for justice and rights, is especially about weaving solidarity between women's networks, offering a protection based on complicity and empathy, respecting their timings, their silences, their pain and their way of coping with their own recovery, listening to their words and recognizing their experience of resistance and care for life in the midst of terror. Achieving a peace that is "ours," where truth, justice and reparation remain central elements for all women is a long process. Therefore, it is important to stay connected for a long time.

And we want to observe the advances and setbacks from this perspective, walking together with all the tools at our disposal (including laws and resolutions) in order to abolish war and violence from history.

1. See also the book: Carol Cohn (editor), *Las mujeres y las guerres*. 1. Barcelona, Institut Català Internacional per la Pau and Edicions Bellaterra, 2015.

2. See the article *Always disobedient*, by Staša Zajović, published in the e-magazine *Peace in Progress*, number 22.

Fotografia : UN Women

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RECOMANEM

Materials and resources recommended by the ICIP

Report
Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice and Securing the Peace

In 2013, the United Nations Security Council directed the secretary general to conduct a study in order to evaluate the implementation of Resolution 1325. The study identified gaps and challenges, as well as emerging trends and priorities for action. Radhika Coomaraswamy took charge of carrying out this study. Coomaraswamy has worked for the defence of human rights in Sri Lanka, and previously acted as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, and later the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. She put together an advisory group of experts from around the world to support the writing of this report.

Discussions and regional consultations were held in parallel to provide the content for this report. A specialised UN group, Women, Peace and Security contributed to the preparation of the report by organising a global survey amongst members of civil society. In addition, 47 civil society organisations, academics and research institutes offered their own contributions and perspectives on a public website. These contributions are reflected in a document entitled *Through the Lens of Civil Society: Summary Report of the Public Submissions to the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security*, published by PeaceWomen.

The findings from Coomaraswamy's investigation and from the advisory group and all of the individuals, institutes and organisations who participated in this process of critical reflection were compiled in a 418 page report *Preventing Conflict, transforming Justice, securing the Peace*[1], which was presented to the Security Council on 14 October,

2015. The study includes a discussion of best practices in the implementation of the resolution and explains the identified challenges and shortcomings, echoing the needs and concerns expressed by women in specific conflict situations. The analysis avoids grand generalisations; rather it is focuses on local experiences. However, it highlights the common demands shared by women across many countries. One of the remarkable points is that all of the women made a similar appeal to the Security Council: that the United Nations must play a prominent role in arresting the process of militarization and militarism that began in the growing cycle of conflict sine 2001. It is essential to stop the normalisation of violence at all levels: local, national and international.

Report
15 years of Resolution 1325. An evaluation of the agenda on Women, Peace and Security.

The report *15 years of Resolution 1325. An evaluation of the agenda on Women, Peace and Security* (in Spanish), by Maria Villellas, researcher at the Escola de Cultura de Pau of the UAB and member of WILPF Spain, was presented within the framework of the International conference 'Women, Peace and Security: 15 years of UN Resolution 1325', organized by ICIP, that took place last Nov 3rd in Barcelona.

Also within the framework of the same conference, ICIP presented a bibliographic compilation of publications and materials on the topic of Women, Peace and Security, and which are available at the ICIP Library.

Book
***Women and Wars*, Carol Cohn (ed.)**

In the prologue to this book, Cynthia Enloe remarks: analysing gender is not an easy task; rather it is an ability that is learnt. This edited volume by Carol Cohn, brings together the knowledge and experience of the contributors, who put into practice their analytical capabilities to explore the question of gender in complex contexts, such as the situation of violent conflict. They discuss the experience of refugee camps, victims of war, support for local women's groups, lobby groups, non-governmental organisations and United Nations agencies. This interdisciplinary text is equally committed to developing and sharing the strengths of a gendered analysis, as it is to identifying the causes, and various aspects of armed conflict made present through a

gendered lens.

In the first chapter of *Women and Wars*, Carol Cohn provides us with a set of essential tools, in order to introduce the conceptual framework of studying and analysing gender. Based on the idea that gender is a relationship of structural power, the author goes on to examine three key phenomena that constitute gender as a structural system of hierarchical power relations: identities, social structures and gendered symbols.

