EDITORIAL

Constructing peace - the agenda for the present and future

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The ancient Greeks placed a great deal of emphasis on managing their social lives and therefore when dealing with conflicts, on finding the right opportunity, the *kairós*. Encountering the right moment, the *kairós*, is essential when making peace, resolving conflicts, and transforming social and international relations. When an opportunity arises that is compatible with the coordinated desires of individuals and institutions it is easier to achieve success. The fact of the matter is that at the end of 2011, working to construct peace is both an obligation and an opportunity: there is a *kairós*. This explains why the central topic of this issue of *Peace in Progress* is the post-conflict reconstruction process in Côte d'Ivoire. When looking at this case, we would also like to highlight the importance of a generic analysis of the model that emerged in the late 1990s at the United Nations - the so-called liberal peacebuilding consensus. The reasons for this are as follows.

First, November 28th was the first anniversary of the second round of presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire - elections that led to disputes over the results between the two candidates and between the institutions mandated to certify and proclaim the winner. This created tensions and led to a situation of dual power, many rounds of negotiations with incentives and coercive measures, the proliferation of armed conflicts, and eventually human rights violations and war (in Abidjan and in some areas in the west of the country in particular). The crisis was not resolved until April, with the use of force by the international forces deployed under the terms of a United Nations mandate. Today, half a year into the new government's term of office, it is time for legislative elections and above all, for the agenda of the construction of peace and development to play a central role.

Second, various events in recent months have placed the importance of good planning of the post-war reconstruction processes at the top of the agenda. These are structured in four areas: a) consolidating the end of the violence; b) rebuilding everything that the violent conflict has destroyed - in both material terms and otherwise; c) resolving the reasons for the conflict in a manner that is long-lasting and acceptable to the parties involved; and d) reconciling the opposing parties - a task that entails building a plural narrative of memory, imparting justice, and repairing policies oriented towards managing the past to enable a better future. This will be an important issue in Yemen and Syria, but the most obvious case is Libya, where the construction of peace agenda is enormous and a source of some concern, as there have been some very worrying signs since the end of the fighting, such as the summary execution of Gaddafi. By contrast, the Ivorian government decided to hand over ex-President Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, in a case in which it is worth following developments very closely.

Third, it is important to focus on the construction of peace because 2012 will be 20th anniversary year of the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*, the report by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, which established the idea of peace building and gave birth to the liberal consensus on peace. Twenty years later, with less optimism and none of the euphoria that the end of the Cold War created in terms of the goal of peace and security, it is necessary to take stock of and constructively review almost the entire concept. Indeed, this will be one of the key areas of the ICIP's activities in 2012.

However, complaining is pointless; it is necessary to take advantage of the *kairós*. An opportunity arises when things do not go as planned, and when the unlikely happens. In the words of the scientist Jorge Wagensberg, if it were not for "the occurrence of improbable events, we would be still bacteria today." Improbable events often happen during the construction of peace, route maps are torn up and it is necessary to resort to DIY.

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IN DEPTH

INTRODUCTION

One year after the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire: turn the page or repeat the mistakes?

Albert Caramés
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A year after the presidential elections, Côte d'Ivoire once again faces elections, in which the representatives in the country's National Assembly will be chosen. If someone who has not followed the news from this African country reads the last few sentences, they would give the impression of relative stability. However, going into details about the last few months involves a thorough analysis of the causes (short-term and long-term) and the developments in the post-election crisis (with 3,000 deaths and more than half a million displaced people) and the challenges for the present and future: reform towards a democratic and civilian control of the security system, the functioning of a representative chamber by holding the legislative elections mentioned above, and the establishment of foundations for a better and stronger social cohesion by means of a process of reconciliation, among others.

For this reason, this issue of *Per la Pau / Peace in Progress* aims to highlight this reflection on the causes of the turbulent situation that Côte d'Ivoire has experienced, and the prospects for avoiding a repetition of it. In more specific terms, the causes of the post-election crisis (Gilles Yabi), the role of the AU's mediation (Neus Ramis) and the challenges involved in reforming the armed forces (Azoumana Ouattara) and the new government of Alassane Ouattara (Rafael Grasa) are the subjects chosen for this reflection, although there are many more possible subjects for discussion, such as the humanitarian situation and the political outlook, among many others. As a complement, this issue also includes an interview with Sophie da Camara, director of the Division of the Security Sector Reform Division (RSS) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the United Nations Mission in the country (UNOCI) and a list of sources providing further information on the situation.

CENTRAL ARTICLES

The causes of the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire

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West Africa Project Director of the International Crisis Group

On 27 November 2010, there was nothing to suggest Côte d'Ivoire was drifting towards a bloody conflict lasting five months, which will be recorded in the annals as "the post-election crisis." It was the eve of the second round of presidential elections and in Abidjan, the largest Ivorian city and the seat of political power, the atmosphere was surreal; so much so that it was hard to believe that the elections announced five years previously were finally taking place. The week had seen the final rallies in the campaign, while there had been an unprecedented debate, broadcast on radio and television, between the two candidates who had obtained enough votes from the first round of voting (held on on 31 October 2010): the acting president, Laurent Gbagbo, and the former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. The good-natured debate had to some extent put Ivorians' minds at rest as they made an effort to believe that the presidential elections, which had been organized after eight years of political-military crisis, would lead to peace. Nonetheless, they all knew that the campaign had become more aggressive between the two rounds of voting, and that militia groups had reappeared in various parts of the country, which suggested that the post-electoral scenarios would not be peaceful.

Why did everything go wrong? Why did the long process of armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire lead to a post-election crisis? (The epilogue to the story took place on 11 April 2011 with the arrest, broadcast on the mass media, of the former President Gbagbo, who is currently waiting trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.) First, because the presidential elections were held in a country where the occupant of the presidential palace has unlimited access to the State's material and coercive resources. This meant that there was a great deal more at stake than usual: for those who had been accustomed to holding power for years - ten years in the case of President Gbagbo - holding onto it was essential. More than his individual interests were at stake – his election was the key to the physical and material welfare in the following years of his family, clan and political, civil and military supporters. The temptation to hold on to presidential power, whatever the outcome of the vote (which is what is supposed to be decisive in a democratic system), became stronger as his prospects for re-election became more uncertain.

Laurent Gbagbo had come to power in October 2000 after an election that had excluded all the influential political players, except for the coup leader General Robert Guéi. Gbagbo was one of three main leaders at that time, but his victory in 2000 was primarily the result of a remarkable ability to take advantage of an exceptional convergence of political circumstances. In 2010, with the usual advantages of an incumbent candidate, it was possible for him to win, but in objective terms he had little more chance of success than his two main opponents, Alassane Ouattara and former President Henri Konan Bédié. Laurent Gbagbo obtained 38% of the votes in the first round on October 31, against Ouattara (32%) and Bédié (25%). However, faced with the political alliance that his two opponents created before the election, the outgoing president was undoubtedly hopeful of winning the second round, but was no longer the favourite. For some of those who for years had linhked their destiny to Gbagbo continuing as president, it had become imperative to win at any cost, even if their candidate was defeated at the polls.

Part of the problem in avoiding a violent post-election crisis lay in the fact that the presidential elections were by no means usual. The election campaign was the last stage in a peace process in a country which had been divided in two since September 2002, after the armed rebellion by the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro, who became prime minister in 2007 thanks to a peace agreement with Laurent Gbagbo. This agreement acknowledged the existence of two armed forces that had previously been in conflict, but had no alternative other than reunification; the two armies participated with the United Nations peace mission in the security process surrounding the presidential election. In this context, the electoral *coup d'etat* carried out by the president after his defeat in the second round was in all probability triggered by an armed conflict between the "loyalist" forces and the former rebel forces. This scenario is even more likely if we consider that the candidate who won at the polls, Alassane Ouattara, was known for his links to the Forces Nouvelles since 2002.

When he was proclaimed president by a constitutional council that had annulled 600,000 votes cast in the north of the country - the home region of most of the ex-rebels and the candidate Ouattara - Gbagbo's camp knew that they were returning the country to an armed conflict. Could the postponement of the presidential elections of 2010 have prevented a post-election conflict? We will never know, although if we consider the psychology of those involved and the passionate nature of Ivorian political rivalries, the answer is probably negative. However, better anticipation of the types and locations of the worst violence would have made it possible to limit the human cost of the conflict.

The intervention of the AU in the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire

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The revitalization of the African Union (AU)[1] has led to the emergence of a regulatory system of peace and security which aims to reduce violence on the continent[2]. The appearance of this institutional architecture is the result of the African community's need to solve its own problems without relying on external decisions. This article discusses the construction of peace promoted by the AU in a complex and multidimensional situation like the recent post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (November 2010-May 2011).

The Ivorian crisis was a major challenge for African Union in three ways: (1) in terms of the design of formulas for types forms of intervention and mediation, (2) in terms of the ability of the AU to maintain pan-African ideological unity vis-a-vis the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (3) and finally, due to the complexity of the domestic situation in terms of both the deterioration in civil security and the availability and willingness of the parties involved to participate in any mediation. It is also a great opportunity for it to demonstrate its credibility in defending the principles that underpin the newly created "African Charter on Democracy, elections and governance"[3]. However, the use of armed force was ultimately the decisive factor in ending the conflict, with dialogue playing a secondary role.

1. Intervention and mediation

The AU launched the mediation process on 5 December 2010, and from the beginning, asserted its recognition of Alassane Ouattara as the winner of the final round of elections held in Cote d'Ivoire, as did the United Nations. That statement was initially criticized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and within the AU due to its possible impact on the mediation process in terms of neutrality.

The AU began to initiate contacts and mediation between the parties involved - albeit with few significant results - through a controversial mission led by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki[4]. Another joint mission venture was led by the AU Chairperson Jean Ping, and the President of ECOWAS, James Victor Gbeho[5]. It was not until last February that the interventions by the pan-African organization intensified. The Peace and Security Council established a panel of experts to resolve the crisis, which was adopting alarming dimensions. The panel, chaired by the Mauritanian head of state, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, consisted of the presidents of Chad, South Africa, Tanzania and Burkina Faso. The conclusions of the report produced by the Panel were: (1) support for a national unity government headed by Alassane Ouattara; (2) a guarantee for a dignified exit for the defeated candidate Laurent Gbagbo; (3) disarmament of the ex-rebels and the restructuring of the army; (4) the restructuring of the Independent Electoral Council (IEC) and the Constitutional Council and (5) the creation of an independent commission of "Truth, Justice and Reconciliation."

The mediation ended with the report issued by the Panel on March 10 at the extraordinary meeting of the AU to discuss the case of Cote d'Ivoire[6], at which the parties were urged to comply with the recommendations mentioned above within a limited time-frame, in order to achieve a peaceful solution to the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. It was not until May that the Constitutional Council proclaimed Alassane Ouattara president of the republic, after allegedly taking into consideration the recommendations of the AU.

2. Pan-African ideological unity over the case of Cote d'Ivoire

As regards the second aspect of the Pan-African mediation, the Ivorian crisis led to the collapse of the exemplary African unity among its member states and as a consequence highlighted the limited authority of the organization and the ideological complexity inherent in it. Contradictory voices were heard among heads of state, making it difficult for the AU to take decisions. For example, the president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, made some statements with content that differed from the resolutions of the ECOWAS and the AU. Elsewhere, the president of Chad, Idriss Deby, surprisingly declared his sympathy for the position of Laurent Gbagbo, while the latter capitalized on this type of criticism. Using anti-imperialist arguments, Gbagbo was trying to win the hearts and minds of some leaders of the AU, thereby creating confusion about the AU's ability to manage and resolve the crisis.

3. The domestic complexity of the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire

On this point, some authors believe that the Ivorian post-election crisis may be remembered as one of the most complex cases on the African continent over the past decade.[7] The likelihood of compliance with the decisions of the AU decreased as the scale of the humanitarian disaster increased, the role of the United Nations in managing the conflict became more extensive (due in part to Gbagbo's accusations against the international intervention) and the willingness of the parties involved to make concessions when negotiating had reached a dead end. As mentioned above, it was not until the armed intervention that compliance with the recommendations of the AU was announced. The degree of success of the promotion of dialogue as a methodology for resolving the conflict in this particular case was therefore somewhat limited.

In conclusion, some of the lessons learnt by the AU from the Ivorian crisis were the organization's limited influence in the resolution of conflicts; the need to work towards finding ways to consolidate the commitments of the peace agreements; the relevance of establishing more African conflict prevention mechanisms; and finally, the use of dialogue as a means towards understanding and consensus within the AU, in order to reach fair agreements that benefit the majority.

1. African Union. "Constitutive Act of the AU." Lomé, Juliol, 2000. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm

2. African Union. "Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union." http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf

3. Union Africaine. "Charte Africaine de la Démocratie, des elections et de la gouvernance". Addis Abeba, 30 January, 2007. http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_Conventions_fr/Charte%20africaine%20de%20la%20Democratie.pdf

4. 5 December, 2010. For more information on the report by Thabo Mbeki on Côte d'Ivoire for the AU: "Le rapport de M.Thabo Mbeki sur sa mediation en Côte d'Ivoire a la suite des elections" http://www.interwatch.org/rapports/rapport_tabo_mbeki.pdf (9 October, 2011).

5. 16 December, 2010 and 3 January, 2011.

6. African Union." Communiqué of the 265th meeting of the Peace and Security Council" 10 of march, 2011, Addis Abeba (Etiòpia). Online: http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/sites/default/files/2011_mar_10_psc_265theeting_cotedivoire_communique_en.pdf (9 October, 2011).

7. Institut for Security Studies. "Cote d'Ivoire: AU at the crossroads. Will the AU meeting finally resolve the Ivorian political stand-off?. Daily Briefing, 11 March 2011. Online: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/11March2011.pdf (9 October, 2011), p.3.

The challenges and agenda for the Ivorian government

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A year ago, Côte d'Ivoire held its second round of presidential elections. The dispute over which candidate won led to a military confrontation in which armed factions supported two self-proclaimed presidents. The end of the armed phase of the crisis came with the arrest of former President Laurent Gbagbo and the inauguration of Alassane Ouattara, a little less than 7 months ago. Although it is too soon to undertake an in-depth analysis of the event, we will review the challenges and the agenda of Ouattara's government, based on his statements (such as his speech to UNESCO on 26 October) and the legacy of the structural factors of the Ivorian crisis and conflict.

Outtara's new executive faced an extremely complex situation, which means that our initial assessment is positive: although there have been no significant positive results, there have been no negative ones so far, at least in terms of important aspects of governability.