The chapters that follow investigate, in detail the relationship between women and war; they explore the multiple factors that configure this relationship, while taking into account the specific aspects of each war. Throughout the text, the various authors address the impacts that war has on women: the disruption of formal economies and levels of subsistence, sexual violence, the impact on health, and the specific experience of refugees and internally displaced peoples. They also analyse the various political positions women take on in relation to war: activism against war and militarisation or activism in support of it. They address the ways in which women participate in war: in state led activities or with armed groups working in opposition to the state. The text also attends to the role women play in constructing peace: their participation in formal and informal peace processes, in post-armed conflict efforts (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), as well as in contexts of post-war.

Through this work, we gain a global vision of the presence, and the efforts of women involved with all aspects of war; a presence and an effort that until now have been hidden under a discourse that revolves around the male experience of war. Concentrating on the experience of women opens up different dynamics of armed conflict, providing a more complex and more profound understanding of the phenomenon of war. This book makes clear that wars cannot be understood without understanding the gender dimension.

Book

***Lay Down Your Arms!*, de Bertha von Suttner**

Published in 1889, the novel *Lay Down Your Arms!* had a great impact at that time, reedited many times and translated to many languages, and soon became a reference book of the pacifist movement. Its author, Bertha von Suttner, Austrian novelist and

aristocrat, was a fervent defender of the pacifist cause and the first woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1905.

The novel is written in first person as a false memoir but, even though it is based on the personal experience of the author, it is definitely not an autobiographical novel. *Lay Down Your Arms!* is a historical novel written in a harsh realistic language – Suttner did a lot of research and documented herself extensively to write the novel, as she was strongly determined to reflect the true nature of war-, but it is also a love story, a novel of ideas and a learning through life story as well.

By adopting the form of a novel (fiction), Suttner was able to reach a wider range of audiences and thus be extensively read by her fellow contemporaries. Her intention on writing the novel is clear and she never hides it: "War is the negation of culture". Thus, the novel is, from page one, a clear allegation against war, militarism, nationalism and patriotic exaltation, and heroism and virility; and an outstanding defense of education and mediation institutions to solve conflicts.

It may not be a perfect novel. However, Bertha von Suttner masters language and has a very conscious use of vocabulary. The book is a classic, an essential novel to have a better understanding of the history of Europe, and an excellent means to get to know one of the pioneers of the pacifist cause.

Documentary
***Mariposas en el hierro*, de Bertha Gaztelumendi**

The butterflies Bertha Gaztelumendi presents to us are neither fragile nor volatile. They are strong women who have managed to face tough situations with courage, who have survived multiple types of violence which they have deeply reflected on, and who now firmly defend the need to build bridges and work for peace.

These are women who speak from personal experience, and bluntly, about different forms of violence against women in the Basque Country: from the most visible and high-profile to the types that go unnoticed. Thus they speak of the violence of ETA, the violence of GAL, and police and institutional violence, but also of gender-based violence or economic violence which can result, for example, in being evicted from your own

home. They also address the difficulties of other situations, such as emigration and exile, when experienced by women.

The documentary is a combination of subtle and intelligent visual metaphors, and very well thought-out intimate interviews, where delicate and deliberate reflections contrast with arduous backgrounds of fire and iron.

The documentary also takes us to more cheerful and dynamic settings like the local markets – places of exchange and dialogue – to illustrate how women of very different origins and ideas have met and joined forces to go beyond pain and to advocate in favor of reconciliation, justice and human rights.

We therefore recommend *Mariposas en el hierro* for all the paths of reflection it offers on the impact of violence on women and on their potential as peacebuilders; and also because of the author's distinctive, feminine and captivating perspective of the Basque Country.

1. Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325.