There were three initial challenges to consolidate the situation in the short term and to begin peaceful construction of the country. The first was to form a real government of unity, with the added difficulty of the enormous polarization of attitudes and positions during the situation of dual power. Even those surrounding the President held different positions and interests: Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the *Forces Nouvelles* (which emrged from the merger of three former armed groups in 2002) and the *Partie Démocratique pour la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI, led by former President Henri Konan Bédié, who played a decisive role in the election result by supporting Ouattara in the second round).

Second, there was the issue of security. Despite the international arms embargo, the end of the crisis led to the detection of many armed groups and a proliferation of weapons. Furthermore, as a result of the failure to comply with the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement as regards demobilization and reintegration, which was extremely limited before the elections, the restructuring and reestablishment of the armed forces has become essential. The UN Security Council saw it in those terms, and included external support to reformulate the national defense and security policy in Resolution 2000, by means of a highly comprehensive strategy for the reform of the security sector.

Third, there is the application of mechanisms of justice in transition periods, i.e. dealing with peace, but also with reconciliation, justice and truth. In this respect, Ouattara announced the creation of a Commission for Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation. Many Ivorians, regardless of their political sympathies, want a peaceful climate and to ascertain the truth, but the difficulties involved in dealing with these issues require appropriate responses to some questions: the Commission's composition, its mandate and its operational capacity on the ground, as well as its collaboration with the International Criminal Court, which is a very sensitive issue. There are also two additional factors to be taken into account: a) the decisions on how to combine truth, justice, reparation and forgiveness, which will define work and the mandate and work of the Commission and especially the application of its results; and b) the future of President Gbagbo and his associates, who are still awaiting trial. So far, one of the problems has been solved with the Ivorian government's decision to hand over Gbagbo to the Court in The Hague on charges of crimes against humanity.

However, in addition to dealing with the most immediate challenges in order to begin a process of transformation from a fragile state of negative peace (the absence of direct violence) towards the early stages of positive peace (peace building), reforms of structural elements are necessary. In specific terms, we will refer to four aspects which are often forgotten.

First, the replacement of the neocolonial development model that despite being initially successful produced a great deal of corruption. Second, the change and democratization of the highly presidential political system, lacking countervailing powers, with limited decentralisation or ability to resolve impose harmony on disputes. Third, the gradual deterioration in the educational system, and particularly of higher education. Fourth, prioritization of the struggle for transparency and the fight against corruption, which also involves remedying some recent reforms that have had undesirable effects, creating new and worse forms of opacity, such as the replacement of the traditional systems in the cocoa market, encouraged by the World Bank.

The list of items on the agenda and challenges does not end there. It is also necessary to address the most well-known structural challenges - those which accelerated the decline in the situation and the conflicts of 2002: national identity, agrarian reform and the legislation which follows from it, the deployment of the state in the north of the country, the reform of the security sector and modernization of the state apparatus, and finally, the development and implementation of public policies for youth as regards education and employment. These are all enormous and very important challenges, in which the construction of peace and development are inextricably linked.

Finally, a long-term task warrants special mention: the gradual construction of a shared and agreed narrative concerning the past, present and future of the country, the result of the analysis of the underlying causes of the conflict and the outlook for peace in the medium term. Placing the issue on the government's agenda (Côte d'Ivoire Horizon 2020, in the words of President Ouattara) is not enough. It will be necessary to work over at least the next three decades and involve all parties, civil society, business and market forces and of course the political forces.

Doing so is a necessary but not sufficient condition to make the final verse of Tikeh Jah Fakoly's famous song a reality: "*Ma Côte d'Ivoire je ne veux plus te voir en larmes. Ma Côte d'Ivoire, je ne veux plus te voir prendre les armes*".

Rebuilding the army of Côte d'Ivoire: problems and prospects

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University of Bouaké

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement signed in March 2007 relaunched the disarmament and reunification process of the Côte d'Ivoire Security and Defence Forces (FDS) and the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), which had been fighting each other since 2002.

On 17 March 2011, President Allassane Ouattara signed a decree ordering the unification of the Côte d'Ivoire Security and Defence Forces (FDS) and the Forces Nouvelles (FN): "Under the terms of the Ouagadougou Agreement, and in order to end all the conflict, I have just signed a decree that creates the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire." In fact, it was a *de facto* integration of the FAFN in the state security apparatus, holding out the olive branch to the FDS so that they could swear loyalty to the newly elected president, and establishing the framework for a future reunification of the armed forces in conflict. Indeed, the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) was created as a framework to unify the two armies. The problem lies in the fact that instead of having a unified army, only the FAFN have been integrated into this structure, while the FDS have mostly adopted an attitude of wait and see. The military, police and gendarmes have remained more or less to one side; there has been no fraternization.

The most important point to note is that despite the Ouagadougou agreements, disarmament has never been implemented. Indeed, the electoral and post-electoral pressures have led to an exponential increase in the stocks of weapons, which are now a threat to subregional security. The reconstruction of the security sector has become more complex in this case. The creation of the FRCI is still a long way from having solved the political and military problem of reunification of previously warring armies. It is no coincidence that the Republican Forces are still thought of as the northern army and receive nicknames like "*the Frères Cissé*".[1]

The name of the new army is still a problem in itself: since the FDS were considered Gbagbo's army, does that mean that the FRCI are the army of President Ouattara? Now that the Houphouëtistes in power, are they not interested in reviving the name FANCI (National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire) to try and build a republican army of development?

The most difficult problems to solve are not those related to the redefinition of the format, the missions and the weapons of the unified army. Instead, they are related to the creation of a new Ivorian soldier, free of blackmail, the ethnification of weapons and the politicization of military behavior. Today's forces are a long way from establishing a republican relationship with the populations that have suffered from the military violence. In some ways, the reconstruction needs to provide the unified army with values.

Partisan struggles for control of coercive structures have led to permanent repeal of the regulations on recruitment, training, promotions and appointments. In addition, the Ivorian army is in crisis because it does not know what to do with the vast amount of young recruits who have joined as a result of the successive crises, to the point that the number of army troops has increased to 50,000 men in a decade, as well as the 10,000 men in the FAFN. The heterogeneity of recruits is now a problem for cohesion and discipline. It is necessary to resolve the difficulties inherent in the relationship between the army on the one hand and citizens on the other. The new government was right to make a priority of the "people's expectations as regards defence."

1. Translator's note: "Cissé Brothers" is a term that comes from the French abbreviation for FRCI ("FR" - "Frères" and "CI" - "Cisse") and is used as a term of ridicule for these forces, either because it evokes the name of a family business, rather than a national institution, or because Cissé is a very common surname in the north, and not the south.

FINDING OUT MORE

Materials produced by Mari Luz Arranz, Blai Carandell and Jone Lauzurika.

On the occasion of the round table discussion *Where next for Côte d'Ivoire?*" organized by the ICIP in April 2011, we produced a collection of resources (http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/icip/menuitem.1e60a3319fb52d7556159f10b0c0e1a0/?vgnextoid=08347cb11456b210VgnVCM1000000b0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=08347cb11456b210VgnVCM1000000b0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default) for analyzing the conflict and political situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

We now offer three types of resources, all of which have been updated:
First, a dossier of resources - Ivorian websites, publications and reports from various NGOs and international organizations.
Second, a timeline that includes the most important parties involved and events that have shaped the country's history since its independence, and which are related to the gestation and subsequent developments of the Ivorian conflict.
Finally, we provide an electoral map that reflects the disparity between the results presented by the Constitutional Council and the Electoral Commission.

RESOURCES DOSSIER

Reports and articles by various international institutions, think tanks and NGOs
- USIP: "Côte d'Ivoire's Political Stalemate: A Symptom of Africa's Weak Electoral Institutions" (http://www.usip.org/publications/c-te-d-ivoire-s-political-stalemate-symptom-africa-s-weak-electoral-institutions) . February 2011.
- International Crisis Group (ICG): Report no. 171, "Côte d´Ivoire: Is War the Only Option? " (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/171-cote-divoire-is-war-the-only-option.aspx). March de 2011.
- Recommendations of the ICG: "A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte d'Ivoire" (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/176-a-critical-period-for-ensuring-stability-in-cote-divoire%20.aspx).   Africa Report Nº176. August 2011.
- Press release from the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (ICC) (http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC_CI_Investigation_Opening_CICC_Media_advisory_Aug2011__3_sp.pdf) announcing that the International Criminal Court authorized an investigation into the post-election violence of 2010. October 2011.
- Human Rights Watch: "Ils les ont tués comme si de rien n´etait" Le besoin de justice pour les crimes post-électoraux en Côte d´Ivoire" (http://www.hrw.org/fr/reports/2011/10/04/ils-les-ont-tu-s-comme-si-de-rien-n-tait). October 2011.
- Amnesty International: "We want to go home, but we can't ": Côte d´Ivoire´s continuing crisi of displacement and insecurity" (http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/info/AFR31/007/2011/en). July 2011.
- Institution for Labour and Social Research: "Child Labour and Cocoa Production in West Africa" (http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/522/522.pdf). FAFO Report of 2006 on child exploitation in cocoa production in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

Academic articles and monographs on Côte d'Ivoire
- Akindès, F. (ed.) (2011). *Côte d'Ivoire: la réinvention de soi dans la violence*. Dakar: Codesria.
- Bamba, A. (2011). At the Edge of the Modern? Diplomacy, Public Relations, and Media Practices During Houphouët-Boigny's 1962 Visit to the United States. *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* 22 (2), 219-238.
- McGovern, M. (2011). *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*. London: Hurst & Comany.
- Mitchell, M. I. (2011). Insights from the Cocoa Regions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana: Rethinking the Migration-Conflict Nexus. *African Studies Review*. 54(2), 123-144.
- Tavares, R. (2011). The Participation of SADC and ECOWAS in Military Operations: The Weight of National Interests. *African Studies Review*, 54 (2), 145-177.

Audiovisual materials on Côte d'Ivoire
Video (http://www.un.org/es/multimedia/video/video43.html) produced by the United Nations on the situation of Ivorian refugees in Guinea (in Spanish).

Documentaries:
- *Le crime invisible* (2011), by Estelle Higonnet and Raynald Lellouche.
  A documentary on the cases of sexual violence taking place in Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2007.
- *The dark side of chocolate* (2011), by Roberto Romano and Miki Mistrati. 46'
  A group of journalists investigates how human trafficking and child exploitation in Côte d'Ivoire sustains the world's cocoa industry.
- *Chroniques de guerre en Côte d'Ivoire* (2008), by Philippe Lacôte. 52'
  The director of the documentary films the neighbourhood where he grew up during the first two weeks of war in Côte d'Ivoire after the outbreak of violence in September 2002.
- *Shadow Work* (2008), by Nigel Walker. 52'
  A documentary portraying Charles Ble Goudé, the man behind the political violence that took place during the presidency of Laurent Gbagbo.

TIMELINE OF THE CONFLICT

1842: France imposes a protectorate over Côte d'Ivoire.

1893: Côte d'Ivoire becomes a French colony.

1944: Félix Houphouët-Boigny founds a union of African farmers, from which the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the organisation in the fight for independence, emerges.

1960: Independence. A presidential and theoretically multiparty system is established.

1960 - 1990: One-party government under the presidency of Houphouët-Boigny. After a period of economic prosperity and political stability that led the country to be described as the "African miracle," the economic crisis in the mid-1980s leads to demands for increased democracy. The Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and the Union of Democratic Republicans (RDR) are established as underground movements.

1990: Legalization of opposition parties and the first multiparty presidential elections. Houphouët-Boigny wins, and appoints Alassane Dramane Ouattara as prime minister.

1993: Houphouët-Boigny dies. His close collaborator, Henri Konan Bédié, becomes president. He introduces the policy of *ivoirité*, the origin of the North-South divide. This policy includes laws discriminating against people originating in the north of the country (mostly Muslims speaking the Diola language), who are considered foreigners.

1995: Bédié is re-elected in an election boycotted by the opposition parties in protest at the amendment to Article 35 of the Constitution, establishing the need to prove the Ivorian nationality of candidates' parents. Bédié thereby neutralizes his main rival Ouattara.

1999: Coup d'etat led by General Robert Guéï. The laws that act as the basis for *ivoirité* are not repealed.

2000: Guéï proclaims himself winner of the presidential elections, but a popular uprising forces him to flee. The FPI candidate Laurent Gbabgo is proclaimed president.

Violence breaks out between Gbagbo's followers, who are mostly southern Christians, and northern Muslims supporting Ouattara (RDR).

2002: Failed coup attempt led by the northern-based armed group Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI).

The MPCI effectively takes control of the north. The North-South divide in the country is institutionalized by the creation of the security zone patrolled by UN forces, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and French Force Licorne troops.

Robert Guéï is killed in mysterious circumstances. His death leads to the emergence of armed groups in the west that merge with the MPCI under the name *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) under the command of General Guillaume Soro.

2003: The Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement is signed by all parties to the conflict. The main points of the agreement are:
- The country's indivisibility
- Creation of a national unity government with representation for the armed groups
- Seelection of a consensus-backed prime minister
- Preparation for elections
- Demobilization of combatants
- Creation of new forces including members of the *Forces Nouvelles*

2004: Violence breaks out between the FN, the government and the international forces as a result of the failure to implement the agreement.

2005 - 2006: As a result of the tensions, the elections are postponed twice (2005 and 2006).

2007: The Ouagadougou political agreement establishes the first direct dialogue between the Government and the FN. Gbagbo and Soro sign the peace agreement.

2007-2009: The elections are postponed once again. Gbagbo remains in power.

2010: There is no clear winner in the presidential elections. The runoff leads to a major political crisis and further violence.

The electoral commission declares Ouattara the victor, with 54% of the vote. The pro-Gbagbo Constitutional Council alleges fraud and declares Gbagbo the winner. Violence breaks out again.

The international community (UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS) recognizes Ouattara as the legitimate winner.

2011/02: The UN forces warn that the violence is reaching levels similar to the civil war.

2011/04:	Ouattara's forces capture Gbagbo.	
2011/05:	Alassane Ouattara begins his presidential term.	
2011/09:	The Truth, Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission is established in order to restore national unity after the post-election violence, which causes around 3,000 deaths and displaces 500,000 people.	
2011/11:	The Ivorian authorities hand over ex-president Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court in The Hague to be tried for crimes against humanity.	

ELECTORAL DIVISION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The map below shows the results of the 2010 presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire. It permits comparison of the results given by the *Conseil Constitutionnel* and by the *Commission Electorale Indépendante* (which were endorsed by the United Nations, in its certification role, as well as by the international community).
Despite the similarities, except for a discrepancy in just one region, the *Conseil Constitutionnel* declared 7 departments null (marked in red), which led Laurent Gbagbo to claim victory, in breach of Article 64 of the Ivorian Electoral Code, which states that the provisional results of the elections must be endorsed or new elections must be called within 45 days.