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TRIBUNA

Nicosia, the last divided capital in the world

Angelo Attanasio
Journalist

In the small hours of 30 December 1963, British General Peter Young took a green pencil and drew a line on the map of Nicosia, from one end of the city's ancient Venetian walls to the other. His aim was to stop the fighting between the two communities that in just one month had left over a hundred dead, most of them Turkish Cypriots, in the old streets of Nicosia. That thin green line — a provisional buffer zone of at most a dozen metres wide — would become the border that has divided the city between the Turkish Cypriot Lefkoşa in the north and the Greek Cypriot Lefkosia in the south for more than 50 years.

After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, this zone was extended to cross the entire island, becoming about 180 kilometres long. Between 5 and 20 August 1974, Turkish troops carried out the second part of their operation and occupied the northern part of the island. 180,000 people, a third of the Greek Cypriot population, were forced to leave their homes in Kyrenia, Famagosta and other occupied areas and go to the southern part. At the same time, some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the south of the island, in Greek hands, to the Turkish occupied north. In the end this double exodus would leave more than 4,000 people dead in the clashes. A further 494 Turkish Cypriots and 1,464 Greek Cypriots were forcibly disappeared. Their fate would not be known for years.

Today the old part of the city is a maze of cafes, tourist shops and gardens with palm trees. Only the high walls surrounded by barbed wire that rudely cut through the quiet streets remind us that those few square kilometres are one of the most militarised

borders areas in the world. 12,000 soldiers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, entrenched in dilapidated old sentry posts, control the southern part of the border. In front of them, more than 40,000 soldiers of the Turkish contingent do the same on the northern border. From the top of turrets flying the Turkish flag, they defend the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an entity whose international recognition is limited to Turkey itself.

“ A third of the population of either side have never crossed the border which divides Nicosia ”

In between, jealously watched by both armies, lies a narrow strip of broken paths and ruined houses. A few sun bleached shop signs are witness to the fact that this was the commercial heart of the city. It is now a no man’s land where the colourless monotony of the faded walls and the rusting metal is broken only by the blue of the UN peacekeepers’ helmets. Access to this Dead Zone is in fact the exclusive responsibility of the UN peacekeepers. The UNFICYP mission, a thousand soldiers deployed along the ceasefire line, has been renewed every six months since 1964 and has an annual cost of over 53 million Euros. The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described it in 2004 as the biggest failure of the United Nations.

The borders were hermetically sealed until 2003, when the then president of the TRNC, Rauf Denktash, decided to open a border post close to the Ledra Palace, the headquarters of the UN contingent. Over recent years another 8 checkpoints have been opened across the island, including one in Ledra Street, the main thoroughfare of the old town of Nicosia. However, according to a study by the research group “Conflict in Cities”, a third of the population of either side have never crossed the border, and most of those who have, have done so only once or twice.

Negotiations between Greek Cypriot politicians and representatives of the north have continued over decades. But they have consistently failed, often for trivial reasons. The memory remains from the 1980s when, in a break in one of their bilateral meetings, a

TRNC general asked for a Turkish coffee. His Greek Cypriot counterpart replied that that was impossible, they only had Greek coffee. The agreements they had reached were blown to bits. The same happened in 2004, when the majority of Greek Cypriots voted 'no' in the referendum on the Annan Plan, rejecting the former UN leader's proposal to establish a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic. Previously, 65% of Turkish Cypriots had voted in favour, but it was necessary for both communities to endorse it.

" Negotiations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot politicians have continued over decades; but they have consistently failed "

There are three main stumbling blocks which have always led to deadlock in the negotiations. The first is the status of the Anatolian immigrants who have moved to the north of the island, under the auspices of Turkey, over the last 40 years. The second concerns the military presence on the island. And finally the restitution of, or compensation for, properties that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots owned on the other side of the island, before they were displaced. This issue has been considered several times in the European Court of Human Rights.

In recent months negotiations have been resumed between the two presidents, Anastasiadis and Akıncı. On 10 September 2015, religious and political leaders came together for the first time to support peace in Cyprus. Various agreements have also been reached, such as the interconnection of the electricity networks between the two parts of the island; a higher degree of interoperability of mobile phones across the Green Line; reducing interference in radio frequencies; or the creation of a commission on gender equality, which comes on top of those that already exist for economy and culture. Despite these encouraging steps, analysts believe that the predictions of a completion of negotiations in January are excessively optimistic. They foresee, with all the political difficulties involved, a new referendum in March 2016. Furthermore, it seems more likely that the negotiating process will continue after the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Cyprus, which are expected for next May.

“A divided city is like a person who is missing an arm, a leg, an eye. There’s something missing”, I was told by Lellos Demetriades, who was mayor of the Greek Cypriot side of Nicosia for 30 years, until 2001, and one of the main promoters of reunification. “However — he added, looking out from the windows of his office, from where you can see across the whole city — I don’t think you can keep cities divided forever. Man is a social animal and this place is too small to have two capitals.”

Fotografia : Marco Ansaloni

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TRIBUNA

The consequences of political violence in the Basque Country

Pablo Aguiar
International Catalan Institute for Peace

Political violence has been present in the Basque Country for decades. Besides the violence exercised directly by the Franco regime, from 1968 onwards we must add the violence of ETA and later that of paramilitary organisations created under the auspices of the Spanish State. With more than a thousand dead, this has been the bloodiest violent political conflict within the Spanish State in the second half of the twentieth century and, if we broaden our field of vision to the whole of Western Europe, it is exceeded only by the political violence generated by the conflict in Northern Ireland, where there were more than three thousand deaths.

When we look at Euskadi, we find that the more than four decades of existence of the terrorist organisation have had a decisive influence on political debate. Besides the direct consequences for the victims, we must note other effects, not on specific individuals, but rather on the society as a whole. I would like at least to highlight three of these consequences:

1. Polarisation

The existence of a terrorist organisation generates a very profound political and social division. Violent actions, whether carried out by ETA or by state security forces and agencies, have provoked an inevitable social confrontation. Violence creates factions — you're either with me or against me — making it very difficult for those who don't clearly identify themselves with either side.

2. Restrictions on political participation

Some limitations were not imposed formally, but nonetheless are reflected in the Euskobarómetro[1]. Until 2009, with some ups and downs, more than 40% of the population of the Basque Country admitted to being "very or somewhat" afraid of participating actively in politics. Another fact: as recently as in the first decade of the 21st century, about 20% of the population stated that there was nobody or almost nobody with whom they spoke freely about politics. But the obstacles to political participation also took an official form, using the apparatus of the state. The Organic Law on Political Parties was adopted in 2002; it would later give legal coverage to the outlawing of Batasuna for not explicitly rejecting violence as a political tool. This illegalisation was not free of controversy and even Martin Scheinin[2] expressed concern about the wording of the law and the possibilities of abuse which it brought. Another flagrant case of the prohibition of the exercise of freedoms that should be respected by the democratic rule of law was that of the newspaper Egunkaria, closed by court order in 2003; seven years later, in April 2010, the High Court acquitted the defendants of all charges. To date, no declarations have been forthcoming on the matter from any representative of the central government.

3. The hijacking of debate

Given that the terrorist organisation promoted certain political aspirations — the independence of the Basque Country and the creation of a socialist state — these goals, especially the first, became taboo items on the Basque political agenda. Thus, the political and social forces opposed to independence resorted to accusing anyone who made proposals in favour of independence of colluding with terrorism. In practice this turned into a veto on one part of the political debate. More recently, given the growth of the independence movement in Catalonia, the question has arisen: why do we see this growth in Catalonia and not in Euskadi? In the last eight years the number of people in favour of independence in Catalonia has gone from just over 10% to around 50%. In the same period, in Euskadi, the desire for independence has been much more stable, from 32% to 25%. Some authors suggest that the prior existence of violence explains this difference.

“ Despite the efforts towards reconciliation, the consequences of violence (polarisation, the hijacking of debate, restrictions on political participation) have still not disappeared ”

Fortunately, with the 21st century there came important political and social changes that led to ETA announcing on 20 October 2011 “the definitive cessation of its armed activity”. It is not the aim of this article to examine the reasons that led to this decision, but rather to analyse its consequences. However, very schematically, I should point out some of these reasons: the model of an end to violence given by Northern Ireland, which had proved successful; the discrediting of political terrorism as a result of the emergence of nihilistic Islamist terrorism; the overcoming of the fear within society with respect to standing up to violence, from organised civil society (*Lokarri, Gesto por la Paz*) as well as from many kinds of artistic expressions; and finally, the growing awareness within the nationalist (“abertzale”) left that terrorist violence was not helping their goal of achieving Basque independence, but rather hindering it.