N.B.: The data used for this map come from the newspaper "Abidjan" (www.abidjan.net) and the newspaper "Thet Economist" (www.economist.com).

RDR(+ 70%)

RDR (- 70%)

FPI (+ 70%)

FPI (- 70%)

Departments cancelled by the *Conseil Constitutionnel*

RDR: *Rassemblement des Républicains*, Alassane Ouattara's party

FPI: *Front Populaire Ivoirien*, Laurent Gbagbo's party

	Conseil Constitutionnel		Commission Électorale Indépendante	
	51,45%	48,55%	45,90%	54,10%
Region	**By regions**			
	FPI	**RDR**	**FPI**	**RDR**
Denguélé	2,16	97,84	2,16	97,84
Savane	6,45	93,55	6,45	93,55
Bafing	17,13	82,87	17,13	82,87
Worodogou	5,30	94,70	5,30	94,70
Vallée de Bandama	14,60	85,40	14,60	85,40
Lacs	19,65	80,35	19,65	80,35
N'zi Comoé	36,60	63,40	36,6	63,40
Zanzan	47,06	52,49	47,06	52,49
Dix-Huit Montagnets	51,18	48,82	51,18	48,82
Haut Sassandra	56,58	43,42	56,58	43,42
Marahoué	55,14	44,86	55,14	44,86
N'zi Comoé	36,60	63,40	36,60	63,40
Moyen-Comoé	54,49	45,51	54,49	45,51
Moyen-Cavally	63,79	36,21	63,79	36,21
Fromager	67,16	32,84	67,16	32,84
Agnéby	84,05	15,59	84,05	15,59
Bas-Sassandra	47,32	52,68	47,32	52,68
Sud Bandama	61,72	38,28	56,04	43,96
Lagunes	51,90	48,10	51,90	48,10
Sud-Comoé	63,38	36,62	63,38	36,62

Regions that contain departments cancelled by the *Conseil Constitutionnel*   Discrepancy in results

INTERVIEW

Sophie da Camara, director of the UNOCI's DDR division in Côte d'Ivoire

Eugènia Riera

International Catalan Institute for Peace

The UN Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in April 2004 when it came to the conclusion that the country was a threat to international peace and security. Its mandate has been extended several times since that date, especially due to the political crisis that was unleashed after the presidential elections of 2010, in order to provide support for local authorities and contribute to the construction of peace. One of the pillars of the mission is the division for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants. We talked about the work it does with its director, Sophie da Camara.

What does the work of the mission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) which you direct in Côte d'Ivoire consist of?

We are in a post-crisis situation and our job is to support the Government in defining DDR policies and strategies. In terms of disarmament, we have three parallel processes. the disarmament of the armed forces and all the representatives of the republican forces (FRCI), militias and foreign groups, the decommissioning of the large stock of arms and finally, the disarmament process for civilians and local communities. In this case, we are running an awareness programme with local authorities.

And in terms of demobilization...

Here we work with various groups. First, with the fighters of the FRCI, which is a very important group because it is necessary to review the size of the army, which will be a slow and gradual process. We also work with the militias, self-defense groups and armed youth movements, as well as with foreign fighters and those on foreign territory. It is necessary to remember that there are more than ten nationalities of armed fighters in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as Ivorians in other countries, especially in Ghana and Liberia.

What form do these operations take?

So far we have concentrated on two priorities: collecting weapons, because there was a great deal of small arms circulating, particularly in Abidjan, and direct negotiation with illegal armed groups. With the agreement of the government - we take no action without government authorization - since June we have negotiated with some groups and have disarmed them with or two operations one a month throughout the country. For negotiation and disarmament, we have defined very clearly how many weapons they have and we keep a record of the combatants to make some progress and help them in the process of economic and social reintegration.

Does the division of the country affect your work?

Yes, obviously, because there are some groups that still refuse to talk to us - although the UN, as an impartial force, generates more trust - and others that are willing to negotiate but not to disarm. And there is also pressure because of the elections. The closer we get to the elections, the less trust we will have and we will see an increasing number of people getting hold of weapons just in case. The elections are a situation which everyone is viewing with a great deal of fear and mistrust. What is clear is that as we approach the elections, we will have fewer handovers of weapons.

Do you have any figures for the number of weapons collected and combatants demobilized?

We have recorded about 1,300 demobilized combatants, most of which were members of militias and paramilitary groups. In terms of weapons, there are around 2,700 collected after the conflict and 12,000 pieces of ammunition, including grenades.

The DDR programs are also linked to reform in the security sector (RSS). How far has the restructuring of the armed forces progressed?

The reform process is very slow. We are supporting the government so that it develops a national policy for defence and security and creates an institution responsible for it. This will give us a clear direction in terms of how to coordinate the military (defense and security) and civil (justice, prisons, customs, etc) areas. That could take years. In Burundi, for example, the reform of the police took 15 years. These processes arouse suspicion in the security and armed forces, and that is why they need to take place slowly and with a great deal of participation because otherwise the risk of destabilizing the country is very high.

The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire began in 2004, and aimed to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements. Since the last elections and the political crisis that resulted from it, the UNOCI has continued its work on the ground. How long do you anticipate working there?

We have a mandate from the Security Council until June 2012. Until the last day of the mission, and we do not know when

that will be, we will working on the DDR and RSS processes.

How are these programmes contributing to the construction of peace?
These programmes are one of the cornerstones for protecting the peace process. With the social cohesion work within the armed forces and the construction of civilian monitoring, we are contributing to the peace process in a very comprehensive way. With the DDR, collecting weapons is obviously not enough to guarantee peace because weapons circulate easily. In any event, it does provide an example to communities, and is a very strong message of cohesion in symbolic terms. The guarantee of peace in the DDR is the long-term reintegration of combatants into civilian life and this is not part of the UNOCI's mandate, but of all UN agencies working in this country, and especially the UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme).

What are the main threats to the consolidation of peace at present?
First, the instability in neighbouring countries. The situation is complicated in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Nigeria, and the main challenge in Côte d'Ivoire is to maintain the peace process in a regional area that is particularly difficult. The second thing is national reconciliation and the rule of law after 12 years of lack of democracy, a lack of justice and social cohesion, and the aggravation of ethnic differences in a country that never used to have ethnic problems. The challenge is to overcome the years of ex-President Gbagbo.

PLATFORM

The end of violence in the Basque Country
Brian Currin
International Human Rights Lawyer specializing in Peace Process Facilitation

ETA's historic public statement on 20 October in response to the Declaration from the International Peace Conference in Donostia – San Sebastian on 17 October, declaring a definitive cessation of its armed activity, brought to a successful end a three year conflict transformation process.

The predetermined objective of this process, which was spearheaded by the political leadership of Abertzale Left, was to achieve a paradigm shift from political violence to exclusively peaceful means as a way of expressing and achieving political objectives.

Getting to a point where an organisation, classified by its own government and by the international community as a terrorist organisation, moves unconditionally and unilaterally from violence to irreversible non violence is unique when compared with other armed political struggles.

There are many factors which contributed towards this outcome, and there equally as many perspectives. These range from the extreme opposite views of defeat and destruction of ETA by Madrid's security forces, to the strategic end of the armed phase of a struggle that has victoriously achieved its objectives. Reality, as we know, is always far more varied, complex and nuanced.