So far in Euskadi, some initiatives have been taken that could be seen as expressions of the principles of transitional justice: truth, justice and guarantees of non-repetition[3]. But despite the efforts to move ahead towards reconciliation, the consequences of violence (polarisation, the hijacking of debate, restrictions on political participation) have still not disappeared.

Overcoming social polarisation will require the passing of time — as Luciano Sandrin says, “Emotions (hate, anger and resentment) tend to become chronic and remain active even after the end of hostilities, coming to be part of a shared memory”[4] — but there also have to be clear and firm political decisions. So far, official initiatives on restoring peace have focused on the direct or indirect victims of violence, but all of society is in need of healing. There are issues such as the treatment of prisoners, on which divisions run very deep[5]. There are also issues that require more inclusive treatment, among which we could highlight: the recognition of all victims[6], and the

unequal way in which they are treated[7]; the development of an inclusive historical memory; the recognition of the suffering caused, on the part of *all* the actors who caused it. If these issues are not addressed, the road will be much longer and more tortuous.

“ The political will and courage to address transitional justice are lacking; without them, the consequences of political violence will not be overcome ”

Regarding full political participation, the Euskobarómetro shows that the fear of participation and concern about violence remain, but are weaker. However, challenges remain here too; the political parties law is still in force and, therefore, the concerns raised by the UN Special Rapporteur still apply.

With respect to the debates that were “frozen” by terrorism, grassroots initiatives like Gure Esku Dago (“It is in our hands”) defend the legitimacy of the right of citizens to decide their future and exercise their right to decide. Not surprisingly, the majority of the Basque political elite is not offering support or encouraging these initiatives. The existing political elite was politically socialised within the context of violence and it is possible that a new generation will be necessary in order to break the taboos and deal with debates that up till now have been blocked.

To conclude, there is a fundamental problem: Spain is one of the last states which, to quote Teresa Whitfield, had a transition without transitional justice, opting instead for amnesia. This operation of hiding everything that was swept under the carpet carries implications; we lack a culture of memory, a vital element in dealing with such processes.

We must be aware that the end of political violence in the Basque Country came less than five years ago. Overcoming that stage may take generations and it requires us to

address the issues of transitional justice. In recent decades there has been a flourishing of analysis and development of this type of justice — Euskadi itself has experts in establishing such mechanisms. There are tools that can be applied, relevant experiences, and people with the capacity to implement them. The only thing lacking is the political will and courage to address transitional justice. Until this is done, the consequences of political violence will continue to be present and will not be fully overcome.

1. The Euskobarómetro is a sociological statistical survey run by the Department of Political Science of the University of the Basque Country.

2. UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

3. The report Various Authors, (2014) "Victims of terrorism in the Basque Autonomous Community. Frustration and hope among indirect victims of murder" (In Spanish: "Víctimas del terrorismo residentes en la CAPV. Desazón y esperanza en víctimas indirectas de asesinatos"); the MemoryLab promoted jointly by the peace centre Bakeola, the Gernika Peace Museum, and Gernika Gogoratuz (the peace research centre "Remembering Gernika"); or the association Euskal Memoria Fundazioa (Basque Memory Foundation); to mention only a few examples.

4. Sandrin, L. (2014) "Perdón y Reconciliación" ("Forgiveness and Reconciliation"), PPC, Salamanca.

5. Concerning the reintegration of ETA prisoners, 50% of the population is in favour in all cases, 21% believe that reintegration should only be considered for those who don't have blood on their hands and 20% insist on their serving their entire sentence. Euskobarómetro.

6. The reports of the Directorate-General for the Support of Victims of Terrorism, on "Victims of human rights violations and unjust suffering produced in the context of politically motivated violence", point in this direction.

7. Until now, the Spanish state has only recognised one sole case of a victim of an act of terrorism carried out by the security forces. Thus, the party responsible for the attack (whether it is ETA or not) has been shown to be a decisive factor in obtaining recognition, and reparations, for victims of terrorism.

Fotografia : EAJ-PNV Andoain

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SOBRE L'ICIP

News, activities and publications about the ICIP

ICIP
International Catalan Institute for Peace

Joan Botam, 2015 ICIP Award

The Board of Governors of the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP), meeting in Barcelona, has decided to present the 2015 Peace in Progress Award to the Catalan priest and Capuchin friar Joan Botam i Casals, promoter of numerous initiatives linked to peace and ecumenism. Botam is one of the most important figures who introduced pacifism to Catalonia and a strong advocate of religion as a source of peace and dialogue.

Joan Botam (Les Borges Blanques, 1926) holds a doctorate in theology and is the founder of both the Víctor Seix Polemology Institute and the Ecumenical Center of Catalonia, of which he is currently president. His career linked to the pacifist movement begins in 1955, when he becomes chaplain of the religious movement Pax Christi. In 1963 he is elected vicar provincial of the Capuchins of Sarrià and, as such, he plays a key role in the events of the *Caputxinada*, the sit-in of students, intellectuals and artists in the Capuchin Convent in 1966. His intervention as vicar provincial was decisive in preventing the arrest of the demonstrators. More recently, Joan Botam represented Barcelona in the United Nations Millennium Summit of religious and spiritual leaders (2000) and was presented with the *Creu de Sant Jordi* Award (2010) for his contribution to interreligious dialogue and the promotion of peace, coexistence and understanding between cultures.

Interview with Joan Botam published in the Peace in Progress e-magazine, Number 24.

ICIP Latest publications

– *Ondas en el agua. Un análisis de la experiencia Glencree*, by Carlos Martin Beristain, Galo Bilbao and Julián Ibáñez de Opacua. Published by ICIP and Líniazero (in Spanish; pdf and ePub) .

– *L'autogovern de l'Índia*, by M.K.Gandhi. Published by ICIP and Angle Editorial (in Catalan).

– *Accountability, a new framework to assess the impact of truth comissions* , ICIP Working Paper by Carlos Fernández Torné.

Seminar 'From Past to Future: Memory and Transition Processes'

With the aim of providing a rigorous approach to various transitional processes that have occurred across much of the world since the end of the Second World War, ICIP and the Democratic Memorial are organizing an international colloquium entitled "From Past to Future: Memory and Transition Processes", with the participation of over twenty speakers.

The seminar will take place 30th November and 1st an 2nd December 2015 in Barcelona (Palau Centelles). Admission to the colloquium is free, but prior registration is required at activitats.icip@gencat.cat

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INTERVIEW

Interview with Luz Méndez, feminist and peacebuilder

Eugènia Riera
International Catalan Institute for Peace

Luz Méndez***, feminist and peacebuilder***

Luz Méndez is a Guatemalan feminist, an activist for women's rights and a peacebuilder. She was the only woman who participated in her country's peace negotiations in the 1990s, and her voice was crucial in ensuring that peace agreements included a gender perspective. Two decades later, she continues defending the political participation of women and fighting for states to take UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security seriously. Because peace cannot be built without listening to women.

Feminist organizations offer a bittersweet account of Resolution 1325. Its very existence is a success, but its implementation and acceptance is not living up to its expectations. To what extent is 1325 useful?

We must recognize the value of the resolution, since it provides us with elements that strengthen the struggle for peace and security. But, on the other hand, in the case of Latin America, 1325 is not very well known, either by states or by civil society. And that is one of our main challenges: dissemination. Furthermore, to achieve the best results in terms of its implementation, we must expand the concepts of peace and security to make them commensurate with the context of our region.

In what way?