This article does not enable an extensive analysis of the many factors that contributed towards ETA's uniquely unconditional and unilateral cessation of armed struggle.

From my perspective the main factors were:

- The realization amongst Batasuna leaders that their prohibition from participation in democratic politics was undermining their political cause of self determination;
- A willingness to listen and respond to the demands from their constituency to conceptualize a new political project;
- An acceptance by Batasuna's top leadership that the only viable new political project would be legalization, and a

willingness to give robust leadership to do whatever necessary to achieve legalization;

- The deep and wide consultation undertaken by Batasuna leaders amongst their entire constituency to explain and motivate the need for a political commitment to exclusively peaceful means that would be irreversible, irrespective of how unpopular that message might be to hard line elements within their constituency;
- Batasuna leadership's ability to engage and collaborate with social and political groups in the Basque Country with which there had previously been very little trust;
- The social rejection of violence by a significant part of Basque society;
- The involvement of the international community and in particular ETA's ceasefire commitment to the signatories of the Brussels Declaration;
- And, finally the success of Bildu in the 2011 March elections.

The support for Bildu in March this year was an incontrovertible message from the pro-independence Basque society of their endorsement for democratic politics above violent political conflict. My assessment then was that ETA would absorb the message and in a relatively short time take the next inevitable step from ceasefire to irreversible cessation of violence, which would remove the final obstacle to the legalization of SORTU and pave the way for a transparent, inclusive and sustainable peace process in the Basque Country.

This is precisely where things are at the moment.

The next challenge is how to consolidate peace. To do that, it is necessary to first identify the future political and social challenges. Before attempting that, I must record that I do not claim to be an expert on Spanish and Basque socio-politics. So please accept these comments from an outsider looking in.

Broadly speaking, there appear to be three main political challenges, immediate, short to medium term and medium to long term. The declaration emerging from the International Peace Conference on 17 October recognizes these challenges.

The Spanish and the French Governments are called upon to respond positively to ETA's statement declaring a definitive end to its armed activity and to agree to talks exclusively to deal with the consequences of violence. This is a critical step in order to begin essential processes to bring closure to decades of violence. The consequences of the violence, which are many and varied, cannot simply be left to resolve themselves. They are of such a nature that cooperation between the protagonists is necessary.

ETA has ended its armed activity, but inevitably the organisation must still possess dangerous weapons and explosives. Decommissioning requires a cooperative process. What happens to ETA leaders who are on the run, who declared the end to armed activity and who will lead the decommissioning process from their side? Issues such as indemnity from prosecution and amnesty need to be discussed. There are more than 500 politically motivated prisoners dispersed in various parts of Spain and France. Their return to the Basque Country and the release of at least some categories of prisoners needs to be carefully managed. The extraordinary and stringent security laws, which are inappropriate in a normalized political environment, should be dismantled.

The short to medium term political challenge is to create an all inclusive forum for dialogue (multi party talks) between all the political parties in the Basque Country to confront the causes of the political conflict and negotiate resolutions.

The political product of these negotiations will inform the nature and extent of subsequent political engagement with the Spanish government.

Socially, it seems to me that the most pressing and daunting challenge is reconciliation. In Spain and in the Basque Country, the divisions are deep and entrenched. They did not begin with the formation of ETA in the early 1950s. In modern history they go back to the internecine Spanish civil war.

There are international models of reconciliation processes which may be instructive. But each country is unique, not only in relation to its conflict but also its national character, traditions, culture, religion etc.

Two other key social challenges to be addressed if peace and reconciliation are to be entrenched are the recognition of all the victims and social reintegration of prisoners.

In recognizing victims, processes and mechanisms should be put in place to assist victims to deal with their loss, pain and suffering, bearing in mind that the peace process itself may, paradoxically, for many victims be an aggravating factor.

The number of prisoners and the length of sentences served in a country that has experienced political violence is often disproportionate. The end of violence invariably results in greater numbers of released prisoners, many of whom are long-term. Prison conditions are often worse for prisoners associated with terrorism and rehabilitation programmes are non existent. As a result social reintegration of politically motivated prisoners is always a complex challenge. The current economic realities in Europe, particularly unemployment rates, will not make it easier.

Specialized training: a requirement for the peace and humanitarian work professional

Jordi Capdevila
Director of International Peace Resource Center, Barcelona

"There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights." Those words, spoken by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the organization's sixtieth anniversary, summarize the complexity of modern conflicts and humanitarian crises and the need for a multidisciplinary approach in order to find appropriate solutions and construct a lasting peace. In a world in which nearly half the countries that emerge from a war return to violence within five years, in which the UN has the most missions in the field in its history, and in which complex humanitarian emergencies occur one after the other, the need for qualified civilian personnel is therefore more urgent than ever.

The International Peace Resource Center (CRIPB - www.bcncentrepau.cat) in Montjuïc Castle is an initiative by Barcelona City Council to promote the training of professionals working in the field in the management of humanitarian crises and conflict resolution based on a comprehensive approach that covers both the crisis/conflict cycle and the stages prior and subsequent to it. The Centre also aims to promote various initiatives to disseminate and raise awareness of the Culture of Peace by means of exhibitions and cultural activities, such as the exhibition "Chile: Photography and Coexistence", which was inaugurated at Montjuïc Castle last October, and the photojournalism and peace workshop with the Magnum and VII Agencies.

The international training programme was created in 2009 based on the conviction that education and training are essential for people who have to meet the challenges posed by humanitarian crises and conflicts, as prior training improves the efficiency and effectiveness of actions in situations in which the response time is critical.

In fact, being able to deal quickly and effectively with complex crises and their devastating impact is the result of previous planning, which includes appropriate provisions for professionals to start work quickly, in a coordinated manner, with clearly defined objectives. However, the work has to begin before the crises occur. The large number of fragile and unstable countries with great social inequalities mean that it is increasingly necessary to promote training in new strategies to prevent conflicts and to maintain and consolidate peace in post-conflict areas or those at risk of returning to conflict.

The areas covered in the field of construction of peace and humanitarian work are both varied and complementary. They can cover areas as diverse and complex as disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, return of refugees, comprehensive reform of the State security institutions and services, constitutional reform, protection of human rights and consolidation of government institutions, as well as many other equally essential tasks.

Once the need for training has been observed, the CRIPB works with a model that is unique in Spain, which is inspired by the philosophy of crisis management and peacekeeping operations training centres around the world. As of 2011, nearly 700 professionals from over 80 different countries have participated in some of the training modules organized in Montjuïc Castle on such diverse and necessary areas as Humanitarian Negotiation, Forced Migrations, Electoral Assistance, Transitional Justice, Civil Protection, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), to name just a few of the 30 courses that have been held in Barcelona.

In order to provide a training of excellence in accordance with the situation in the field, the CRIPB has established collaboration agreements to offer courses with academic institutions and international agencies that are leaders in their respective areas and in the training of civilians in crisis situations and peace operations: European Commission - United Nations Development Programme Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Centre for International Humanitarian Cooperation (CIHC), Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) / Fire Services College UK, International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR International), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), The Hague Academy for Local Governance and the United Nations Development Program – Democratic Governance Group (DGG). Every year, new institutions and international partners join this initiative, showing their international focus and commitment.

The training modules taught are highly practical and based on experience gained in the field. The exchange of knowledge among participants, simulations and case studies are a basic part of the training, which also includes interactive teaching of the theoretical foundations.

Thanks to its partnerships with leading international agencies in their respective fields and the contributions from the participants, the CRIPB in Barcelona provides excellent training appropriate to today's changing and complex conditions on the ground, and has become an authentic international node of knowledge for professionals working in the areas of peace and humanitarian action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On violence

Hannah Arendt. *Sobre la violència*. Barcelona: ICIP - Angle Editorial, 2011.

Hannah Arendt was undoubtedly one of the most cogent and influential minds of twentieth century political thought, as well as one of the most prolific authors. May 1968 and the Cold War provided the political backdrop for an essay from a historical perspective. The text is imbued with the legacy of the wars and revolutions of the first half of the twentieth century. In this book, Arendt considers violence in a particularly turbulent situation, taking the non-violent social movements for civil rights that existed at the time she was writing the essay as her main reference for analysis.

The author reviews key concepts of political theory that were not sufficiently clear in the political thought of the 1970s: "It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does not distinguish among such keywords as *power, strength, force, authority* and finally *violence*". All these words suggest a means for men to dominate each other. The subtlety of Arendt's thought clarifies the differences between these concepts, and concludes that what makes violence distinctive is its instrumental nature. She also deals with political action, which she sees in terms of a manifestation that is inherent in the human condition. The network of human relationships requires a plural context in order to transcend and acquire theoretical substantiation.

Hannah Arendt sympathized with the nonviolent movement, and acknowledges rationality and emotional content when violence is exploited in order to achieve objectives that are often sympathetic to moderation and justice. Nevertheless, the author rejects the idea that violence in itself has the ability to create power and to establish political freedom.

M.L.A.

Women, war and peace

www.womenwarandpeace.org

Women, war and Peace is a series of five documentaries which depict the situation of women in different conflict zones in the world.

In addition to being victims of conflicts and wars, women are key figures in peace and reconciliation processes. Set in four different continents, these documentaries question the traditional view of war as a "man's thing" and they are a useful tool to illustrate how it affects women.

The first episode, *I Came to Testify*, reports the story of Bosnian women of the city of Foca at the witness stand of the International Criminal Court, where, for the first time, violation was recognized and punished as a crime against humanity. The second, *Pray the Devil Back to Hell*, narrates the fight for peace by Liberian women after 14 years of civil war. The third episode, *Peace Unveiled*, depicts how Afghan women stand up against the Taliban. The next episode, *The War We Are Living*, tells the story of afro-Colombian women who fight against terror at the Cauca region. Last, *War Redefined* offers us a global vision by means of testimonials of several experts and victims of conflicts.

The series is available on the web site, where you can also find interviews and extra material related to these conflicts, complementing the previously mentioned episodes.

M. L.

Excellent infographics on NATO attacks in Libya

http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/2011/may/23/libya-nato-bombing-no-fly-zone
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data

Now that the NATO operation in Libya has come to an end, it's time for some retrospect. How many NATO attacks took place over Libya since the start of Operation Unified Protector in April? What was hit? How many attacks has each country been involved in? Etc.

Answers to these questions are provided by The Guardian's interactive timeline, charts, and other infographics on the NATO operation that cost millions of dollars and involved nearly 13,000 personnel from 18 countries.

The datablog, which they claim to be "the most complete breakdown of the NATO operation yet published", is particularly useful because, whereas NATO does not provide details of individual member's efforts, the Guardian also incorporates data from Member State's defence ministries and news reports.

Providing a unique insight into the division of labour of this NATO operation, it shows clearly that, while the US may have dominated the operations, with more than 8,000 personnel participating in the first weeks of the operation, the weight of the conflict has fallen on the UK, Italy, France and Canada. Moreover, it shows that the Arab states involved - Jordan, Qatar and the UAE - have been reluctant to play a significant role.

Apart from the visually highly attractive infographics you can also download the full datasets. In short, definitely worth a visit!

L.v.T.

I Shall Not hate

Izzeldin Abuelaish. *I Shall Not hate. A Gaza Doctor's Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity*. New York: Walker & Company, 2011.

More than sixty years of conflict between Palestinians and Israelis have led to hatred almost inevitably permeating the relationship between the two peoples. In that part of the world, walls of segregation, homemade rockets, bombs and suicide attacks are now assumed to be natural and logical expressions of hatred.

In this context, which is certainly not optimistic for the construction of peace, it is surprising to hear voices like that of Izzeldin Abuelaish, a Palestinian doctor from Gaza who has devoted much of his life to building bridges between Palestinians and Israelis. His method is medicine, which forgets ethnic differences and promotes solidarity in its commitment to saving lives. His goal is to show that the frontiers between the two peoples are not insurmountable and that coexistence is possible.

Izzeldin's commitment to building these bridges, which led him to become the first Palestinian doctor working in a hospital in Israel, has encountered numerous obstacles along the way: endless humiliations and hold-ups at checkpoints when leaving Gaza; hostility from members of both communities; and above all, the loss of three of his daughters under Israeli fire during the bombing of Gaza in 2008.

Despite these setbacks, some of which are very dramatic, Izzeldin has decided not to hate, because he says that hatred is a chronic and destructive illness. Instead, this doctor is continuing his struggle to construct peace between Palestinians and Israelis - a peace that he sees in terms of human dignity, respect and dialogue. Listening to his story is therefore a recipe against the perpetuation of hatred and a small dose of hope in the search for peace in the region.

J. L.

Taking a stand 2

Elizabeth F. Boardman. *Prendre partit 2.* Com participar en equips de construcció de Pau. Barcelona: ICIP – Icaria, 2011.

This second volume of the book by Elizabeth F. Boardman continues with the didactic and pragmatic tone that was apparent in "*Taking a Stand Part 1 - a guide to peace teams and accompaniment projects.*" This time around, the author's analysis focuses on three peace organizations working on initiatives for the construction peace on the ground. While the first volume looks at a wide range of questions and issues that a person may consider before joining a project of this type, in the second part the author looks in detail at the distinguishing features of three of the most important organizations in this field: *Christian Peacemaker Teams, Voices in the Wilderness* and *Peace Brigades International*. In a final section, the text gives a brief overview of other organizations that also undertake this type of mission.

The book, which continues the themes set out in the ICIP's "Tools for Peace, Security and Justice" collection, is highly practical. It aims to be a useful tool and this will certainly be the case. There are at least three profiles of people for whom this book will be very useful. First, people considering the possibility of joining an accompaniment and peace-building project. Second, those interested in finding out about the distinctive features and key individuals in accompaniment organizations, i.e. those who want to find out more about the peace movement in broader terms. Finally, the book will also be useful for people who cooperate or work with peace organizations in Catalonia; they will find it very useful for finding out how other organizations deal with certain problems, how to solve them and will probably be inspired to improve their own projects. All in all, this is a very practical and useful volume written in simple and straightforward prose. It is in short a useful **tool**.

P. A.

NEWS

ICIP NEWS

Parliament receives the ICIP Peace in Progress Award

On 24 October, the International Catalan Institute for Peace awarded a extraordinary ICIP Peace in Progress Award to the Parliament of Catalonia for 'representing and symbolizing, as a prime example of the sovereignty emanating from the people of Catalonia, the continuity and legacy of the institutions, customs and practices of our ancestors, in which consensus, dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes are deeply rooted.