In Latin America, most of the armed conflicts that arose in the decade of the 70s have ended – with the exception of Colombia, where there is a peace process underway that

will soon conclude. However, we are experiencing a process of increasing violence that affects society as a whole, and women in particular. In recent years, state and non-state actors that generate violence and insecurity for the sole purpose of accumulating capital illegally have emerged. We live in a new war context, characterized by militarization and the growth of organized crime, deriving from the trafficking of drugs, human beings and light weapons. This is a serious problem that affects the region. And that is why the concept of what constitutes a conflict, what constitutes peace and what constitutes security must be expanded in order to adapt the content of the resolution to the local reality.

Would women then be more likely to identify with it?

Yes. There is a lot of violence in our countries driven by transnational corporations in extractive industries, which generates great violence against women and their communities. These women should feel protected by Resolution 1325 because they are defending peace and security in their communities. They are peacebuilders, just like the women who struggle for justice and memory, and they should be seen and recognized as such. In this way we could contribute to a greater dissemination and implementation of the resolution. It is also essential that governments do their part by moving forward in the formulation of national action plans. In Latin America, only Chile and Paraguay have approved these plans.

“ In Latin America we live in a new war context characterized by militarization and that is why we should expand the concepts of peace and security ”

Are the lack of political will and the lack of funding the main obstacles to the implementation of 1325?

Yes, both are definitely serious obstacles. Because it is ultimately the governments who are mainly responsible for the implementation of the resolution and that is where work needs to be done. UN member states should show greater political will through concrete actions and policies. And funding should be increased. Coinciding with the presentation of the Global Study on implementation of 1325, several countries have pledged to increase funding. However, we don't want these funds to go towards more weapons and militarization, but rather to more empowerment of women and more investment in economic and social development.

In fact, under the pretext of Resolution 1325, some governments have decided to simply increase the presence of women in the security forces. However, this militaristic use was not the spirit of the resolution…

Interpretations of this type contravene the main essence of the resolution. 1325 was conceived as a tool of women's human rights and not as a mechanism to increase armed and police forces. Of course there should be gender balance in all areas of decision-making, not only in the armed forces and UN peacekeeping missions, but also in political participation at the national level. The tendency to think that 1325 is about more women in the armed forces and in peacekeeping missions is very worrisome.

“ The tendency to think that 1325 is about more women in the armed forces and in peacekeeping missions is very worrisome ”

The data on women's participation at peace negotiation tables (9%) are not encouraging either, despite the fact that, according to a UN report, the presence of women considerably increases the probability of a stable agreement. What do you attribute this contradiction to?

First of all, this is a result of the patriarchal system. Women are underrepresented in all areas of policymaking, such as peace negotiations. This is the main obstacle to be overcome. All actors involved in peace tables, particularly the international community,

should make an effort to ensure that women are incorporated in negotiations so that peace agreements have a gender perspective. I am convinced, based on my own participation in the peace negotiations in Guatemala (1991-1996), that, had it not been for the presence and capacity of influence of women, commitments related to the situation of women would not have been incorporated in the peace agreements. And that was also the lesson I drew when I participated in peace negotiations in Burundi as part of the team of experts in gender. At the end of the process, when the incorporation of the presence of women was achieved, it became possible to include commitments related to their empowerment and gender equality. It is absolutely essential to ensure the participation of women, not only their presence, but also the quality of their influence.

In the negotiations in Colombia and the Philippines women have been incorporated. Is that an chievement of 1325?

1325 has undoubtedly been a factor. In the case of Colombia, international actors who are involved in the negotiation process know the resolution and support it. And, most importantly, 1325 has empowered women. In the Philippines, too, there is a women's movement that has used the resolution decidedly.

" Women are underrepresented in all areas of policymaking. This is the main obstacle to be overcome "

Should more mechanisms of control and accountability exist with respect to the implementation of 1325?

That's right. It is necessary for UN member states to be accountable to the citizenry and to the Security Council on the actual implementation. But I also think that we do not need more nice stirring speeches in UN debates; what we need are mechanisms to know exactly what each country is doing in favor of the implementation of the resolution.

Should women's organizations themselves increase pressure on states?

Yes, and to do so it is necessary to strengthen our alliances worldwide. We must remember that the resolution is precisely the result of this ability to forge alliances, the political will of women's movements internationally. We must unite more, not only women's movements but also other types of institutions including, for example, academic institutions.

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