The award, a sculpture created by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel called *Porta del Sol*, was presented to the president of Parliament, Núria de Gispert, by the President of ICIP, Rafael Grasa. The presentation took place in the Catalan parliament during the ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of Pau Casals' speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

The ICIP Peace in Progress Award was created by the Board of Governors of the ICIP to recognize the work done by individuals or groups towards peace. As well as the special prize awarded to the Parliament, the ordinary round of the first ICIP Peace in Progress Award also began this autumn. The award will be given in early 2012.

The ICIP brings together 40 international experts at a seminar on business and conflict

The seminar "Companies in Conflict Situations", organized by the ICIP, which brought together forty international experts working from different perspectives in both academia and organizations, was held in Barcelona on 20 and 21 October. The participants included representatives of SIPRI, Amnesty International, OECD, Sherpa and Global Witness, among other organizations, and specialists in international criminal law, private military security companies, the arms trade and the exploitation of natural resources.

At the two-day conference, the experts discussed the role played by the private sector in armed and other conflict situations, such as environmental conflicts. They debated the ways for business can become involved in conflict situations, such as the air transport of conventional weapons, the private security industry or the relationship between the exploitation of natural resources and conflict. They also considered the existing codes of conduct of private security companies and the instruments of the so-called 'soft law'.

The contents of the seminar "Companies in Conflict Situations" will be published in the near future in a report by the professor and co-organizer of the conference, Maria Prandi.

New ICIP publications

This autumn, the ICIP has published two new titles in its Policy Papers collection: *Strategies to redimension the relationship between the EU and the ICC after Kampala* (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/Policypapers/2011/PP%20%20N%C3%BAm%20octubre%20angl%C3%A8s.pdf), by Claudia Jimenez Cortes, Montserrat Pi Llorens and Esther Zapater Duque, and *How to make criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission more effective?* (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/Policypapers/2011/RESPONSABILITAT%20PENAL%20-%20VERSIO%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%20-%20maquetada.pdf), by Xavier Pons Rafols. Both texts are available in Catalan, Spanish and English on the ICIP website.

We have also expanded the Working Papers collection, with three more titles: El Foro Social Mundial y los movimientos antisistémicos (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/WorkingPapers/2011/wp11_04_cas.pdf), by the economist and social movements and culture of peace researcher Jordi Calvo; Nuevas tendencias en la construcción de la paz. Otra forma de innovación social (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/WorkingPapers/2011/Arxius/wp11_02_cas.pdf), by Paul Ríos and Gorka Espiau; *Cultural Relativism in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Right Council* (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/WorkingPapers/2011/wp11_03_eng.pdf), by Roger Lloret Blackburn.

Finally, the ICIP Bibliographic Dossier Number 3 (http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Centre%20de%20documentaci%C3%B3/Dossiers%20tem%C3%A0tics/dossier_bibliografic/03%20ENG%20ICIP%20dossier%20bibliogr%C3%A0fic.pdf), a collection of articles on peace and security published recently in the journals available in the ICIP Library, has also been published. The issue includes a specific section on articles relating to the abandonment of armed struggle.

Debate on the Global Arms Trade Treaty

This November, the ICIP organized a new session in the *Analysis Tools* series on the future of Global Arms Trade Treaty with Xavier Alcalde, the ICIP specialists, and Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau. The two speakers discussed some key factors for understanding the nature of the Treaty and its scope, i.e. the types of weapons, ammunition and other equipment it would regulate, what type of activities or transfers it would affect and how it should be implemented. The signing of the Treaty is scheduled to take place in the summer of 2012 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

The end of ETA's armed struggle

After 40 years of conflict, the Basque terrorist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, has decided to put an end to its violent campaign. According to an announcement released on the 20th of October the International Peace Conference held in San Sebastian three days prior to the declaration – where, among others, the UN's former Secretary General Kofi Annan and Sinn Féin's leader Gerry Adams took part – was key in formulating the terrorists' decision. The top members of ETA, who considered the event to be of "great political importance", declared that "the recognition of Euskal Herria and the respect of the people's will have to prevail over imposition" since that "is the wish of the citizens of the Basque Country". Peace organizations such as ICIP celebrate the announcement and consider that this is a very important step on the road towards peace and reconciliation in the Basque Country.

The death of Muammar al-Gaddafi

The end of the Libyan dictatorship finally arrived on the 20th of October, 2011, when the "Brother-Leader" of the old regime, Muammar al-Gaddafi, was captured and executed by rebels loyal to the National Transicional Council (NTC) of Libya. His death brings an end to Africa's longest-standing dictatorship since 42 years ago the young general successfully led a military coup against king Idris I of Libya. The fall of his regime brings the civil war to an end, which, along with his mandate, has been immersed in controversy. In what has become the Arab's spring "hottest" conflict, al-Gaddafi witnessed his former political allies become bitter enemies who leaded the military intervention which helped bring his regime to an end. The country's uncertain future now hangs between a return to dictatorship or transition to democracy after the NTC's president, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, declared on the 23 of October that the country was at last "free" and that the new government would not contradict the *Sharia* Law.

2011 Nobel Peace Prize

The Norwegian Committee of the Nobel Institute has equally divided the prize among three women: the Liberian Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee, and the Yemenite Tawakkol Karman, for "their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full participation in peace-building work". The first laureate, Ellen Johson Sirleaf, became in 2006 the first female president in Africa; a position from which she has contributed to the country's security and economic and social development. The second laureate, Leymah Gbowee, was a key figure in the mobilization and organization of Liberian women – despite religious and ethnic differences – to bring the country's rampant conflict to an end, as well as promoting female participation in the elections. The third Nobel laureate, Tawakkol Karman, is an activist for women's rights, democracy and peace in Yemen. The recognition of her work brings the prestigious award closer to the revolts of the Arab Spring.

Brazil will investigate war-crimes committed during the military-dictatorship rule

The Brazilian Senate has given the green light to create a truth commission to investigate crimes committed in the country during the 1964-1985 military rule, which deposed then President Joao Goulart of his office. The commission will be given a two-year mandate to look into the cases presented, and defines its goal "to guarantee peoples' right to memory and truth and promote national reconciliation". However, an amnesty law of 1979 – confirmed by the Brazilian Supreme Court – prevents trials from being held. Last year, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found Brazil guilty of human rights abuses committed after the 1964 military coup. The Brazilian government officially recognizes 400 "disappearances" and deaths during the dictatorship.

New Special Rapporteur on Transitional Justice in the UN

The United Nations Human Rights Council has established a mandate for a Special Rapporteur to promote "truth, justice and reparation and to guarantee non-recurrence". The position will be oriented at informing the Council about the situation of certain countries, normative frameworks and national practices related with transitional justice which deal with massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It will also provide guidelines on assistance to affected countries. The Resolution was presented by 75 members of the Council and adopted by consensus. A candidate to fill the position will be announced soon.

First Free Elections in Tunisia

The country which ignited the Arab Spring revolts and that became the first to kick out its dictator has also become the first to hold free elections to designate a constitutional assembly. With a participation rate of 90%, the winner has been the moderate Islamist Ennahda with 41,47% of votes. The second most voted party has been the left nationalist "Congress for the Republic", followed by Ettakatol, also left-winged. The European Union has considered that the "historic" event "marks the beginning of a new era" in the country, and has emphasized the sense of "freedom" which has prevailed in the electoral process. ered that the "vent is his the moderate islamist Ennahda with 41,47% of votes.